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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem

On January 7, 1950, the People's Daily of the People's Republic of
China (PRC) reported: "Our troops on the east coast salute the New
Year. This year Taiwan will be liberated. People from all walks of life
in Taiwan are thirsting for liberation."' Six days earlier, the Central
Daily News of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in a front page
story reported: "President Chiang Kai-shek proclaims 1950 they are
to counterattack and recover the Mainland." 2 Thirty-six years later,
Taiwan is still not "liberated," nor the mainland "recovered." Politically, they are divided; geographically, separated; each government
hostile; each contending; each proclaiming its right to govern the Middle Kingdom, China; each being recognized by various countries; each
placing major emphasis on the China reunification issue: the old political philosophy of "one unified China" commemorates the only common tradition shared by the two governments.
As the propaganda organs of their respective governments, the
People's Daily and the Central Daily News have reported on the China
reunification issue for the past 36 years strictly along party lines.
The two reports have been diffuse, have portrayed images dressed
with the language of propaganda, images clothed with political cliches,
with the rhetoric of persuasion. The news of the 1950s was not impartial, the news in the 60s unrealistic; the news of the 70s focusing on
atrocities; all of the news for the past 36 years biased and subjective.
On December 15, 1978 came the abrupt announcement establishing diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States. This
news marked the beginning of a dramatic change in the reporting diplomacy concerning the China reunification issue. The approach became more subdued, showing more recognition, displaying more
acceptance toward the other side.
On December 17, 1978, the People's Daily terminology "ruling
clique" was used for the last time. The ROC leaders were now labeled
"Taiwan authorities" by the PRC; Chiang Kai-shek became "xiansheng" or "Mister," illustrating a polite alteration in language, a less
I. Jorg-M. Rudolph, Media-Coverage on Taiwan in the People's Republic of China
(Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1983) No.
3 (56), p. 58.
2. Central Daily News, January I, 1950.

(1)
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antagonistic use of vocabulary. 3
In 1979, "the Chinese Communist bandits" in the Central Daily
News became "the Chinese Communists." The People's Republic
China and titles of PRC leaders were printed in quotation marks.
Thirty years of the People's Daily's pledge to "liberate Taiwan by
all means" became the "return of Taiwan into the arms of the
motherland."
The Central Daily News' "We will counterattack and recover the
mainland" became the non-military language of "unifying China
under the Three Principles of the People."
These changes reveal a tendency toward objectiveness, a measure
of leniency toward the other side; they suggest the development of a
political atmosphere more conducive to achieving a reunification,
more open to communication between the two governments. Were
these changes superficial or substantial?
The major shift in coverage centers on the peace overtures offered
by the PRC to the ROC. The PRC government announced the first
overture five and a half years ago, the People's Daily reported. Before
that, reports had often focused on the "bloody liberation of Taiwan,"
not on a peaceful reunification. Despite the change to support of a
peaceful reunification, the PRC has refused to make a commitment of
nonviolence toward the ROC.
Before December 1978, the Central Daily News was vague about
these overtures. Now it covers them with rejection, with malice,
spurning every overture, discrediting every intention of the PRC.
These overtures, their responses, and the issues of reunification are
complex issues; they raise many questions. Are the PRC's peace proposals too unreasonable, too inconceivable for the ROC to accept? Is
the ROC too stubborn, too apprehensive to give any peace plan a
chance? Are both governments sincere enough to achieve reunification? Do these peace proposals, with their goal of reunification, represent the opinion of the majority of the Chinese people? These answers
must be found through a scientific survey of the one billion Chinese on
the mainland and on Taiwan. Obviously, such a survey would prove
difficult, indeed impossible, to conduct; therefore, a survey of media
coverage of the issue offers an alternative approach, offers insight and
understanding the potential of unification, its form and possibility.
These insights would be worthwhile not only academically but also
practically.
3. People's Daily, December 17, 1978.
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Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study is to test the relevance of a
communications approach of the integration theory of international
relations; to study the issues of China's national integration. The test
is made through a quantitative survey and a qualitative analysis of
coverage of the issue in the official party newspapers of the PRC and
the ROC. Specifically, the study uses survey and analysis to test five
assumptions of integration theory.
Assumption 1: National integration is a multidimensional
phenomenon. 4
Test 1 : The study chooses variables and selects factors computed
from the survey; they determine if China's potential reunification is
multidimensionally reported in the two newspapers.
The study adopts the model of Karl Deutsch, developed in the
mid-1960s, that used transaction flows as one set of variables to assess
the level of national integration in Europe. 5 Deutsch used variables,
which included interviews with elites, and content analysis of selected
key newspapers in France and Germany. 6
The study also adopts the approach of integration theorist Bruce
Russett. Russett used factor analysis to distinguish regional groups;
he reduced larger separate variables to smaller ones. Small groups can
be used as indicators of political integration. 7
Assumption 2: Consensus is an essential prerequisite for political
integration. Political consensus determines what functions integration
institutions should perform. 8
Test 2: The study attempts to determine if a consensus exists between the two Chinese party newspapers in their attitudes about
China's national integration.
Assumption 3: The mutual relevance and responsiveness necessary for integration are brought about by a growth in transactions between members of the two systems. Integration may be identified
from community-building efforts in the past. By measuring changes in
the intensity and scope of transactions between a given group of actors, the growth of a sense of community in a region can be
4. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), p. 424, 438 and 459.
5. Ibid., p. 454.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 446.
8. Trevor Taylor, ed., Approaches and Theory in International Relations (London and
New York: Longman, 1978), pp. 241-242.
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determined. 9
Test 3: To determine the quantity, quality and make-up of transactions between people or elites of the PRC and the ROC, the study
examines the trends that the two party newspapers have followed in
reporting about the other side and about the common issue.
Assumption 4: Outside governments and international organizations, and nongovernmental actors, act as important catalysts in integration schemes. 10
Test 4: The study aims to provide evidence that China's national
integration involves foreign factors, and is not just an internal affair as
some decision makers in the PRC, the ROC and the United States
have proclaimed. Specifically, the study examines U.S. involvement in
China's national integration, as a major foreign or external factor.
Assumption 5: The "spill-over" or "ramification" concept of integration theory claims that economic interdependence may lead eventually to political unification; hence, initial attempts to integrate along
relatively non-controversial, economic lines may eventually spill over
into attempts to integrate along more controversial political lines. 11
Test 5: The study attempts to determine the relevance of economic integration between the two ·chinas and examines the extent of
this integration. Using information from the survey, it analyzes economic developments, specifically the competition in foreign trade and
the different domestic standards of living of the PRC and the ROC.
Importance of the Study
The unification of China has been a major source of conflict between the PRC and the ROC since 1949. The shift of U.S. diplomatic
recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1979, and the 1984 agreement between the PRC and Britain regarding Hong Kong, have enhanced the importance of the issue of reunification for the two
governments. How the issue will be resolved will have a significant
effect on the peoples of each country, extending beyond these two
countries to the political climate in the world.
Analyzing how each country approaches the issue and uses its
official party press may reveal how reunification will be achieved and
how the issue will be managed.
The findings of this study demonstrate the significant trends of
each newspaper in reporting on the same issues and in reporting about
9. Ibid., p. 243.
10. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 41.

II. Ibid., pp. 418-419 and 432-433.
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the opposite side. These trend data can be important for an understanding of China's national integration.
The study may also be of value as a reference of how the two
governments have used their media, how they express their views on
national integration, why they reject views of the opposite side, how
they influence their own people, and how they maintain a propaganda
dialog with the opponent.
Writers on integration share an interest in studying communications within the units to be integrated. According to theorists Karl
Deutsch and Amitai Etzioni, people learn to consider themselves as
members of a community. This membership results from human communications patterns. In general, integration theorists hold that people adopt integrative behavior because of expectations developed
among elite groups in government and private sectors; therefore, successful integration depends upon a people's ability to "internalize" the
integrative process. 12
The news media of the PRC and the ROC give evidence of the
changing positions of PRC and ROC leaders regarding reunification.
To the extent these leaders voice the desires of the PRC and ROC
populations, the news media also give evidence of the changing positions of the respective populations.
This study may also be useful as a reference for the peoples of
these two nations, who may have difficulty finding objective analyses
of issues, views and strategies of either country on the reunification
issue.
In light of the delicate diplomatic balance that the United States
maintains between the PRC and the ROC, this study might also promote U.S. understanding of an issue that could have international
significance.
Organization of the Study
The present chapter identifies the purpose and the importance of
the study and discusses the direction of the work.
Chapter II briefly reviews the history of China's national integration, focusing on more than 50 years of fierce struggle between the
PRC Chinese Communist Party and the ROC Chinese Nationalist
Party. A summary of theories of integration and the communications
approach to national integration are also included in this chapter.
Chapter III covers the methodology of the thematic content anal12. Ibid., p. 424.
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ysis and factor analysis that were used for conducting the survey. For
the study, a scientific survey of the two party newspapers between December 1978 and May 1985 was conducted to analyze the approach of
each to China's national integration.
The criteria for selecting thematic categories for factor analyses
were based on concepts used in theories of integration and in a communications approach.
The thematic categories were used as a basis for developing hypotheses, which are also presented in this chapter. These categories
are also used to test the five hypotheses.
Chapter IV develops an analysis of the data using a computerized
quantitative research design and a qualitative research interpretation
of five factors that were found through factor analysis.
The five factors supporting the hypotheses are categorized, labeled and interpreted according to events in the PRC and the ROC
relating to reunification that occurred between December 1978 and
May 1985.
The factors reveal the policies of both parties regarding national
integration and identify the key variables in the future of the issue.
Chapter V provides conclusions and assessments and makes recommendations on how all parties can not only understand these factors but also use their understanding to determine future policies that
will shape China's national integration.
Because of the politically sensitive issues of recognition and governmental legitimacy, this study uses a neutral approach in data collection, reference selection and terminology. Politically biased terms
are avoided. "The People's Republic of China" is used instead of
"Red China" or "Communist China" and "The Republic of China"
instead of "Free China" or "Chinese Taipei."
Romanization of Chinese names and terms is determined by context. Discussions involving the People's Daily use the Pinyin system,
which is officially accepted in the PRC; discussions involving the Central Daily News use the Wade-Giles system, which is accepted in the
ROC.
An appendix of relevant historical documents, events and data
statements is added at the end of the study to assist scholars and to
assist the reader in drawing personal conclusions.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
History of China's National Integration Within the Mainland
The study of China's long history of national integration is a prerequisite to understand the issue of China's reunification.
In its more than 3,000 years of recorded history, China has gone
through many repetitive but cyclical periods of unity and disunity.
Dynasties have emerged, empires have prospered, and kingdoms have
degenerated and disintegrated; nevertheless, the Chinese nation has always survived because its people have held a unified political philosophy that there is and always has been only "one China."
Three thousand years ago, Confucius failed to unite the country's
six kingdoms. Since then, millions of Chinese have perished in battles
over unification. Some perished in defeat, others in victory. War minimizes progress, and the misadventures of that conflict presage China's
plunge into the modem world.
Division, struggle and turmoil have disrupted the history of
China in periods of unity as well as in periods of division. Of the 3, 107
years of history, 1,963, or 63.18 percent, were periods of unity; 1,144
years, or 36.82 percent, were years of division. There were, thus, 819
years more of unity than of division. 1 Moreover, during years of division, a multi-state rather than an actual unified China was often the
case, as in the East Chou period (770-249 B.C.), the Ch'un-chiu period
(722-481 B.C.), the Warring States period (403-211 B.C.), the Later
Han Dynasty (9-220 A.D.), the Three Kingdoms (220-280), the East
Tsin Dynasty (317-420), the South and North Dynasties (420-590),
the Five Dynasties (907-960), the South Sung Dynasty (1127-1279)
and the Republic (1912-1986). 2
To both ancient and modem Chinese people, the existence of
multiple, political systems has not meant the discontinuity of "one
China"; these multiple states still exist within the same cultural sphere
of the Chinese civilization.
A far more serious threat to the "Chung-Kuo" (Middle Kingdom) China has been the invasion of foreigners who might destroy
Chinese culture. Perpetuation of culture and ideological unification
have always take priority over territorial unification, the assumption
I. Dun Li, The Ageless Chinese, A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scibner's
Sons, 1965), pp. 562-568.
2. Ibid.
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being that, with a common cultural basis, a multi-system China would
sooner or later be reunified. 3
"The world of the Chinese" to the Chinese quiets itself in the
center of the universe, while the "world of the non-Chinese" prattles
in the other regions. Until Western powers reached China, Chinese
leaders considered the sphere of influence of their civilization "TienHsia" (under the sky), the entire world. 4
Nations rise and fall, people are unified and divided; the Chinese
understand this cyclical principle of history. Historically, the Chinese
demonstrate patience during division, nurturing a belief that their nation will eventually be reunited. 5
"One China" is the ideal of the oldest Chinese issue, unification;
this unification is of paramount importance in the dispute between the
contending governments of the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on
Taiwan. From an historical perspective, the present division of China
into two hostile political systems is parallel to the competition between
elite groups in the early years of China's dynastic history.
The Chinese Communists of the PRC and the Chinese Nationalists of the ROC agree wholeheartedly on the old political philosophy
of "one China," despite the more than 50 years of fierce struggle between them.
History of China's National Integration Between the Mainland and
Taiwan: Ancient Times to 1949
It is intriguing to examine the two Chinese governments from a

historical perspective. Although both Chinese states insist on the ideal
of one China, Taiwan has never been more than an outlying region of
the Chinese mainland. The term "China" (Chung-Kuo, Middle Kingdom) itself came into use before the birth of Christ. But it only referred to various states in the central Yellow River valley. ChungKuo was gradually heralded as all of mainland China; nevertheless,
Taiwan, like Outer Mongolia, was not framed within the mainland
government until the late 17th century. 6
3. Yung Wei, "The Unification and Division of Multi-System Nations: A Comparative Analysis of Basic Concepts, Issues, and Approaches," in Hungdah Chiu and Robert L.
Downen, eds., Multi-System Nations and International Law: The International Status of
Germany, Korea and China (Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc., 1981), No. 8 (45), p. 66.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ramon H. Myers, "A United States Policy," in Ramon H. Myers, ed., Two Chinese
States (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover International Studies, 1979), p. 68.
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The earliest inhabitants of Taiwan were of Malay stock, not Chinese. Third-century Chinese historical records make reference to Taiwan as "1-chou," Barbarian Island, and "Liu-chiu" (the same name
now used for Japan's Ryukyu Islands) and give no indication that Taiwan was part of China; rather, Taiwan was regarded as a tributary
state in the same category as Thailand, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam, Laos
and Korea. 7
Chinese conquest of the island has been argued. Some historians
have cited Shang-shu, a Chinese history book that was probably finished in the early third century B.C., to prove that Taiwan had been a
tributary to a Chinese state in ancient times. But this is probably more
legend than history. Other historians have said that a Chinese military expedition against 1-chou in the third century A.D., by forces of
the Wu ruler Sun Chuan (reign 222-252) and an expedition against
Liu-chiu in the seventh century by forces of Emperor Yang of the Sui
dynasty (589-618) were all in actuality against Taiwan. Therefore,
they argue, Taiwan was conquered during these early periods. 8 These,
however, were only temporary victories and did not result in Chinese
settlement of the island.
To understand that political boundaries are not part of Chinese
tradition and thought is to understand the status and potential future
of Taiwan with respect to the government on the mainland. Moreover, China has always been a land-based and land-directed society.
Until recently, the sea and coastal mountain ranges formed both natural boundaries and barriers for China. 9 The Chinese of the early empires did not view those people living on the seaward side of the
coastal slope as Chinese. The Chinese people lived along the coasts of
the Yellow and Yangtze River valleys. China's expansion was inland;
its trade routes westward, across India and Asia Minor, to Europe.
The Great Wall itself is more than a linear frontier; it is the most
important delimitation of a zonal frontier, where there are minor delimitations. What could not be included in the Empires was
excluded. 10
7. William R. Kintner and John F. Copper, A Matter of Two Chinas (Philadelphia:
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979), p. 41.
8. Yu-ming Shaw, "Modem History of Taiwan: An Interpretative Account," in
China and the Taiwan Issue, edited by Hungdah Chiu (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 8.
9. Ray E. Johnson, "Assessing the International Status of Partitioned Nations: Theories and Findings," in Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen, eds., op. cit., p. 20.
10. Owen Lattimore as cited in S. Whittimore Boggs, International Boundaries-A
Study of Boundary Functions and Problems (Morningside Heights, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1940), p. 136.
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China's organization was also unsuitable for both these regions:
neither could be conquered without drastic changes in the Chinese
way of life. Even today, Taiwan can be viewed as a frontier area that
China has never properly incorporated. 11
The government waited for several centuries before sending Chinese immigrants and a Chinese administration to Taiwan and the adjacent Peng-hu Islands (Pescadores). There is documentary evidence
indicating that by 1171 Peng-hu had become a Chinese military outpost. By 1225, it was administratively incorporated into the Chinese
Empire and placed under the jurisdiction of Tsin-kiang County of
Chuan-chou Prefecture, Fukien Province. 12
In 1517, the Portuguese discovered Taiwan and named it Formosa. China made no protest when Taiwan came under foreign control. Until the mid-1600s, there were few contacts between the
mainland and Taiwan. Taiwan and Peng-hu were under the seige of
foreign traders and adventurers as well as Chinese pirates. In 1602,
1609, 1616 and in the late 1620s, several raids by Japanese pirates or
by the Tokugawa Shogunate forces were made against Peng-hu and
Taiwan. None of these invasions, however, brought much benefit to
Japan. 13
In the late 16th century the Dutch first appeared in the Far East.
In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was established to coordinate
all Dutch colonial activities in East and Southeast Asia, including Taiwan. The first Dutch occupation of the island came in 1622. The
Ming Court agreed to let the Dutch live on Taiwan, and to set up
trading posts, even though the Ming Court kept control of Peng-hu
Islands. For 37 years (1624-1662) Taiwan remained a Dutch colony,
with temporary Spanish rule over its northern part between 1626 and
1642. 14 After the Ming dynasty rulers were conquered by the Manchu
leaders in 1661, a Chinese loyalist of the Ming Court, Gen. Cheng
Cheng-kung (Koxinga), fled to Taiwan with a small force and a
number of followers, driving the Dutch from Taiwan and formally establishing a Chinese government in exile. Although his government
never regained power on the mainland, the Chinese gained de facto
rule over Taiwan for the first time in history. During this period a
massive Chinese immigration to Taiwan occurred. 15
From 1662 to 1683, Gen. Cheng, his son and his grandson ruled
1 I. Johnson, op. cit., p. 21.
12. Shaw, op. cit., p. 8.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
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Taiwan. In 1683, Gen. Cheng's grandson surrendered Taiwan to the
Ching (Manchu) Empire (1644-1911), which administered Taiwan as
a prefecture of the mainland Fukien Province for 202 years. In 1886,
the Ching Empire made Taiwan a separate province of China. 16
The desire to bring about this political extension thus did not
come from the Chinese themselves, but from their Manchu conquerors, even though although Chinese settlers from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces had brought Taiwan well within the Chinese cultural
sphere by the late 18th century. 17
In the 1800s, the United States government asked China if Taiwan was a part of China. China replied no. Commodore Perry then
recommended that the United States establish protectorate status over
Taiwan. Because of reasons relating to domestic politics, the U.S.
president decided against this. 18
In 1874, an Okinawan ship ran aground on Taiwan, and its crew
was murdered by aborigines. Japan protested the incident in Peking,
but China disclaimed any responsibility on the grounds that the crime
had not been committed "in its jurisdiction." 19
Nine years later, Taiwan was declared a separate province; it was
yielded to Japan in 1895 by the Treaty of Simonoseki, which signified
China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), ending the
longest period of Chinese administration on Taiwan-the 212 years
between 1683 and 1895. 20
Before Japan was able to establish jurisdiction over the island, the
Chinese on Taiwan revolted, refusing to accept Japan. They declared
their independence and established the "Republic of Taiwan." The
Republican government of 1895 was dominated by the Chinese and
ignored by the rest of the world; its existence has been conveniently
long since forgotten. Nevertheless, within months, the Japanese pacified the island. For the next 50 years, Taiwan was a Japanese
colony. 21
On November 26, 1943, at the Cairo Conference, ROC President
Chiang Kai-shek, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a joint communique. The
16. Ibid., and Myers, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
17. Ibid.
18. Kintner and Copper, op. cit., p. 42.
19. E. House, "The Japanese Expedition to Formosa," cited in Lung-chu Chen and W.
M. Reisman, "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title," in Yung-hwan Jo,
ed., Taiwan's Future (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1974), p. 174.
20. Myers, op. cit., p. 69.
21. Kintner and Copper, op. cit., p. 43.
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Cairo Declaration declared that "all the territories Japan has stolen
from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores,
shall be returned to the Republic of China."
On July 26, 1945, the heads of governments of the United States,
the ROC and the United Kingdom further declared in the Potsdam
Proclamation, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried
out." This was accepted by Japan in its surrender of September 2,
1945. 22
The ROC government took over Taiwan from the Japanese on
October 26, 1945. The next day, it announced that Taiwan was a
province of China. The ROC has governed Taiwan ever since. 23
In the following four years, the mainland and Taiwan were integrated as "one China" for the second time. The first had been the
period between 1683 and 1895. This single Chinese nation, however,
was dismantled for the second time on October 1, 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party conquered the mainland and established the
PRC government. The proclamation establishing the PRC marked
the end of a 22-year civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists on the mainland. The defeated Chinese Nationalist Party
moved the ROC government from Nanking to Taipei in December
1949, 24 making the Taiwan Strait a natural boundary of disintegration
between the PRC and the ROC.
Two Chinese governments have been actively participating on the
international stage since 1949, although neither government has recognized the legitimacy of the other. Officially, both have maintained de
facto recognition by most countries of the world. In reality, there are
two Chinas. 25
History of China's National Integration Between the PRC and the
ROC, 1949-1985
The PRC and the ROC have existed as independent political entities with separate international personalities for 36 years; however,
both have continued to engage in the struggle for national integration.
Though not primarily a military struggle, the problem has had a military aspect, although it has largely been waged with political, diplomatic and economic weapons.
22. Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in China
and the Taiwan Issue, edited by Hungdah Chiu, (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 148.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Myers, op. cit., p. 69.
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The PRC has sought to undermine the ROC's international status, sought to influence the rest of the world to view Taiwan as a legal
part of the PRC, and sought to convince the people of Taiwan that
they cannot avoid ultimately accepting the sovereignty of the PRC
over the island. Throughout this struggle, the governments in Peking
and Taipei have maintained that China is one nation and that Taiwan
is a province of China; furthermore, the peoples of both nations have
been denied the right of self-determination in deciding their international status.
The nations of the world thus have not been asked to recognize
Taiwan as an independent state, a state separate from China, but have
been forced into a position of officially recognizing one or the other.
The inability of the ROC to extend its governmental authority beyond
Taiwan and its associated islands has made it difficult for most nations
to refuse indefinitely to recognize the government in Peking as the legitimate government of China. Most nations realize that the Peking
government has governed the vast majority of the Chinese people for
more than 30 years. 26

1.

The Struggle for International Position

During the first 20 years after 1949, the rivalry between the PRC
and the ROC centered on membership in the United Nations. The
China seat, first occupied by the ROC and later claimed by the PRC,
was the symbol of legitimacy determined by the international community. Many nations, as well as international organizations, tended to
follow the lead of the United Nations in their own policies toward the
two claimants.
The ROC was a charter member of the United Nations, and one
of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In January
1950, three months after the founding of the PRC, the PRC's premier
and foreign minister, Chou En-lai, cabled U.N. Secretary General
Trygve Lie demanding that the ROC be ousted from the United Nations and that the PRC seated in its place. When a Soviet-sponsored
resolution supporting the PRC was voted down, the Soviets walked
out of the Security Council. They vowed neither to return nor to accept any Security Council decision as long as the ROC representative
remained. In August, the PRC again cabled the United Nations,
charging that President Harry S. Truman's positioning of the U.S.
Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland at the outbreak of the
26. Ralph N. Clough, "Taiwan's International Status," in Hungdah Chiu and Robert
Downen, eds., op. cit., p. 141.
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Korean war was an act of armed aggression against the PRC. 27
In November 1950, Gen. Wu Hsiuchuan, presenting the PRC
case before the Security Council, argued that the island of Taiwan was
an integral part of China, supported by the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, which had been returned to the Chinese government in 1945
after the Japanese surrender. Consequently, Gen. Wu said the intervention by the Seventh Fleet to prevent the "liberation" of the island
by the PRC was "open and direct aggression against Chinese territory," calling on the Security Council to condemn the United States
for the act, demanding the complete withdrawal of its armed forces
from Taiwan. A resolution presented by the Soviet representative was
voted down. By this time, large-scale PRC forces had intervened in
Korea, and the Soviet Union had vetoed a six-power resolution calling
for the withdrawal of these forces. 28
By 1951, the United States was able to get a resolution passed in
the General Assembly condemning the PRC as an aggressor for having attacked U.N. forces defending South Korea.2 9
Thus, the PRC's early efforts to replace the ROC in the United
Nations, and efforts to force the United States to abandon Taiwan,
failed. President Truman's reversal of a U.S. hands-off policy toward
Taiwan made a successful PRC invasion impossible. The PRC's intervention in Korea, where a U.N. force representing 16 nations was resisting North Korea, placed a large stumbling block in the way of the
PRC's early acceptance. 30 Because the Korean War set in motion programs of U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan, relations steadily
grew closer, culminating in the signing of a mutual defense treaty in
December 1954. The PRC denounced the treaty as an attempt by the
United States to legitimize its occupation of Taiwan. When the PRC
launched a successful assault on the minor offshore island of Tachen in
January 1955, the United States came to the ROC's assistance. Subsequently, a congressional resolution was passed authorizing the president to deploy U.S. forces to offshore islands if necessary to ensure the
defense of Taiwan. This sent a sharp warning to the PRC. 31
Recognizing that it lacked the military force with which to challenge the United States, the PRC shifted to a conciliatory policy in
27. Ralph N. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," in
Hungdah Chiu and Shao-chuan Leng, eds., China: Seventy Years After the 1911 Hsin-Hai
Revolution (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1984), pp. 525·526.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., p. 527.
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1955. At the conference of nonaligned nations in Bandung, Indonesia
in April 1955, Premier Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people
did not want war with the United States; he offered to negotiate on the
question of relaxing tensions in the Taiwan area. 32
As a result, talks between ambassadors from the United States
and the PRC with some European countries opened in Geneva in August 1955. The two sides did reach an agreement on the repatriation
of citizens of the countries, but no progress was made on the Taiwan
issue. 33
The United States suggested that the PRC renounce the use of
force against Taiwan. The PRC maintained that the "liberation" of
Taiwan was a domestic issue. The PRC attempted to resolve the issue
peacefully, but reserved the "sovereign right" to use force if necessary
on Chinese territory. According to the PRC, the only issue between
the United States and the PRC concerning Taiwan was the "occupation" of Taiwan by U.S. forces. This international issue, it said,
should not be confused with the domestic question of asserting PRC
control over Taiwan. 34
The United States made it clear that negotiations with the PRC
did not constitute diplomatic recognition. It continued to regard the
ROC as the legitimate government of China, and it continued to allocate large amounts of U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan. Still,
the ROC authorities expressed concern at U.S. willingness to negotiate
with the PRC, and they continued to assert their determination to recover the mainland. 35
Disappointed that the Geneva talks had failed to produce results
either in gaining diplomatic recognition from the United States or in
weakening Washington's links with Taipei, the PRC changed its tactics again in 1958. In his famous Moscow statement of 1957 that "the
East wind was prevailing over the West wind," Chairman Mao Tsetung declared his belief that the alignment of forces in the world was
shifting against the United States. 36
Mao went further in testing the U.S. commitment to the defense
of Taiwan, deploying a massive bombing of the ROC's principal offshore island, Quemoy. There were serious doubts among the American people and U.S. allies regarding the wisdom of risking war over
the offshore islands. Nonetheless, the U.S. government moved large
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 527-528.
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forces into the area and firmly supported the ROC's efforts to break a
blockade of the island. 37
Ambassadorial talks resumed in Warsaw, providing a channel of
communication during the heat of the crisis. The deadlock between
Washington and Peking concerning the Taiwan issue remained unbroken; although a direct clash between U.S. and PRC forces was
avoided, Quemoy remained in the hands of the ROC. The PRC soon
reduced its bombardment to a token shelling on odd days to demonstrate its rejection of the cease-fire sought by the United States. 38
The military clash over Quemoy strained the relations of the two
Chinese governments with their big-power supporters. Neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union wished to be drawn into a military
confrontation. Opinions around the world strongly favored a withdrawal of ROC forces from the offshore islands. 39
Both the PRC and the ROC, however, viewed these islands as a
lasting link between Taiwan and the mainland, a symbol of their intentions to reunite China on their own terms. The longer the United
States suggested that the ROC reduce its forces, the more the ROC
resisted. PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi told foreign diplomats in Peking that the PRC's policy was "Liberation" of the offshore islands
and Taiwan together. The PRC, however, never again resorted to military action to sever the offshore islands from Taiwan. 40
Neither the use of military force nor bilateral negotiations had
caused the United States to withdraw its support from Taiwan. With
its control over the Chinese mainland and the vast majority of Chinese
people secured, the PRC gained confidence. The United States found
it increasingly difficult to mobilize majority support in the United Nations for an annual resolution "not to consider" the Chinese representation issue. Memories of the Korean War faded, the United Nations
admitted many new members, and many nations considered the
ROC's claim to represent the Chinese people to be unrealistic. Consequently, from 1961 the United States and its allies adopted a different
approach, defeating resolutions to seat the PRC by mobilizing majority support for a resolution, which required a two-thirds majority vote.
By 1971, however, even this tactic had worn thin; it became increasingly difficult to persuade member nations to exclude the PRC. In
1971, for the first time in 20 years, the U.S. Congress did not pass a
37. Ibid., p. 528.
38. Ibid.
39. Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1978), p. 21.
40. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," op. cit., p. 528.
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resolution opposing the seating of the PRC in the United Nations.
American opinion favored the PRC admittance, provided a place be
made for the ROC also; however, the PRC repeated that it would not
enter the United Nations as long as the ROC remained there. 41
President Richard M. Nixon's announcement of his upcoming
visit to Peking in July 1971 came as a surprise. He announced that he
would seek to normalize relations between the PRC and the United
States, signalling a radical change in U.S. policy. This change broke
down barriers which kept the PRC out of the United Nations: by
October 1971, the PRC was voted in and the ROC expelled. 42 Their
expulsion from the United Nations started a multi-national shift of
diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking, further fueled by President
Nixon's trip to the PRC in February 1972 and the Shanghai
Communique. 43
Even though the language of the Shanghai Communique was
carefully drawn, the United States did not accept the PRC's view that
Taiwan was a part of the PRC; however, the United States did accept
the views held on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that Taiwan was a
part of China, virtually ruling out U.S. support for an independent
Taiwan. Moreover, the United States declared that the Taiwan issue
should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves by announcing the U.S. intention eventually to withdraw all forces and military
installations from Taiwan. 44
The communique and other aspects of Nixon trip to the PRC
were widely interpreted as the beginning of a U.S. disengagement from
Taiwan; this influence spread quickly to other countries. The number
of countries maintaining relations with the PRC and the ROC had
been about equal in 1971. By February 1973 countries recognizing the
PRC rose to 85, while those recognizing the ROC fell to 39. By 1985,
159 nations had diplomatic relations with the PRC and only 22 with
the ROC. 45
The PRC began to take advantage of its new position, replacing
the ROC in the organs of the United Nations. The PRC replaced the
ROC in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic
and Social Council, and many affiliates such as UNESCO, WHO, the
Food and Agriculture Organization, the Intergovernmental Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Consultative Or41. Ibid., pp. 528-529.
42. Ibid., p. 529.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," op. cit., p. 179.
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ganization. The PRC also forced the ROC out of a large number of
intergovernmental financial organizations. In 1980, after changes in
foreign economic policy brought about by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC
applied to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
The ROC was forced to withdraw. In 1986 PRC was admitted to the
Asian Development Bank, of which the ROC has long been a member
with U.S. support. 46
Demanding the expulsion of private organizations in Taiwan
from international bodies, the PRC concentrated on the 300 or more
international nongovernmental organizations affiliated with
UNESCO. At the 18th general conference of UNESCO in Paris in
1974, the PRC succeeded in passing a resolution urging all these organizations to exclude the ROC and to break off all relations with "bodies or elements linked with Chiang Kai-shek." Some organizations
complied; others refused. Peking wanted similar resolutions passed at
the following biennial UNESCO conferences. The resolution of the
21st session at Belgrade in 1980 "noted with concern that certain international nongovernmental organizations maintaining relations with
UNESCO retain among their members bodies or persons linked with
the Taiwan authorities, purporting to represent China and conducting
activities in that capacity." The resolution requested all the organizations "take immediate steps to debar bodies or persons linked with the
Taiwan authorities from membership and from carrying out activities
either in the name of the 'Republic of China' or China in the name of
Taiwan as a region distinct from China." 47
The International Council of Science Unions has resisted PRC
pressure to expel Taiwan on the grounds that science is a nonpolitical
activity and that any legitimate scientific organization should be entitled to belong regardless of nationality. In May 1980 the ICSU
adopted a resolution agreeing to accept separate organizations from
Taiwan and the PRC as full members representing Chinese scientists.
But the PRC declined to participate in a September 1980 meeting because it could not regard Taiwan as a full voting member of the
organization. 48
The PRC also has worked hard to squeeze Taiwan out of international sports. The hardest-fought and lengthiest battle was the
Olympic Games. Until the summer of 1976, teams from Taiwan competed and PRC teams did not. At the Olympic Games in Montreal in
46.
47.
48.

Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," op. cit., p. 530.
UNESCO, Conference Document 21 C/PRG, V/DR. I, September 1980.
Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," op. cit., p. 530.
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1976, however, the Canadian government ruled that Taiwan could not
compete under the name Republic of China. Therefore, the ROC withdrew. The struggle continued within the International Olympic Committee, which recognized Taiwan, not the PRC. In November 1979,
after a postal ballot of all members, the IOC announced its decision to
recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee in Peking as the national
committee of China. Taiwan would be allowed to compete under the
name "Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee" and must use a flag and
anthem other than those of the ROC. After an unsuccessful attempt
to fight the IOC decision, the Olympic committee in Taiwan agreed in
March 1981 to accept its new status. Both the PRC and the ROC
competed in the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. 49

2.

The Unfinished Civil War and Propaganda Battles

In addition to undercutting the ROC's international status, the
PRC has taken a variety of other measures to gain final victory in the
unfinished civil war and to achieve China's national integration.
To keep alive its hope of recovering the mainland, up to 1969, the
ROC launched occasional small-scale reconnaissance teams against
the mainland. It also sent high-flying aircraft to gather intelligence. It
maintained regular air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait. 50
In early 1962, Chiang Kai-shek readied his forces to take advantage of possible revolt on the mainland triggered by several successive
years of severe economic hardship. In response, the PRC reinforced
its troops in Fukien. But no rebellion occurred. The United States
informed the PRC that it had no intention of backing an ROC attempt
to invade the mainland. The crisis subsided. 51
In recent years, military operations have taken on a routine quality, the PRC not challenging sea and air domination of the Taiwan
Strait by the ROC navy and air force, the ROC not taking any actions
against the mainland. A tacit understanding has developed as to the
boundaries for normal sea and air operations by each side. Neither
encroaches upon the other. In the early 1960s, the odd-day shelling of
Quemoy and Matsu took the form of shells containing propaganda
leaflets rather than high explosives. Even the propaganda shelling was
halted after the United States established diplomatic relations with the
PRC on January 1, 1979. 52
49.
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Except for the short-lived use of large-scale military forces
against the offshore islands in 1958, the civil war has been conducted
primarily by political rather than military means. At the National
People's Congress of 1956, PRC Premier Chou En-lai outlined a policy toward Taiwan. Chou pledged that "the Chinese people would
seek to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible ... the
possibility of peaceful liberation is increasing." 53
Chou declared that the PRC was willing to negotiate with the
ROC on specific steps and terms for a peaceful "liberation." He urged
that representatives be sent to Peking to negotiate, assuring the Nationalist military and political personnel on Taiwan that they would
not be punished for past deeds. On the contrary, Chou said, if they
worked for a peaceful "liberation," they would be rewarded by participating in the socialist development of the motherland. He invited
them to visit the mainland to see for themselves conditions there. He
guaranteed their safe entry and departure. 54
The PRC followed up its declaration on peaceful "liberation"
with propaganda broadcasts to Taiwan, encouraging appeals from
friends and relatives on the mainland to prominent individuals on Taiwan. Peking's appeals, which stressed the love for the mainland,
urged the leaders of the ROC not to allow themselves to be controlled
by the United States. 55
ROC President Chiang Kai-shek flatly rejected the proposals for
negotiation, declaring that there was "absolutely no possibility of any
compromise" with Peking. "The ROC government has already had
too many painful experiences in negotiating with the Chinese
Communists. " 56
Throughout the 1960s, the PRC and the ROC fought a propaganda war, filling the airwaves with denunciations of each other.
When monsoon winds blew toward the mainland, ROC psychological
warfare units sent balloons carrying messages and gifts of food; however, there is little evidence that the population on either side was significantly impressed. 57
After President Nixon's shift in policy toward the PRC in 1971,
the Peking authorities redoubled their efforts to convince the people of
53. Ibid., p. 533.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Hungdah Chiu, "China, the United States, and the Question of Taiwan," in
Hungdah Chiu, ed., China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis (New
York: Praeger, 1973), p. 275.
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Taiwan that they could not depend on the United States and that "liberation" was inevitable. Instead of directing their appeals exclusively
to the mainlander-Chinese ruling group on Taiwan as they had in the
past, they began to cultivate the Taiwanese-Chinese. The PRC recognized that family and other personal ties with the mainland were eroding with the passage of time, and recognized that the political
influence of the Taiwanese-Chinese was growing. The Taiwanese-Chinese made up 85 percent of the population and owned most of the
farmland, commercial and industrial enterprises in Taiwan. Assuming
that the Taiwanese-Chinese would gain control of decision making at
the national level, the PRC needed to ensure that the Taiwanese-Chinese as well as the mainlander-Chinese on Taiwan would continue to
adhere to the one-China concept. 58
The PRC cultivation of the Taiwanese-Chinese took a variety of
forms. The Taiwan Self-Government League, the chief political organ
for promoting the "liberation" of Taiwan, assumed a more prominent
role. The PRC even softened its hostility toward the Taiwan Independence Movement, which it had previously labeled as a tool of the
United States. It continued to oppose their advocacy of Taiwan's independence, but supported their attacks on the ROC. 59
High officials, including Premier Chou En-lai, met with visitors
from abroad, including some of Taiwan origin, to subdue fears of what
might happen to Taiwan after liberation. In a lengthy conversation
with overseas Chinese from North America in August 1972, Chou
stressed the complexity of the Taiwan problem. He asked for patience
and the avoidance of a military solution, denying that the integration
of Taiwan into the PRC would lower living standards there. Shanghai, he pointed out, had continued to enjoy a living standard higher
than the rest of the mainland after its "liberation." Chou emphasized
the important role that the Taiwanese-Chinese would play in the
peaceful "liberation" of Taiwan. 60
In a similar conversation with a group of overseas Chinese in October 1974, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping warned that although
priority was being given to a peaceful "liberation," non-peaceful
means could not be ruled out if Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang
Ching-kuo continued to reject negotiations. He expressed the hope
that "patriotic" forces could gradually develop in Taiwan that could
58. Ibid., pp. 534-535.
59. Ibid.
60. Joseph J. Lee, "Peking's View of Taiwan: An Interview with Chou En-Iai," in
Yung-hwan Jo, ed., Taiwan's Future (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1974), pp. 6570.
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play a part in either a peaceful or non-peaceful solution. 61
The ruling Nationalist Party in Taiwan was not persuaded. It repeatedly rejected any form of negotiations with the Communist Party
in Peking. 62
The heaviest blow to the people of the ROC was still to come. On
January 1, 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with
the ROC to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China,
notifying the ROC that it was terminating the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty at the end of 1979. These actions, long sought by the
PRC, appeared to remove the principal obstacles to the incorporation
of Taiwan into the PRC; nevertheless, the ROC held out firmly
against submitting to the PRC's control. 63
The PRC was not in a position to force submission because it
lacked the military capability to succeed in a naval attack across the
Taiwan Strait. To build such a force would require large resources,
which were urgently needed for modernizing the country. The Taiwan Relations Act passed the U.S. Congress and became effective on
April10, 1979. The statute is central to the future of the United States
relationship with Taiwan, 64 emphasizing that the United States would
be gravely concerned by any attempt to subdue Taiwan by force.
Meanwhile, the United States continued to supply substantial amounts
of weapons to Taiwan. The use of force against Taiwan thus could
shatter potential PRC relations with the United States as well as with
Japan. The PRC has relied heavily on both the United States and
Japan for modernization and for political support against the Soviet
Union. 65
The PRC thus adopted a conciliatory policy toward the ROC following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United
States. On January 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress issued "A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,"
which halted the odd-day propaganda shelling to the offshore islands
of Quemoy and Matsu, and called for peace talks between the PRC
and the ROC, attempting to end the military confrontation along the
Taiwan Strait. This statement assured that reunification would "not
cause the people of Taiwan any losses," and called for the establishment of "Three Links"-postal, transportation services and trade61. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: People's Republic of China
(hereafter cited as FBIS), Dec. 10, 1974, pp. ES-6.
62. Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," op. cit., p. 536.
63. Ibid.
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between the mainland and Taiwan. 66
In early January 1979, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping told a group
of visiting U.S. senators that an integrated Taiwan would be allowed
to maintain its own political and economic systems, and even its
armed forces. It would, however, have to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over the island and take down the ROC flag. Deng said that
force would be used against Taiwan only if the Soviet Union interfered
there or if the ROC refused indefinitely to negotiate. 67
The PRC has continued to maintain this basic position. Their media has issued a steady stream of articles and statements encouraging
unification sentiment among the people of Taiwan and describing the
growing indirect trade between the mainland and Taiwan through
Hong Kong. The PRC media play up the popularity of Taiwan-made
TV sets, tape recorders and electric fans among the people of mainland
China; they report cordial conversations between scientists, writers
and university professors from Taiwan and the mainland meeting
abroad; and they publicize the special treatment given in the PRC to
athletes of Taiwan origin from Japan and the United States. Mainland
television broadcast a documentary on life in Taiwan. According to
Radio Beijing, special reception centers have been established in mainland ports for fishermen from Taiwan who seek shelter from typhoon
or need vessel repair. The PRC media continually urged personal contact between people from Taiwan and the mainland. 68
The ROC has regarded the PRC's conciliatory attitude as a
"united front tactic" aimed at undermining resistance on Taiwan,
making it vulnerable to a takeover by the PRC. The ROC has continued to flatly reject PRC proposals to negotiate, to open direct trade, or
to establish postal, shipping or airline connections. The manifesto of
the Twelfth National Congress of the Nationalist Party in MarchApril 1981 reiterated the party's unyielding anti-Communist position
by declaring its determination to unify China under Sun Yat-sen's
Three Principles of the People. The manifesto said: "We know that to
talk peace with the enemy amounts to inviting our own collapse and
that to compromise with the enemy is the same as destroying ourselves."69 By 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act, continued sales of U.S.
defense equipment to the ROC, and the election of Ronald Reagan as
president of the United States had combined to frustrate any hopes for
concession by the ROC. Two years after the ROC was diplomatically
66.
67.
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69.
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isolated from the United States, there was still no change m its
attitude. 70
The PRC leadership decided that it needed a dramatic new initiative. This took the form of the "Nine-Point Peace Proposal" of September 30, 1981, which was presented by Marshall Ye Jiangying, the
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. While much of its content repeated earlier public proposals
made to Taiwan, the document emphasized the theme seeking to restore attention to the integration issue. The major points were: Peace
talks between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party
could be held on a "reciprocal basis" after an initial "exhaustive exchange of views" by party representatives; the Taiwan province could
become a "special administrative region" of the PRC with "a high
degree of autonomy"; the central PRC government would "not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan"; Taipei authorities would be welcome to "take up posts of leadership ... and participate in running the
(unified) state"; and both the "freedom of entry and exit" and commercial investments and profits could be "guaranteed" for people of
Taiwan. The PRC also offered to "subsidize" Taiwan's budget whenever its "local finance was in difficulty." 71
Y e's 1981 peace proposal also included a personal appeal to the
Nationalist Party:
We hope that the Nationalist authorities will stick to their
one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas"
and that they will put national interests above everything
else, forget previous ill-will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the
great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to
win glory for our ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and
write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese
nation. 72
The ROC issued a swift and specific response to the proposal.
President Chiang Ching-kuo suggested that the proposal was "primarily intended to stop U.S. arms sales to our country." From an historical perspective, he added, "The Chinese Communists consistently
follow the strategy of seeking their goals through peace talks when
70. Robert L. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait (Washington, D.C.: The Council
for Social and Economic Studies, 1984), pp. 42-43.
71. People's Daily, October I, 1981.
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these cannot be attained by military means.'m And Premier Sun Yunsuan on June 10, 1982, observed that all of the PRC's offers contained
two pre-conditions or assumptions: that the ROC would become a
"provincial government" under PRC jurisdiction and that forceful invasion of the island could not be ruled out if preliminary peace talks
should fail. "If the political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the Chinese mainland and free China continue to narrow, the
conditions for peaceful reunification can gradually mature," Sun said.
"The obstacles to reunification will be reduced naturally with the passage of time. " 74
While publicly supporting the PRC's approach, the United States
declined to become involved in the Chinese integration issue. The
U.S. Department of State responded in support of Sun's statement:
We are very interested in the import of [Sun's] speech, which
appears to be consistent with the concept of peaceful settlement of the [Communist-Nationalist] differences .... We welcome any moves in this direction. We reiterate, however, our
firm policy that the resolution of those differences is a matter for the Chinese people themselves, and our only interest
is that any resolution be peaceful. We do not see a role for
the United States in promoting or arranging such a
settlement. 75
On July 25, 1982, the People's Daily reported that Liao Chengzhi,
the PRC official in charge of Taiwan relations, sent a letter to his former friend and schoolmate, ROC President Chiang. Liao offered to
come to Taiwan to discuss reunification. On August 17, 1982, Soong
Mei-ling, widow of the late ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, replied
to Liao in a public letter on behalf of President Chiang, rejecting
reunification talks.
On the same day, the United States and the PRC announced their
joint communique to limit U.S. arms sales to the ROC, to ultimately
phase them out altogether. Also on the same day, the ROC publicized
U.S. assurances not to play a mediation role, nor to exert pressure on
the ROC to enter into negotiations with the PRC. The PRC reiterated
its "fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification"; and the
United States announced that it understood and appreciated this
policy. 76
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Renewing its military threat against the ROC, the PRC also
hardened its terms for unification. On the date of the communique,
Chai Zemin, the PRC Ambassador to the United States, said in a
television interview with CBS, "We [will not] make any commitment
to any country on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. We
consider the Taiwan problem to be China's internal affair. It is up to
us to decide how to solve this problem." 77
On October 27, 1982, the PRC tested its submarine-based rockets
in the sea area north of Taiwan. Presumably it wanted to show off its
military might. On December 28, 1982, the PRC denied that the test
was intended as a threat; nevertheless, the threat of using force against
the ROC on Taiwan had already reached the people of Taiwan. 78
The PRC terms for unification were hardened by its adoption of
Article 31 of its constitution on December 4, 1982. The preamble
states, "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic
of China. To accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland
is a lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots
in Taiwan." Unspecified is the time or manner of achieving this goal,
but Article 31 declares, "The state may, when necessary, establish special administrative regions. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law by the National
People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions." 79
This new article, absent from previous constitutions, differentiates
"administrative" from "autonomous" regions, which are defined in
Article 30 as comprising "nationality areas. " 80
The terminology "special administrative region" of Article 31 is
identical with the nine-point peace proposal, which offers Taiwan "a
high degree of autonomy." This suggests that the provision was deliberately designed to cover Taiwan, and possibly Hong Kong and Macao as well.s'
On December 17, 1982, ROC President Chiang rejected the
PRC's offer of a "special administrative region" for Taiwan because he
saw a lesson in what had happened to Tibet, which was taken by PRC
force in 1959. 82
In January 1983, the PRC demanded the ROC's expulsion from
the Asian Development Bank. In May 1983, Liao Chengzhi of the
77. People's Daily, August 26, 1982.
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80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Central Daily News, December 18, 1982.

CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE

27

PRC said that Taiwan could continue to buy U.S. weapons and participate in the bank after unification with the PRC. 83
On July 26, 1983, PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, in an interview
with Taiwan-raised professor Winston Yang of Seton Hall University,
said that Taiwan would not have "complete autonomy" after unification, but would enjoy the "right to follow internal policy." 84 Deng
offered a number of new proposals to open a dialogue with the ROC
government on reunification. "[The PRC] will not send troops or officials to Taiwan to take over, to manage, to supervise or to interfere
with Taiwan's internal affairs," Deng announced. "Taiwan will retain
its own armed forces and also the right to acquire weapons to maintain
defense capabilities, and Taiwan may use its own flag and use the
name 'China, Taiwan.' " 85
Until now, the PRC had insisted that reunification would require
the ROC to fly the PRC flag and would require a name change from
ROC to "Taiwan, People's Republic of China." Deng said the plan
would "essentially maintain the status quo and only give the appearance of reunification." 86
The ROC rejected the proposal as a trick to open the way for
communist control. The ROC would only consider reunifying if the
PRC abandoned communism to embrace the ROC's political ideology,
the Three Principles of the People. 87
Deng, the PRC's foremost political figure, responded, "We mean
what we say. We play no tricks." Calling the ROC's demands "unrealistic," Deng offered the plan for turning the island into a special
administrative region with "exclusive rights" to administer its legislative, judicial and military systems without interference from the PRC
government. 88
Deng said that the ROC on Taiwan could retain its independence, and a system different from that of the mainland. "It may exercise independent jurisdiction, and the right of final judgment need not
reside in Peking. Peaceful reunification does not mean the mainland
swallowing up Taiwan, of course, nor vice versa." 89
Although he offered the most far-reaching assurance to the ROC
on Taiwan, promising a free hand in running the island, Deng empha83. Downen, op. cit., p. 100.
84. The Washington Post, July 30, 1983.
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sized that any autonomy would be limited and conditional. "Complete
autonomy is simply out of the question," Deng said, "Complete autonomy means 'Two Chinas,' not 'One China.' " 90
Though all of the PRC's peace proposals have been rejected by
the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has not given up its strategies or goals
for eventual integration. Furthermore, the PRC has tried to involve
the United States in China's integration, although it has often claimed
it to be an internal affair.
On January 1, 1984, Deng Yingchao, the widow of former PRC
Premier Chou En-lai, said at a New Year's Day party that "foreign
interference in China's internal affairs would not end" until reunification takes place. At the same time, she also denounced the Taiwanese
Independence Movement. 91
In January 1984, during a visit to the United States, PRC Premier
Zhao Ziyang said, "The Taiwan issue is the major difference between
China and the United States.'' He declared that reunification of China
is one of "two great historical tasks" facing the current generation. 92
The United States, however, still retains its policy of non-involvement.
Returning to attempts to directly persuade the ROC, Deng
Yingchao of the PRC, on January 16, 1984, in a speech at the 60th
anniversary commemoration of the First National Congress of the Nationalist Party, issued a "third united front" for peace talks. 93 In another public letter on February 17, 1984, Soong Mei-ling, Chiang Kaishek's widow, rejected the proposal. 94
On February 22, 1984, Deng Xiaoping, in a meeting with former
White House national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, said that
following unification Taiwan would be allowed to continue to practice
capitalism under a "One Nation, Two Systems" model. The concept
suggested that the PRC was softening its position, nevertheless, the
ROC still rejected the new integration model publicized as "One Nation, Two Systems. " 95
Whether there be any integration model or satisfactory solution
for both the PRC and the ROC remains unanswered. But it is still
possible that both governments could agree on the formation of one
China of which Taiwan is a part and that mutual understanding could
avoid renewed warfare.
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Despite firm opposition by the ROC to open and direct links with
the PRC, the ROC has tolerated growing indirect trade, mostly
through Hong Kong, which exceeded $500 million in 1984, and had
already reached this amount in the first half of 1985. 96
In an interview with PRC journalists before Zhao's visit to Washington in January 1984, President Reagan reiterated the U.S. position
of remaining uninvolved: "We are not going to turn our backs on old
friends in order to strengthen or make new friends. . . .The problem
between the People's Republic and the people on Taiwan is one for the
Chinese to settle between themselves. We will do nothing to
intervene. . . ." 97
However, the United States has continued to be the principal target of PRC and ROC foreign policy. The rivalry has intensified since
the beginning of the Reagan administration. Encouraged by President
Reagan's campaign statements, the ROC has argued for a greater degree of "officiality" in relations with the United States and has sought
more advanced arms for its defense. The PRC has repeated its view
that the Taiwan Relations Act conflicts with the joint communique on
establishment of relations and has reminded Americans that it never
agreed to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Reagan administration has
responded cautiously. It has sought to develop further relations with
the PRC, which it regards as important for geopolitical reasons. At
the same time, it has adopted a more cordial style than the Carter
administration in its unofficial relations with the ROC. 98 Nevertheless, the United States has retained its policy of allowing the PRC and
the ROC to solve the integration problem between themselves.
The Theoretical Framework of A Communications Approach to
National Integration
As with many contemporary theories of international relations,
integration theory is a relatively new and more precise way of looking
at an old problem. The problem considers the merger of two or more
states to form a new, larger state, a phenomenon that has long been of
interest not only to students but also to those more directly involved in
world politics. 99
Integration theory is full of controversies. Integration involves
the merger of all institutions, separate communities, usually within a
96.
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specific geographic area, into a larger unit. Different institutions play
different roles, however; elite and popular attitudes differ, and as do
economic, political and social transactions. Does integration occurs
passively and mutually? Or is it brought about by the conscious intervention and manipulation of an integrating elite? 100 Furthermore,
there is even little agreement as to how integration itself should be
defined. Some say it is a process; others a condition. With controversial implications of integration, can states become integrated without
losing their individual identities? 101
Transactionalists and neofunctionalists take contrasting views to
integration theory. The transactionalists emphasize transactions between people. Transactions indicate attitudes toward others as a reflection of their interdependence. The transactionalists concentrate on
the volume and rate of these transactions. They monitor changes in
public opinion. 102
The neofunctionalists stress how supranational institutions
emerge as various self-interest groups merge to be integrated. 103
Although the two approaches differ in style and emphasis, they
do share some common broad elements to be used as the basic theoretical framework of this study.

1.

Integration is a multidimensional phenomenon

Many integration scholars note the importance of a theory based
on a recognition of integration as a multidimensional phenomenon. 104
These scholars develop theories and establish links among that encompass the major dimensions. Leon Linberg identifies these dimensions
as the "multiple properties of collective decision-making systems" and
defines integration as an "interactive multidimensional process" that
must be identified, compared, measured and analyzed. 105
According to Philippe C. Schmitter, "Understanding and explanation in this field are best served not by the dominance of a single
accepted grand model, but by the simultaneous presence of antithetic
and conflictive ones, which, while they may converge in certain aspects, diverge in many others." 106
According to Joseph Nye, distinctions should be made among
Ibid., p. 242.
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categories of catalysts, the external environment, and the interruptions
that occur in integration. Integration should be broken down into its
economic, political and legal aspects, which in tum should be divided
into measurable subtypes. 107

2.

Integration is directed by the elites of the units

Successful integration depends on a people's ability to internalize
the process, which turns on the ability of internal elites, not external
elites, to direct the process.
Expectations of integration are developed among elite groups in
government and in private sectors. Joseph Nye cites many historical
examples of integration resulting from choices made by elites or national bureaucrats. The extent to which elites become participants in
regional integration determines the extent of integration. Elites are
said to be wary of integration because it may threaten their level of
control. 108
The extent to which elite groups of integrating units think alike is
important. Nye says that the higher the level of elite consensus, the
more likely that steps will continue to be made toward integration. If
elites share consensus only to a certain point, then integration will not
go beyond that point. 109
Neofunctionalists stress the role of self-interest in influencing attitudes toward integration, emphasizing the individual motives of elite
groups. "Neofunctionalists," Haas says, "rely on the primacy of incremental decision-making over grand designs." Haas assumes here
that most political actors stumble from one decision to the next without considering the consequences of earlier decisions. They are "incapable of long-range purposive behavior." 110

3.

Integration is based on a consensus among the people of the
units to be integrated

Consensus sustains legitimacy. Political systems develop and are
maintained because their members share consensus on the basic structure of the system. Such systems are based on procedural consensusgeneral agreement on the political framework and the legal
processes-and substantive consensus-general agreement on the solutions to problems. The greater the procedural and substantive con107.
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sensus, the greater the integration of the political system. 111
Two related questions are fundamental to the study of integration: (1) How are procedural and substantive consensus achieved and
maintained? (2) Why do or do not citizens defer to the controlling
unit?112

4.

Integration can be achieved with or without use of violence

One of the founding fathers of modem integration theory, Karl
Deutsch, says that integration is "the attainment within a territory, of
a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough
and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population." 113
This emphasis upon peaceful change or reorientation of attitudes
is reflected in a slightly different way by integration theorist Ernest
Haas. Haas has defined integration as "the tendency toward the voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously
eschews the use of force in the relations between the participating
units and groups." 114 Joseph Nye carries this theme further, stating
that regional political organizations "have made modest contributions
to the creation of islands of peace in international systems." 115
Regional integration has even been seen as a means of promoting
peaceful cooperation and reducing conflict. 116
Other theorists have argued that political systems become or remain intact because of the presence or threat of force. Amitai Etzioni
says that a political community's control over the use of violence is
one criterion affecting its level of integration. This community has a
center of decision-making that allocates resources and rewards, and
forms the main source of political identification for the majority of
citizens. 117

5.

Integration can be achieved through a communications
approach, or through persuasion, i.e., through media
persuasion

One integration theory is based on the hypothesis that nationalIll.
112.
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ism can be redirected into a framework for international cooperation
in place of national competition and war. 118
Ernest Haas defines integration as a process "whereby political
actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing
national state." 119
Writers on integration hold several ideas in common. All are
concerned with the process by which loyalty shifts from one center to
another. They also share an interest in communications within the
units to be integrated. According to Deutsch and Etzioni, people
learn to consider themselves members of a community as a result of
human communications patterns. 120
To a greater extent than other writers on integration, Deutsch
uses both a communications and a system theory. Deutsch states:
The existence of social science is based on the ability to treat
a social group as an organization and not as an agglomeration. Communication is the cement that makes organizations. Communication alone enables a group to think
together, to see together and to act together. All require the
understanding of communication. 121
Communication among people can produce either friendship or
hostility. Deutsch says that political systems endure as a result of
their ability to abstract and code incoming information into appropriate symbols, to store coded symbols, to disassociate certain important
information from the rest, to recall stored information when needed,
and to recombine stored information entered as input into the
systems. 122
The development of a political unit depends on the flow of communications. Countries are "clusters of population, united by grids of
communication flows and transport systems, and separated by thinly
settled or nearly empty territories." People are groups of persons
joined together by an ability to communicate on many topics. Boundaries are generally areas in which populations and communications
decline sharply. 123
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Integration is accompanied by an increase in transactions, trade,
capital movement, and communications, and in the exchange of people
and ideas. 124 Deutsch assumes that the mutual identification necessary for integration is brought about by a growth in transactions. 125
Deutsch and the transactionalists argue that the variables for integration can be identified from community-building efforts in the past; by
measuring changes in transactions between groups, transactionalists
can assess the growth of a community in a given region. 126
Deutsch hypothesizes that the more one state interacts with another, the more relevant they become to each other. Such an increase
in mutual relevance, however, does not necessarily lead to integration.
It must be accompanied by mutual responsiveness, or the ability to
respond to the demands of the transactions. 127
The transactionalists contend that as communications increase,
so will the development of a sense of community. The transactionalists use transaction flows among people as indicators of "mutual relevance" or interdependence, and to determine changes in the levels of
transaction flows to determine if people are receiving favorable responses to the demands. Favorable responses may lead to extended
communications. 128
Increases in transactions can therefore be seen as part of a learning process. People become accustomed to using new procedures for
making demands and settling disputes. They become accustomed to a
developing mutual recognition. In this way common values emerge.
Transaction flows thus create a "social-psychological community." 129
The methodology used by the transactionalists causes them to
look for two main patterns of communications: a high volume of
transactions within the region over a wide range of economic, political
and social activities, and an increasing divergence between the volume
and range of transactions between the region and the outside world. 130
Transaction flows can thus be used to determine the degree of
interdependence within a region and to determine if the people in the
region are becoming more dependent on each other than they are on
people outside of the region. 131
Ibid., p. 439.
Taylor, op. cit., p. 243.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 244.
Ibid., p. 245.
Ibid.
131. Ibid.
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Integration may be affected by external elements

Externalization is the extent to which members of an integrating
unit must develop common positions to deal with nonmembers. This
has happened with the European Community in its various negotiations with outside parties, including the United States. 132
To a greater extent than earlier neofunctionalist theory, Nye assumes the importance of external actors. Their active involvement is
part of the process in which the importance of outside governments
and international organizations, as well as nongovernmental actors,
act as catalysts in regional integration. 133
Elites cannot help but take into consideration external problems,
such as dependence on exports, threats from larger powers, or the loss
of status in a changing international system. 134
Nye hypothesizes that "the further integration proceeds, the
more likely third parties will be to react to it, either in support or with
hostility." 135
7.

Integration can be achieved through economic or other nonpolitical factors

The neofunctionalists see integration as a process in which actors
collaborate at the international level to further their individual and
collective interests in some technical, relatively non-controversial area.
These national actors feel that their interests are best served by delegating decision-making powers to a new supranational body. 136
This gradual development of integration is not a result of an
emerging ideological commitment to supranationalism, nor is it a result of a consensus on more immediate goals; rather, integration
evolves because its best serves the individual interests. 137 Central to
Haas's work is the concept of spill-over. Mitrany calls it the doctrine
of ramification, which is integration through non-political factors. 138
The major assumption of the spill-over concept is that initial attempts to integrate along relatively non-controversial economic lines
will eventually spill over into controversial, political areas. Political
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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integration will follow economic integration. 139 In David Mitrany's
doctrine of "ramification," collaboration in one technical field leads to
collaboration in other technical fields. This is an essential difference
between ideological and technical collaboration. 140 Eventually such
collaboration will encroach upon and absorb the political sector. In
particular, "economic unification would build up the foundation for
political agreement, even if it did not make it superfluous." 141 Haas
agrees that there is a tendency for persons who gain from interaction
in one sector to favor integration in other sectors. 142 "Earlier decisions," Haas says, "spill-over into new functional contexts, involve
more and more people, call for more and more interbureaucratic contact and consultations, meeting the new problems which grow out of
the earlier compromises." 143 There is an "expansive logic" contributing to spill-over from one sector to another. The process is one by
which the nations "upgrade" their common interests. 144 Haas continues to say that economic issues in a democratic, industrial setting are
most likely to spill-over into political integration 145; however, Haas
acknowledges that spill-over is not automatic. It will occur only if
"actors, on the basis of their interest-inspired perception, desire to
adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation." 146
To lead to spill-over, Haas says, "decisions must relate directly to experienced needs and demands of important national elites." Some specific issues, such as human rights are more likely to lead to spill-over
than others, such as trade union issues. 147
Previous Studies on National Integration
Studies which have compared the media of divided nations have
been a late development in political communications science. The
study of divided nations from a social, rather than a political, perspective did not emerge until the 1960s. Previous studies of the unification
of various states into a larger unit were focused on Western Europe
and the emerging nations. Using concepts such as "social communication," "political integration," "security community," "overlapping
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.,
141. Ibid.,
142. Ibid.,
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.,
146. Ibid.,
147. Ibid.
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membership," "multiple loyalty," and "nation-building," scholars like
Karl Deutsch, Ernest Haas and Lucian Pye have made many contributions to the understanding of the processes involved in
integration. 148
The divisions of China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany into Communist and non-Communist political systems have been major political developments since the end of World War II. In 1975, Vietnam
became the only one of these divided nations to be reunified by force.
The divided states of China, Korea and Germany have not given up
their goals of achieving one integrated nation, still resenting terms
such as "two Chinas," "two Koreas" and "two Germanies." 149
China's reunification situation is unique. It differs from that of
Korea or Germany, which were divided by international agreements
among outside powers: China was divided by civil war.
The greatest difference from the other divided countries lies in the
small size of Taiwan compared to the mainland (1:3,000). Each of the
smaller parts of the divided states has about the same population,
around 18 million. Each has long operated as an independent state;
each is larger than two-thirds of all states belonging to the United Nations. East Germany has nearly one-third the population of West Germany; North Korea has almost one-half the population of South
Korea. By contrast, the ROC on Taiwan has less than one-fiftieth the
population of the PRC on the mainland. 150
Among the divided countries, only the PRC has had enough
political clout to prevent other nations from establishing diplomatic
relations with both parts of the divided states. Long ago, West Germany and South Korea abandoned efforts to force other nations to
choose between Bonn and East Berlin, Seoul and Pyongyang. Many
countries now have established diplomatic relations with both parts of
Germany and Korea. Because of the PRC's enormous size, its importance in world affairs, and its control of the vast majority of the Chinese people, the PRC has been able to demand that countries wanting
diplomatic relations with it cannot maintain such relations with the
ROC on Taiwan. Forced to choose, most countries, many reluctantly,
have chosen Peking over Taipei; likewise, Taipei refuses to maintain
official relations with any country recognizing Peking. 151
A survey of the literature on the media of divided nations on na148.
149.
150.
IS l.
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tional integration reveals three basic problems: first, there is no common term that is neutral and precise enough to be an effective
operational concept for empirical research on the media of divided nations; second, there is a failure in obtaining unbiased, complete and
first-hand data on the media of the divided nations on the subject of
national integration; third, there is much subjectivity in analyzing and
interpreting both quantitative and qualitative data. 152

152. Review of some previous studies on related subjects is omitted in this edition.
Available upon request.

CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN: METHODOLOGY AND
HYPOTHESES
By reviewing the literature on China's national integration, one
discovers that most studies use historical not communications research, methods to analyze the issue; few focus on the nature or function of the media's role in the China reunification issue. This study
compares the two Chinese party newspapers on the issue of China's
reunification, within the analytic framework of integration theory.
Thematic content analysis and factor analysis are the most suitable methodologies for this research design. The reasons for choosing
these two newspapers as the basic media samples, and for using these
methodologies as well as the proposed hypotheses drawn from the theoretical framework, are as follows:
Media Sample: the People's Daily of the PRC and the Central
Daily News of the ROC
Both official party newspapers, the People's Daily of the PRC and
the Central Daily News of the ROC have been the major political propaganda organs for their parties since the newspapers started; they are
the most appropriate media sample to test party views, to determine
strategies, and to analyze proposals affecting the China reunification
issue.
The design uses a sample of each newspaper from the period from
December 1978 to May 1985, commencing in the same month when
President Jimmy Carter announced the establishment of U.S.-PRC
diplomatic relations and the termination of U.S.-ROC diplomatic relations. This event marked the beginning of the dramatic change in coverage on China's national integration in the two newspapers.
The sample newspapers were coded and analyzed at the Library
of Congress in Washington, D.C., the Library of the Chinese Mainland Research Institute of the Chinese Culture University, the Information and Reference Divisions of the Central Daily News and the
Central News Agency in Taipei, Taiwan.

1.

The People's Daily of the PRC

The People's Daily or Renmin Ribao, as it is referred to in the
romanization used in the PRC, was founded in Yanan, Shaanxi prov(39)
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ince on June 15, 1948. 1 But that paper was the Liberation Daily, an
important Chinese Communist Party paper in Shanghai. The People's
Daily started as the main party paper in Hebei province toward the
end of the civil war in 1948. On February 2, 1949, following the Red
Army's march into Peking, the party converted the North China Daily
News, the former organ of the Nationalist Party Ministry of Information, into the People's Daily. 2 Operated under the jurisdiction of the
Central Committee of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, it is the
official paper, the voice of the party and the PRC government. Its
influence filters down to even the most remote villages. 3 Although it is
not the country's largest newspaper, the People's Daily probably comes
as close to being a national newspaper as can be found in the PRC.
Exact official circulation figures are unpublished, but it is known to
sell well over six million copies each day; however, because of the
great distances between cities, poor transportation and high illiteracy,
the paper does not penetrate the provinces extensively. Its influence is
felt throughout the land, and copies are read by opinion leaders on a
national scale. 4 The paper started publishing eight pages daily in January 1980. Before that, it published six pages on weekdays and four
pages on Sundays and holidays. It contained no advertisements until
January 1979. It sells for the equivalent of 2.5 cents.
If one judges by the usual standards of quality journalism, the
People's Daily is one of the world's most unusual dailies. It buries
world-shaking events in back-page briefs, and it contributes little to "a
world community of reason"; nevertheless, it ranks as one of the
world's most widely read serious journals, serving as the ultimate
voice of authority for the PRC's one billion people. 5
In many respects, the People's Daily is more a governmental bulletin board or propaganda organ than a newspaper. It is a classic example of the restricted paper in a restricted society: it does not
represent the state, but serves party interests; it provides "must" reading for officials, party leaders, diplomats or interested "China-watchers" inside and outside the PRC who keep up with party matters. 6
I. Derk Bodde, Peking Diary (New York: Henry Schuman, 1950), pp. 102-108.
2. Shuhfarn Ning, Peirding, Chiitai Tan and Jiahorng Yu, eds., A Concised Journalism Dictionary (Hangzhou, Zhejiang: Zhejiang People's Press, 1984), p. 297.
3. John Hawkins, Mass Communication in China (New York and London: Longman,
1984), pp. 85-86.
4. John C. Merrill and Harold A. Fisher, The World's Great Dailies (New York: Hastings, 1980), pp. 266-267.
5. Ibid., p. 264.
6. Ibid.
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To understand why the People's Daily plays the role that it does is
to understand those elements in Communist ideology that affect the
press. The Leninist and the Maoist conceptions of mass persuasion
determine the nature of Chinese Communist press. Lenin sought a
press fully integrated in the structure of the Communist Party and its
government, depending on and supportive of the party, and reflecting
the political or economic tasks of the party in each stage of national
development. 7
Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Communist Party built
on these concepts: A journalists' first duties were to carry out revolution in the name of the party. He opposed a professional role for
them. 8
In the Soviet Union, reporters and editors are politicians first,
journalists second; in the PRC they are almost entirely political representatives for the party. In the PRC, journalism exists to educate, to
mobilize the masses, and to achieve party objectives. Achievement of
these goals places objective and factual reporting-so important to
Western journalism-in a secondary role; therefore, "negative news"
about the party, stories about sex, or articles about crime seldom appear in PRC papers. Whenever the party or government makes a new
move or an alteration on a international issue, the People's Daily is the
first to defend the act. In that role, it has dealt almost exclusively with
the major national and international issues. It gives about 60 percent
of its space to the former and 40 percent to the latter. Local news is
left to the provincial newspapers. Domestically, the main news in the
People's Daily is largely concerned with national progress. Internationally, it focuses on unfavorable aspects of events related to its ideological foes, either the West or other Communist nations. For
example, during the 1960s it lashed out repeatedly against "U.S. imperialism in Vietnam." Since 1965, its attacks on the Soviet Union have
become increasingly vitriolic. 9
Despite the People's Daily's large circulation and its nationwide
influence on behalf of the party, it is not the PRC's largest circulation
daily, being second in readership to the daily tabloid-size Cankao
Xiaoxi (Reference News), with circulation in 9 million. Cankao Xiaoxi
comes closest in the PRC to being a daily newspaper in the normal
usage of the term. 10 However, the People's Daily clearly makes a
strong impact on PRC society, lucidly provides outsiders insights into
7. Ibid., pp. 264-265.
8. Ibid., p. 266.
9. Ibid.

10. Howkins, op. cit., p. 86.
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thought and change in the PRC, and remains unfailingly loyal to the
Chinese Communist Party, to its central committee, skillfully using
information to support party views and central committee causes.
The People's Daily started to publish an overseas edition July 1,
1985. It is edited in Hong Kong and printed in Hong Kong, Paris,
San Francisco, New York, Tokyo and Sydney. Aimed at creating a
favorable image of the PRC, it contains a daily page of Taiwan and
Hong Kong stories. 11
2.

The Central Daily News of the ROC

The Central Daily News, or Chung Yang Jih Pao under the WadeGiles Chinese translation system, was founded on March 21, 1927, in
Hankow, central China. It stopped publication in September of that
year and resumed on February 1, .1928, in Shanghai. Due to wars, the
paper moved five times: February 1, 1929, to Nanking; March 1927 to
Changsha; September 1, 1929, to Chungking; September 10, 1945, to
Nanking; and March 12, 1949, to Taipei. 12 The paper is the official
voice of the Nationalist Party, or "Kuomingtang" under the WadeGiles Chinese translation system, of the ROC. It claims to be the vanguard and rear guard of party policies. Its stated publishing goal is to
promote party policy not profits. ROC President and Party Chairman
Chiang Ching-kuo has instructed the paper "to provide greater service
for the goal of China's reunification under the Three Principles of the
People." 13
The paper· clearly proclaims itself a propaganda organ for the
party. It is not an ordinary objective newspaper by Western journalism standards, though most of its editorial staff received Western-style
journalism education; one of its former chairmen of the board, Hollington Tong, and one of its former publishers, Ma Hsin-yeh, were
Missouri journalism graduates in 1911 and 1935 and Missouri journalism medalists in 1957 and 1984. The mission of the Central Daily
News is similar to that of the People's Daily. 14
The paper publishes 12 pages daily, averaging 40 percent of its
space for news and averages 60 percent for advertisements. It publishes 16 pages on special holidays and has published an airmailed edition for overseas Chinese reade.rs since June 1950. 15 Though the
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.

People's Daily, overseas edition, July I, 1985.
Central Daily News, February I, 1984.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Central Daily News is the authoritative paper for promoting the party
line, it is not the country's largest paper by circulation standards. It
shares this characteristic with the People's Daily. Although some publishing experts in Taiwan estimate circulation to be 250,000, ROC circulation figures are inaccurate; the paper itself claims 600,000. The
China Times, by comparison, is estimated to have a circulation of
650,000, while claiming 1.2 million. Estimates for the United Daily
News are 550,000, with a claim of 1 million. 16 Since August 1979, the
Central Daily News has printed pictures in color 17 ; the People's Daily
still prints pictures in black and white except for the edition: on February 4, 1979, the People's Daily printed a full page of color pictures of
Taiwan.
The editorial policy of the Central Daily News is regarded by
some scholars to be as uncompromising as they consider the Nationalist Party. The paper's format is Western-style, but its content lacks
the Western tendency toward critical reporting, while criticism of the
president or any high-ranking officials does not appear in print.
On April 26, 1983, a bomb was set off in the Central Daily News
building in Taipei by the Taiwanese Independence Movement, and a
protest was lodged against the paper's owner, the Nationalist Party.
Twelve people were injured in the explosion. 18
Thematic Content Analysis

This study examines the news output of the two Chinese party
newspapers as they have covered the China reunification issue. Thematic content analysis and factor analysis are the most appropriate
methods to conduct this study. Content analysis, Benard Berelson
says, is "a systematic technique for analyzing message content and
message handling; content analysis is a tool for observing and analyzing overt communication of selected communicators." 19 Berelson
characterizes content analysis as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content
of communication." 20
Berelson says that content analysis has been used in three ways
16. Interview with Tung-chen Lin, director of advertising department, Central Daily
News, Taipei, July 1, 1985.
17. Central Daily News, ibid.
18. Ibid., December 13, 1983, p. 3.
19. Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press, 1952), p. 18.
20. Ole R. Hoslti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p. 3.
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for evaluating communication: (1) evaluation of performance against
standards; (2) evaluation of performance of one body of content
against another; (3) evaluation of performance of content against a
non-content source. Content analysis, however, has a wide range of
uses in the understanding of relationships that can lead to predictions
of behavior. 21
After the outbreak of World War II, H.D. Lasswell suggested
that a "world attention survey" be conducted by an ongoing analysis
of the world's press. The purpose of such a survey, he said, would be
to increase understanding of the international environment by describing changes and continuities in press coverage. Content analysis of
newspapers would reveal the relative prominence (frequency) and
evaluation (pro or con) of selected political symbols, including the
names of leaders, nations, policies and institutions. 22 The choice of
newspapers was based on theoretical and practical considerations:
In many countries the head of state makes few public statements, and these may be almost purely ceremonial. Party
platforms often go unrevised year by year. So far as pressure
groups are concerned, there are great differences in importance from state to state, and the task of gathering such fugitive material is a vast research project. The published
proceedings of legislative bodies are often scanty, or altogether lacking. All states are modern enough to publish
newspapers, however, so that comparable channels can be
used for comparative purposes. Further, we can be relatively
sure of who controls and who reads the news. In nearly all
states some papers are understood to be leading organs of the
party in office and of the government. Where the party system is competitive, the principle organ of parties and factions
can be identified. Even with the coming of radio and television, the daily paper continues to occupy an important position in the media (and newspaper content is more accessible
to study than are broadcasts). 23
Content analysis allows for the examination of manifest content
by using statistical analysis. The resulting data measure probabilities
of chance occurrence, reveal implications about the sources of the con21. Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Throp and Lewis Donohew, Analysis in Communication Research (New York: Macmillian, 1967), p. 2.
22. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 44.
23. H. D. Lasswell, D. Lerner and I. de S. Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 17.
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tent, and reveal behavior that is likely to be the result of the content. 24
The quantitative/qualitative debate is an old one in social science
research; nevertheless, the two approaches both aim at the same goal.
Critics such as Siegfried Kracauer and A.L. George support a qualitative approach and object to quantification as a requirement. 25 In this
study, both approaches are used in gathering and analyzing most of
the data and interpreting the results.
On the matter of manifest versus latent content, Berelson says
that content analysis is limited to the "description of the manifest content of communication." This limitation only applies to the coding
stage of data collection. In systematically collecting the data, manifest
attributes are used to code the contents. These include previously defined categories, words, paragraphs, etc. At the interpretation stage,
latent meanings can be extracted. 26
This study draws on Ole R. Holsti's definition of content analysis
as any technique for making inferences by systematically identifying
specified characteristics of messages. The assumption underlying this
definition is that, by systematically identifying the rules and analyzing
the data, the researcher works from a scientific basis which gives validity to the results.
Thematic content analysis constitutes the core of the quantitative
segment of the study. Themes help to provide a sense of the direction
of the content regarding China's reunification. A central element of
any thematic content analysis is the set of categorical themes which
identify the coded content. "In the absence of standard schemes of
classification," Holsti says, "the analyst is usually faced with the task
of constructing appropriate themes by trial and error methods. This
process consists of moving back and forth from theory to data; of testing usefulness of tentative themes; of then modifying them in the light
of the data. " 27
Common requirements in defining themes for content analysis are
that the themes "reflect the purpose of the research; they must be exhaustive; be mutually exclusive; be independent; and be derived from a
single classification principle." 28 These requirements meet the need
24. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 13.
25. Siegfried Kracauer, "The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis," Public Opinion Quarterly 16 (Winter 1953-54): 631-43; and A. L. George, "Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content
Analysis (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1959), pp. 7-32.
26. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 12-14.
27. Hoslti, op. cit., p. 104.
28. Ibid., p. 95.
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for objective measurement. But, as Proeben Sepstrup says, "Category
formation (theme formation too) should not-as is often the case in
positivistic content analysis-be seen as a neutral-value-free phase preceding the actual content analysis. This is the decisive phase of content analysis and it is imperative that category formation is determined
by the purposes and hypotheses, and solely by these. " 29 The theme
category is one special kind of content category; the theme itself is
considered a unit of analysis, each theme being placed in a large compartment known as a theme category. A variety of different themes
with essentially the same basic meaning can be classified under a single
theme category. "A theme is an assertion about a subject matter; the
subject must be present or implied in the assertion." 30

1. Theme Selection
To ensure that the selected themes of this study were exhaustive,
mutually exclusive, independent and not overlapping, five political
communications scholars specializing in the China reunification issue
and integration theory were consulted. They are Dr. Tao-tai Hsia,
chief of the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress; Dr.
Hungdah Chiu, School of Law, University of Maryland; Mr. Robert
L. Downen, director of special projects, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the U.S. State Department; Dr. Hsing-ti Cheng, professor
of public policy, National Chengchi University; and Mr. Kai-huang
Yang, professor of Mainland problems, Chinese Culture University of
Taipei. Fifty-four thematic categories were decided on. These represent the most important political events, statements and announcements by all parties related to China's reunification from December
1978 to May 1985. These 54 categories were used as variables to test
the performance of the two Chinese party newspapers in covering the
China reunification issue during the mentioned period.
The thematic categories used as operational variables for this research design are shown in Table 1.
29. Proeben Sepstrup, "Methodological Developments in Content Analysis?" in Karl
Erik Rosengran, ed., Advances in Content Analysis (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications,
1981), p. 137.

30. Budd, Throp and Donohew, op. cit., p. 47.
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TABLE 1
THEMATIC CATEGORIES
Description of Report

Mnemonic Label
1
2

"One Greater China" territory. For
example, border disputes between the PRC
and the Soviet Union, the PRC and India,
and the PRC and Vietnam; island disputes
between the PRC and Japan, the PRC and
Vietnam; and the integration dispute
between the PRC and the ROC regarding
Taiwan as a part of China.

#2 SCENERY 1
2

The beautiful scenery in the mainland and
Taiwan. For example, the great Wall, the
Silk Road, the Yangtze River, the West
Lake, and Ali Mountain.

#3 HISTORY

Chinese history and historical figures. For
example, Confucius, Lao Tze and Mencius.

#1 TERRITO

1
2

#4 SUNSOON 1
2

#5 CNPREVO 1
2

#6 ONECHIN 1
2

#7 CHINESE

1
2

Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader
who overthrew the Manchu Empire, and
Soong Ching Ling, Sun's widow and the
PRC's honorary president.
The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by
Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party.
The traditional political philosophy of "one
China."
The Chinese as one people regardless of
where they live or what they believe.

#8 HOMESIC 1
2

The separation of people from their native
towns resulting from the political
separation between the mainland and
Taiwan.

#9 RELATIV

The separated relatives divided by the
Taiwan Strait.

1
2

# 10 REGRDEF 1
2

The visits made by overseas Chinese or
people from the other side, and defections
of navy or air force pilots, scholars, artists,
scientists or politicians to the other side.
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# 11 FAVCOMO 1

Commentary favorable to the other side.

2

# 12 UNFCOMO 1

Commentary unfavorable to the other side.

2

#13 FAVPOLO 1
2

#14 NEUPOLO 1
2

#15 UNFPOLO 1
2

#16 FAVMILO 1
2

# 17 NEUMILO 1
2
# 18 UNFMILO 1
2
#19 FAVSOCO 1
2

#20 NEUSOCO 1

Favorable political report about the other
side.
Neutral political report about the other
side.
Unfavorable political report about the other
side.
Favorable military report about the other
side.
Neutral military report about the other
side.
Unfavorable military report about the other
side.
Favorable societal report about the other
side.
Neutral societal report about the other side.

2

#21 UNFSOCO 1
2
#22 WARMUSA 1
2
#23 USCOLDO 1
2

#24 DIPLWUS 1
2
#25 TAIREAC 1
2

Unfavorable societal report about the other
side.
Promoting a warmer relationship with the
United States.
Calling on the United States to maintain a
colder relationship with the other side.
The PRC's diplomatic relationship with the
United States.
The "Taiwan Relations Act" passed in
March 1979 by the Congress of the United
States as the guideline for unofficial U.S.Taiwan relations, after the severance of an
official diplomatic relationship between the
United States and the ROC on January 1,
1979.
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#26 ARMSALE 1
2

#27 HUNACAS 1
2

#28 SCIETRA

1
2

#29 STRATEG 1
2

#30 HOLLAND 1
2

#31 USSR

1
2

#32 INTLORG 1
2
#33 OLYMPIC 1
2
#34 NAT1SY2 1
2
#35 TIBETMO 1
2
#36 HONGKON1
2
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Arms sales to Taiwan from the United
States after severance of U.S.-ROC
diplomatic relations.
Defection of PRC tennis player Hu Nato
the United States in 1983, which caused
temporary sour relations between the
United States and the PRC.
Transfer of American scientific technology
to either Chinese government.
Emphasis on PRC's or ROC's strategic
importance to Asia, the United States or
the world.
Dutch submarine sale to the ROC in
November 1980, which caused temporary
sour relations between Holland and the
PRC in March 1981.
Concerning the USSR's possible
involvement and influence in relations
among the PRC and the United States.
The fight between the PRC and the ROC
for representation in international
organizations.
Representation and participation by the
PRC and the ROC in the Olympic Games.
The PRC's "One Nation, Two Systems"
Model to integrate Hong Kong and Taiwan
as "one China" under PRC rule.
The PRC's Tibet Model to integrate
Taiwan as an autonomous region under
PRC rule.
The PRC's Hong Kong Model to integrate
Taiwan in the same way as Hong Kong
will be when its sovereignty is returned to
the PRC in 1997 from Britain.
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#37 INSIST4

1
2

#38 SPEADMR 1
2

# 39 FORCINT 1
2

#40 PRINCB

1
2

#41 POINTS9

1
2

#42 LIN3EX4

1
2

#43 PEACETK 1
2

#44 MULTISY 1
2

#45 CCPNATC 1
2

PRC's political insistence on the "Four
Fundamental Principles": 1. Always stick
to the socialist road; 2. Always retain
Communist Party leadership; 3. Follow
through with the dictatorship of the
proletariat; and 4. Follow the thoughts of
Marx, Lenin and Mao.
PRC "Special Administrative Region"
adopted on December 4, 1982, in Article 31
of the PRC's new constitution, as an
alternative for integrating Hong Kong and
Taiwan under PRC rule.
Threats by the PRC to integrate Taiwan by
force.
ROC's proposal to integrate under its
political philosophy of "The Three
Principles of the People": (1) Nationalism,
(2) Democracy, and (3) The People's
Livelihood.
The PRC's 1981 "Nine-Point Peace
Proposal" to integrate Taiwan.
The PRC's 1979 "Three-Link, FourExchange Peace Proposal" to begin to
integrate the ROC: 1. Three links: mail,
transportation services and trade. 2. Four
exchanges: relatives and tourists, academic
groups, cultural groups and sports
representatives.
The PRC's peace-talks proposal to the
ROC for China's national integration.
The "Multi-System Nations Model"
suggested by ROC scholar Yung Wei,
recognizing the other Chinese government
and co-existing.
The PRC's peace proposal for cooperation
between the Chinese Communist Party and
the Nationalist Party to achieve China's
national integration.
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#46 TAINDPN 1
2

#47 TWOCHIN 1
2

#48 INDTRAD 1
2

#49 ADVECOS 1
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The "Taiwanese Independence Movement"
organized by the Taiwanese overseas to
promote a Taiwan independent from rule
by either the PRC or the ROC.
The "Two Chinas Model" advocated by
some scholars and denounced by both the
PRC and the ROC.
Indirect trade between the PRC and the
ROC through Hong Kong or Singapore.
Advocacy of its own economic system.

2

#50 UNFECOT 1
2

#51 SPECOZN 1
2

#52 OPENCIT

1
2

#53 FAVECOT 1
2

#54 NEUECOT 1
2

Unfavorable economic report about the
other side.
PRC's "Special Economic Zones" in
Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou of
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of
Fujian Province, announced in 1979 and
approved by the government on August 26,
1980.
PRC's 1984 opening of 14 coastal cities for
foreign trade and investment.
Favorable economic report about the other
side.
Neutral economic report about the other
side.

*"1" represents the People's Daily and "2" represents the Central
Daily News.

2.

Trend and Direction Analysis

Among the 54 thematic categories, 14 are designed for specific
trend and direction analysis of the two newspapers' reports about the
other side. These 14 thematic categories are political, military, societal and economic reports about the other side in three directions:
favorable, neutral and unfavorable; and commentary to the other side
in two directions: favorable and unfavorable. Seldom is commentary
neutral.
To statistically determine intensity through frequency, the trends
of directions computed from the samples are examined. Trend analysis
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has been used most effectively in the area of direction analysis. A
trend refers to the increase or decrease of the frequency of given content over a period of time. Trend analysis is done after the basic quantification of the material; its analysis for this sample also comes after
the basic data are computed. 31
The direction method was derived by Richard W. Budd. He defined three directions as criteria for judging news as favorable, neutral
or unfavorable:
Favorable: Those items reflecting social cohesion and cooperation and political and economic stability and/or strength.
Favorability will be judged on the basis of international cooperation (political, social and economic) in which the country or any group or individual representing that country is
depicted as strong, right or cooperative. In internal affairs,
favorability will be judged on the basis of persons cooperating in political, social and economic affairs. For example,
events and incidents which depict the country or any group
or individual within the country as progressive, successful,
peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified or as exercising leadership will be considered favorable. This classification will not be assigned where the country, or any group or
individual thereof, is depicted as exploiting its strength upon
weaker nations, groups or individuals.
Neutral: Those items which reflect neither favorable nor unfavorable conditions either through balance of content or a
lack of controversial material.
Unfavorable: Those items which report social conflict and
disorganization and political and economic instability and/
or weakness. Unfavorability will be judged on the basis of
international tensions (political, social and economic) in
which the country, or any group or individual representing
the country, is depicted as weak, wrong or uncooperative. In
internal affairs, unfavorability will be judged on the basis of
civil disruption in which there is conflict between persons or
groups of persons within the country in political, economic
or social affairs. For example, events and incidents which
depict the country, or any group or individual immoral, impractical, unlawful, disunified or lacking in leadership will be
classified unfavorable. 32
31. Ibid., p. 60.
32. Ibid., p. 53.
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Content analysis, Budd says, is most useful when it is able to
show direction, or the lack thereof. 33
Besides direction itself, the intensity of direction is also studied
measured by the coding offrequency. A scale of intensity is also given
to compare the two newspapers in each of the reporting areas about
the other side.
3.

Units of Measurement

(1) Coding Sample Newspapers
The sample newspapers used for this study were the domestic editions of the People's Daily of the PRC and the Central Daily News of
the ROC. Samples were gathered between December 1978 and May
1985.
It is most appropriate for this study to use the domestic editions
of the papers. The People's Daily only started its overseas edition on
July 1, 1985, and the Central Daily News only publishes a condensed
four-page daily for its airmailed edition for overseas Chinese readers.
The domestic editions of the two papers are aimed at reporting and
promoting party ideologies and policies for domestic readers. It is on
an equal comparative level to use the domestic editions of the two
papers for this study.
The original domestic editions of the People's Daily of December
1978 to May 1985 were found and coded at the Library of Congress in
Washington, D.C., and at the Chinese Mainland Research Institute of
the Chinese Culture University in Taipei, Taiwan, in December 1984
to March 1985.
The original domestic editions of the Central Daily News of December 1978 to May 1985 were found and coded at the Reference and
Information Divisions of the Central Daily News and the Central
News Agency in Taipei, Taiwan, in March 1985 to June 1985.
The People's Daily published six pages daily from December 1978
to December 1979, except for four pages on January 1, on the Chinese
lunar-new-year holiday (January 28-31), on Labor Day (May 1), on
the PRC's National Independence Day (October 1-2,) and on Sundays; it published eight pages daily from January 1980 to June 1981,
except for four pages on January 1, on the Chinese lunar-new-year
holidays (March 16-18, 1980, and March 5-7, 1981), on Labor Day
(May 1), and on National Independence Day (October 1-2); it published eight pages daily from July 1981 to May 1985, except for four
33. Ibid., p. 50.
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pages on January 1, on the Chinese lunar-new-year holidays (January
25-27, 1982, February 13-15, 1983, February 2-4, 1984, and February
20-22, 1985), on Labor Day (May 1), and on National Independence
Day (October 1-2).
The subtotals of the coded pages of the People's Daily were 186
for December 1978; 2,166 for 1979; 2,696 for 1980; 2,764 for 1981;
2,892 for 1982; 2,892 for 1983; 2,900 for 1984; and 1,188 for January
to May 1985.
The total of the coded pages of the People's Daily for December
1978 to May 1985 was 17,502.
The Central Daily News published 12 pages daily from December
1978 to May 1985, except for four pages for the first three days of the
Chinese lunar-new-year holidays (January 28-30, 1979, February 1618, 1980, February 5-7, 1981, January 25-27, 1982, February 13-15,
1983, February 2-4, 1984, and February 20-22, 1985), eight pages for
the fourth and the fifth days of the Chinese lunar-new-year holidays
(January 31-February 1, 1979, February 19-20, 1980, February 8-9,
1981, January 28-29, 1982, February 16-17, 1983, February 5-6, 1984,
and February 23-24, 1985), and 16 pages for other holidays (January
1; March 29, Youth Day; April 5, Tombsweeping for Ancestors' Day;
September 28, Teachers' Day and Confucius' Birthday; October 10,
the ROC's National Independence Day; October 25, Taiwan Restoration Day; November 12, Sun Yat-sen's Birthday; and December 25,
Constitution Day, and on special occasions: February 1, anniversary
of the Central Daily News; September 3, Soldiers Day; and other irregular special days of celebrations or events.
The subtotals of the coded pages of the Central Daily News were
372 for December 1978; 5,158 for 1979; 4,408 for 1980; 4,408 for 1981;
4,404 for 1982; 4,404 for 1983; 4,432 for 1984; and 1,780 for January
to May 1985.
The total of the coded pages of the Central Daily News for December 1978 to May 1985 was 29,366.
Combined with the 17,502 pages of the People's Daily, 46,868
pages of the two Chinese party newspapers were coded for this study.
Since an average of 5 percent of its space was for advertisement
and an average 95 percent for news and editorials, the People's Daily
actually offered an equivalent of 16,627 pages of news and editorials.
With an average of 40 percent of its space for advertisements and
an average of 60 percent for news and editorials, the Central Daily
News actually offered an equivalent of 17,617 pages of news and editorials for this study. But the Central Daily News published four more
extra pages than the People's Daily in the form of celebration or pub-
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lie-bulletin non-news articles on 85 special-occasion days. Subtracting
the 340 pages of these extra non-news pages, the Central Daily News
finally offered an equivalent 17,277 pages of news and editorials.
The two newspapers offered a very similar amount of space devoted to news and editorial; there is was than a 3.5 percent difference.
(2) Coding Units
The smallest segment of content counted and scored in content
analysis is the coding unit. The most common units are a word; a
theme or assertion; a paragraph; an item; a character, group, object, or
institution; and space or time. Using the entire article as the coding
unit is acceptable when the goals of the study and the category system
used are of a general nature. The measures may even be as large as
pages or whole issues of publications, depending on the statement of
the problem. 34
Counting themes rather than words can yield more information.
Thematic analysis is linked to direction categories. A theme is a single
idea or single item of information extracted from a segment of
content. 35
This study, being founded on the specific problem of China's national integration, uses the theme unit.
(3) The Context Unit
The context unit is the body of material surrounding the coding
unit. As much of the material as is required to characterize the coding
unit is considered. If the coding unit is the word, the context unit may
be the sentence in which the word appears. It might also be the paragraph or the entire article. The context unit must be large enough to
provide the background necessary to permit accurate judging, but not
so large to cause confusion. In some instances, there may be both
implicit and explicit context units. The explicit context unit may be
the article in which the coding unit appears, the implicit coding unit
the publication or publications analyzed. 36
The entire article was chosen as the context unit for this study
since the entire article in the two Chinese party newspapers provided
appropriate enough background information to make coding
decisions.
For each theme, all 46,868 pages of the two sample newspapers,
34. Ibid., pp. 33-35.
35. Ibid., p. 34.
36. Ibid., p. 36.
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including any of the 54 thematic categories, were examined, and their
frequency was recorded. A frequency of "1" was coded for each
theme in an article. An article might have no theme, one theme or
more than one theme related to the subject of the study.
Frequencies were then transferred to tables and charts as trends
and directions. In this way unmanageable data was transformed into
manageable information.

4.

Reliability and Validity

Reliability, in measurement, means that investigators using the
same techniques on the same material will get substantially the same
results. 37
In content analysis, reliability depends in part on how well the
researcher describes the coding instructions. For example, simply
counting the number of times a key word or symbol appears presents
no problem. Assigning direction to statements, detecting propaganda
themes, or judging the strength of words may be more difficult to describe. Some of the standard tests of reliability, test-retest, equivalentforms, and split-halves, are adaptable to content analysis. For content
analysis, the test-retest method requires more than one coder using the
same instructions to classify the same material. 38
For this research, a reliability test was given to two coders. Both
were Chinese journalism graduate students. Both frequently read the
two Chinese newspapers in their regular studies. They were asked to
code 78 randomly selected sample newspapers with the set of 54 thematic categories prepared for the study. To determine the reliability
of the two coders, Holsti's formula was used. 39
The test was made before the analysis of the results of coding and
counting; it received a reliability coefficient of .91. This level of reliability was considered satisfactory for this study. 40
To determine the validity of this research, the analyst asked if the
methods produced the desired information. He also asked how well
his concepts or variables fit his measurements of them. Validity may
be determined by one or more methods: jury, known-group, independent-criterion, and construct-validity. 41
37. Ibid., p. 66.
38. Ibid., p. 67.
39. Ibid., p. 68, and Hoshi, op. cit., p. 140.

40. Budd, Throp and Donohew, op. cit., p. 69.
41. Norman H. Nie, C. Hadlai Hull, Jean G. Jenkins, Karin Steinbrenner and Dale H.
Bent, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 469.

CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE

57

Experts were asked to judge relevant parts of the methodology,
and to define of variables or measuring techniques. The four expertscholars of political communications familiar with the issue of China's
national integration were asked to examine and modify the 54 thematic categories.
The coders read the two Chinese party newspapers without any
language barrier and with no comprehension difficulty in identifying
the 54 themes in the two newspapers. These themes are almost selfevident; words or sentences themselves indicate what themes they
represent.
Factor Analysis

The most distinctive characteristics of factor analysis are data reduction and concept development. Using factor analytic techniques,
this research revealed whether some underlying patterns of relationships exist; if so, the variables could be "rearranged" or "reduced" to a
smaller set of factors or components.
Factor analysis of social characteristics was used in this study to
test whether there are indeed five separate factors as determined by the
hypotheses which constitute the concept of China's national integration. Factor analysis was also used to determine loadings on factors
corresponding with the variables that were theoretically associated
with the five assumptions discussed in the section on the theoretical
framework of national integration.
Hypothesis

The theoretical framework of national integration is defined for
this study as a multidimensional phenomenon. It can be achieved
either through peaceful means with a basis of consensus or by forceful
means, directed and decided by elites; it may be achieved sooner if
there is a solid basis of mutual understanding built between the two
sides; and it may be affected by external economic or other non-political factors.

1.

Hypothesis I: China's National Integration Is A
Multidimensional Phenomenon

A factor analysis of the survey of the two Chinese party newspapers by 54 thematic categories could produce five to six factors, which
could account for most of the variance of the theoretical framework of
national integration. This could show that China's national integration is a multidimensional phenomenon.
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2.

Hypothesis II: An Integrative Consensus on Nationalism
Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Leads to Either
Peaceful or Forceful Integrative Means; However, No
Consensus on Integrative Methods or Models Will Be
One of the Found Factors

Thematic categories #2 "Scenery," #3 "History," #4 "SunSoong," #5 "1911 Hsin-hai Revolution," #6 "One China," #7
"Chinese," #8 "Homesick," #9 "Relatives," # 10 "Regressions and
Defectors," #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," #40
"ROC's Integration Model of the Three Principles of the People,"
#41 "PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal," #42 PRC's Three-Link,
Four-Exchange Peace Proposal," #43 "PRC's Peace-Talk Proposal,"
and #45 "PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the Communist and the Nationalist Parties" could all correlate with and load
substantially on one factor defined as "nationalism consensus" because
these thematic categories are mainly nationalism-oriented. These categories could also lead to a peaceful integration based on a nationalism
consensus, except # 39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC"
as an alternative integrative means if none of the peaceful integrative
means are accepted by both sides. There could be no integrativemodel factor correlated by #34 "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems
Model," #35 "PRC's Tibet Model for the ROC," #36 "PRC's Hong
Kong Model for the ROC," #37 "PRC's Four Insists," #38 "PRC's
Special Administrative Region for the ROC," #44 "Multi-System
Nations Model," #46 "Taiwanese Independence Movement," and
#47 "Two Chinas Model" since none of these are accepted by both
the PRC and the ROC. There could be no factor on integrativemethod-or-model consensus.
These could meet the assumption of integration theory, which
states that national integration can be achieved on a basis of consensus
by either peaceful or forceful means. The greater consensus that exists
between the integrative units, the better the chance they could be
integrated.

3.

Hypothesis IlL· A Factor of Diverse Mutual Understanding
Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Reveals A
Tendency of Unfavorable Reporting About
the Other Side by Both Papers

Thematic categories # 11 "Commentary Favorable to the Other
Side," # 12 "Commentary Unfavorable to the Other Side," # 13
"Favorable Political Report About the Other Side," # 14 "Neutral
Political Report About the Other Side," # 15 "Unfavorable Political
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Report About the Other Side," # 16 "Favorable Military Report
About the Other Side," # 17 "Neutral Military Report About the
Other Side," # 18 "Unfavorable Military Report About the Other
Side," # 19 "Favorable Societal Report About the Other Side," # 20
"Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side," #21 "Unfavorable
Societal Report About the Other Side," #53 "Favorable Economic
Report About the Other Side," #54 "Neutral Economic Report
About the Other Side," and #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report
About the Other Side" could all correlate with and load substantially
on one factor defined as "Diverse Mutual Understanding."
This consensus on "Diverse Mutual Understanding" could reveal
a tendency of unfavorable reporting about the other side by both papers. The two papers are directed and managed by the elites of the
two parties or countries; their consensus could further reveal that
these elites, as integration theory says, direct China's national integration by promoting unfavorable reports about the other side for the
masses. This promotion could not speed up, but could slow down, the
pace of China's national integration.

4.

Hypothesis IV: A Factor of U.S. China Policy Will Be One
of the Found Factors Which Proves that China's
National Integration Has An External or
Foreign Factor

Thematic categories #22 "A Warmer Relationship with the
United States," #23 "U.S. Colder Relationship with the Other Side,"
#24 "Diplomatic Relationship With the United States," #25 "U.S.
Taiwan Relations Act," #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," #27 "Hu Na Case,"
#28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," #29 "Strategic
Importance," #32 "Representation in International Organizations,"
and # 1 "Territory: Taiwan Is Part of China" could all correlate with
and load substantially on one factor defined as "U.S. China Policy."
This could correspond with the assumption of integration theory
that national integration may be affected by external elements.
Other foreign-oriented thematic categories #30 "Holland," #31
"USSR," and #33 "Olympics" could not correlate with and load on
the "U.S. China Policy" factor or the "Foreign" factor by themselves
because they are unrelated by the nature of the events among them.

5.

Hypothesis V: A Factor of Economic Function Will Be One
of the Found Factors Which Might Lead to Eventual
National Integration
Thematic categories # 34 "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems
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Model for the ROC," #36 "PRC's Hong Kong Model for the ROC,"
#48 "Indirect Trade Between the PRC and the ROC," #49 "Advocacy of Its Own Economic System," #51 "PRC's Special Economic
Zones," and #52 "PRC's Opening of 14 Coastal Cities" might correlate with and load substantially on one factor defined as "EconomicFunction Factor."
All these might encounter the assumption of integration theory
which states that national integration can be eventually and indirectly
achieved through economic or other non-political factors.

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH FINDINGS: ANALYSES AND
INTERPRETATIONS
Results of Factor Analysis

To measure the correspondence between the hypotheses and the
data, a principal factor solution with iterations and varimax rotation
was performed. The factor solution groups thematic categories into
factors, and varimax rotation makes factor loadings for the variables
of the thematic categories less complex by giving the simplest factor
structure. The data from the 54 thematic categories were used to calculate a 54 by 54 correlation matrix that related pairs of themes. This
correlation matrix was factor analyzed using the principal factor solution with iterations, then submitted to a varimax rotation.
Two criteria were used to determine the number of factors to be
used for rotation. The first chose the numbers having eigenvalues in
excess of 1.00, while the second chose those having at least 5 percent
of the variance. Five factors were chosen for rotation. The results of
the factor loadings after varimax rotation are shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2
VARIMAX ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX FOR 54
THEMATIC CATEGORIES
Thematic
Categories
#1 TERRITOR
#2 SCENERY
#3 HISTORY
#4 SUNSOONG
#5 CNPREVOL
#6 ONECHINA
#7 CHINESE
#8 HOMESICK
#9 RELATIVE
# 10 REGRDEFE
#11 FAVCOMOT
# 12 UNFCOMOT
#13 FAVPOLOT
#14 NEUPOLOT
#15 UNFPOLOT
#16 FAVMILOT
# 17 NEUMILOT
#18 UNFMILOT

Factor Factor Factor Factor Factor Communality
I
II
III
IV
v
h 2 =SMC
.157
.429
.079
.585*
.682*
.887*
.218
.578*
.663*
.065
-.137
.054
-.129
-.164
-.060
-.132
-.113
.073

-.125
-.042
-.024
-.116
-.053
.207
.032
.172
-.248
.375
.646*
-.278
.593*
.022
-.346
.037
-.164
.322

(61)

.271
-.006
.107
.030
.372
.201
.342
-.271
-.277
.215
.112
.219
.177
-.172
-.054
.174
.089
.091

.566*
-.168
.028
-.033
-.010
.051
.170
-.115
.074
-.040
-.142
.405
-.009
-.274
-.005
.023
.239
.330

-.111
.057
.483
.195
-.067
.191
.393
-.181
.026
-.103
.044
-.035
.091
.047
.160
.001
.040
.074

.447
.217
.253
.397
.611
.910
.349
.484
.584
.203
.472
.294
.408
.134
.152
.049
.107
.232
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.160
.074
.236
-.096
-.043
-.053
.011
.073
-.061
-.069
.048
.031
.011
-.048
-.045
-.027
-.000
-.032
.241
.386
.680*
.512*
.907*
.864*
.592*
-.053
.913*
-.039
.081
-.010
.177
.054
-.026
-.009
-.126
.008

.580*
.712*
.059
.309
.142
-.086
.171
.074
.354
.736*
.355
-.090
.391
.366
.051
.045
.057
.369
.131
.215
.070
.210
-.021
-.112
-.116
.156
.002
.009
-.003
.047
-.047
-.453
.252
.002
.731*
-.047

.089
.012
-.256
.094
-.278
-.201
.113
-.002
-.070
-.002
-.198
-.109
-.063
.094
.120
.881*
.427
.750*
.469
.403
.194
.332
-.009
-.103
.068
.216
-.030
-.214
-.061
.090
.439
-.052
.538*
.423
.193
.632*

-.089
.053
-.358
.793*
.791*
.635*
.102
.086
.049
-.028
.625*
-.119
.205
.047
-.014
.041
.079
.088
-.037
.055
-.143
.029
.024
.116
.403
-.031
.159
-.035
-.001
.220
-.030
-.067
.012
-.087
-.017
.056

-.031
-.050
.436
.144
.065
-.040
.842*
.859*
.085
.102
.152
.109
.174
.236
.253
-.149
-.055
-.116
.168
.149
.246
.163
-.044
-.105
.318
.012
.037
-.143
.334
.149
-.088
.026
.143
-.085
-.128
-.034

.380
.518
.444
.764
.731
.455
.763
.756
.144
.557
.582
.047
.230
.204
.083
.804
.195
.721
.326
.384
.587
.445
.826
.795
.633
.075
.862
.069
.122
.081
.235
.217
.375
.194
.605
.406

PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL VARIANCE

13.5%

11.6%

7.6%

7%

5.3%

45%

PERCENTAGE OF
COMMON VARIANCE

31.6%

26.1%

16.7%

14.9%

10.7%

100%

EIGENVALUE

6.941

5.719

3.660

3.263

2.356

#19 FAVSOCOT
#20 NEUSOCOT
#21 UNFSOCOT
#22 WARMUSA
#23 USCOLDOT
#24 DIPLWUSA
#25 TAIREACT
#26 ARMSALES
#27 HUNACASE
#28 SCIETRAN
#29 STRATEGY
#30 HOLLAND
#31 USSR
#32 INTLORGA
#33 OLYMPICS
#34 NATISY2
# 35 TIBETMOD
#36 HONGKONG
#37 INSIST4
#38 SPEADMRN
# 39 FORCINTE
#40 PRINCI3
#41 POINTS9
#42 LIN3EX4
#43 PEACETKS
#44 MULTISYS
#45 CCPCNPCO
#46 TAINDPNM
#47 TWOCHINA
#48 INDTRADE
#49 ADVECOSY
#50 UNFECOT
#51 SPECOZNS
#52 OPENCITY
#53 FAVECOT
#54 NEUECOT

*These thematic categories have loadings above .50 cutoff point.
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TRANSFORMATION MATRIX

FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR

I
II
III
IV
V

FACTOR
I

FACTOR
II

FACTOR
III

FACTOR
IV

FACTOR

.949
-.186
-.017
-.135
-.214

.018
.774
.346
-.331
-.412

.234
.592
-.599
.275
.397

.123
.096
.459
.865
-.123

.169
.071
.555
-.216
.781

v

The 54 by 54 matrix of correlations revealed that the five factors
account for 45 percent of the total variance. Factor I represents 13.5
percent of the total variance; Factor II, 11.6 percent; Factor Ill, 7.6
percent; Factor IV, 7 percent; and Factor V, 5.3 percent.
Within the five-factor solution, Factor I accounts for 31.6 percent
of the total variance; Factor II, 26.1 percent; Factor III, 16.7 percent;
Factor IV, 14.9 percent; and Factor IV, 10.7 percent. All five factors
have eigenvalues in excess of 2.35.
As predicted, the tests yielded five important factors. For a loading to be significant at the .01level, a moderately conservative loading
of .50 was chosen for the cutoff point, which was based on the overall
interrelationships between thematic categories. In the varimax rotated
factor matrix, Factor I accounted for 31.6 percent of the variance and
had moderately high loadings in 11 thematic categories, as shown in
Table 3.
TABLE 3
FACTOR I
THEMATIC
CATEGORY

LOADING
POINT

DESCRIPTION

#45 CCPCNPCO

.913

#41 POINTS9

.907

PRC's peace proposal for cooperation
between the Chinese Communist and
Chinese Nationalist Parties to achieve
China's national integration.
PRC's 1981 "Nine-Point Peace Proposal"
to the ROC for a peaceful national
integration.
The traditional political philosophy of "one
China."

#6 ONECHINA

.887
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#42 LIN3EX4

.864

#5 CNPREVOL

.681

#39 FORCINTE

.680

#9 RELATIVE

.663

#43 PEACETKS
#4 SUNSOONG

.592
.585

#8 HOMESICK

.578

#40 PRINCI3

. 512

PRC's 1979 "Three-Link and FourExchange Peace Proposal" to the ROC: l.
Three Links: postal, transportation services
and trade; 2. Four Exchanges: relatives and
tourists, academic groups, cultural groups,
and sports representatives .
The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by
Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party .
Threats by the PRC to integrate Taiwan by
force .
The separated relatives divided by the
Taiwan Strait .
PRC's peace-talk proposal to the ROC.
Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader
who overthrew the Manchu empire, and
Soong Ching Ling, Sun's widow and the
PRC's honorary president.
The separation of people from their native
towns resulting from the political separation
between the mainland and Taiwan .
ROC's proposal of "China Reunification
under the Three Principles of the People":
(1) Nationalism, (2) Democracy and (3)
The People's Livelihood.

Factor I has 11 significant loadings on thematic categories related
to nationalism consensus and its strategies. This was predicted by Hypothesis II; therefore, Factor I is labeled as the "Nationalism Consensus" factor. No consensus on integrative methods or models is found
in this or any other factor.
Factor II accounts for 26.1 percent of the variance and has moderate loadings on six thematic categories shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
FACfOR II
THEMATIC
CATEGORY

LOADING
POINT

DESCRIPTION

#28 SCIETRAN

.736

#53 FAVECOT

.731

#20 NEUSOCOT
#11 FAVCOMOT

.712
.646

Transfer of American scientific technology
to either Chinese government.
Favorable economic report about the other
side.
Neutral societal report about the other side.
Favorable commentary to the other side.
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.593

#19 FAVSOCOT

.580
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Favorable political report about the other
side .
Favorable societal report about the other
side.

Factor II is characterized by moderate loadings on the thematic
categories concerning reports about the other side. This is as Hypothesis III predicted. Factor II is identified as the "Mutual Understanding" factor.
Factor III accounts for 16.7 percent of the variance and has loadings on five thematic categories shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
FACI'OR III
THEMATIC
CATEGORY
#34 NAT1SY2

LOADING
DESCRIPTION
POINT
.881
PRC's "One Nation, Two Systems" model
to integrate Hong Kong and the ROC
under PRC rule.
#36 HONGKONG
.750
PRC's Hong Kong model to integrate the
ROC under PRC rule, and the return of
the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC
in 1997 from Britain.
.538
"PRC's Special Economic Zones" in
#51 SPECOZNS
Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of
Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of
Fujian Province, announced in 1979 and
approved by the government on August
26, 1980.

Factor III shows substantial loadings on the thematic categories
related to integration through PRC's economic reforms and indirect
economic means. This is as predicted in Hypothesis V; therefore, Factor III is called the "Economic Function" factor.
Factor IV accounts for 14.9 percent of the variance and has loadings on five thematic categories shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6
FACI'OR IV
THEMATIC
CATEGORY

LOADING
POINT

DESCRIPTION
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#22 WARMUSA

.793

#23 USCOLDOT

.791

#24 DIPLWUSA

.635

#29 STRATEGY

.625

#1 TERRITORY

.566

Report on promoting a warmer relationship
with the United States .
Report calling on the United States to
maintain a colder relationship with the
other side .
Report on the official diplomatic
relationship with the United States .
Emphasis of its strategic importance to
Asia, the United States or the world .
"One Greater China" territory. For
example, border disputes between the PRC
and the Soviet Union, the PRC and India,
and the PRC and Vietnam; island disputes
between the PRC and Japan, the PRC and
Vietnam; and the integration dispute
between the PRC and the ROC regarding
Taiwan as a part of China.

Factor IV in the rotated factor matrix is marked by moderate
loadings on the thematic categories related to U.S. relations with both
sides; and related to the U.S. position regarding Taiwan as a part of
China. This was predicted in Hypothesis IV, therefore, Factor IV is
called the "U.S.-China Policy" factor.
Factor V accounts for 10.7 percent of the variance and has a loading on two thematic categories shown in Table 7.
TABLE 7

FACfOR V
THEMATIC
LOADING
DESCRIPTION
CATEGORY
POINT
#26 ARMSALES
.859
U.S. arms sales to the ROC to protect
Taiwan from PRC's forceful integration.
#25TAIREACT
.842
The "Taiwan Relations Act" passed on
March 13 and 14, 1979 by the Congress
and signed by the president of the United
States, and effective on April 10, 1979. The
Act is a guideline for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan
relations, after the severance of an official
diplomatic relationship between the U.S.
and the ROC on January 1, 1979.

Factor V is marked by loadings on the thematic categories related
to U.S. protection of Taiwan. Factor Vis named the "U.S. ProtectingTaiwan Policy" factor.
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Hypothesis IV predicted that Factor IV and Factor V would be
categorized as the "U.S.-China Policy" factor; however, the result
shows Factor IV to be a category related to the U.S.-China policy and
offers in Factor V a category related specifically to the U.S. ProtectingTaiwan policy. Factor V separates a particular U.S. policy on Taiwan
from Factor IV of general U.S.-China policy on the China national
integration issue. Factor V, therefore, also confirmed Hypothesis IV.
Overall, the results of the factor analysis support five of the hypotheses, confirming Hypothesis I, which states that China's national
integration is a multidimensional phenomenon with five factors that
account for most of the variance of a theoretical framework of national integration. The findings of five factors are consistent with Hypotheses II, III, IV and V when 28 of the 54 thematic categories are
used.
After discussions of trend analysis and directional analysis, the
descriptions of the five factors are interpreted.

Trend Analysis
The survey coded a reporting frequency total of 35,708 in 54 thematic categories from the two newspapers over the six-and-a-half year
period. The People's Daily showed a reporting frequency total of 7,570
or 21.2 percent compared to the Central Daily News' 28,138 or 78.8
percent.
The Central Daily News showed frequencies about three times
more than the People's Daily when reporting on China's national integration; therefore, the Central Daily News, more than the People's
Daily, considered integration an important challenge to the legitimacy
of its government and considered integration to be a pressing problem
to the security of its people both internally and externally.
The reporting trend by the two newspapers, as shown in Figure 1,
and the observations made during the data collection, reveal that the
People's Daily took more of an offensive initiating position. For example, it offered peace proposals and other integrative methods and models called on the United States to assist in achieving China's national
integration. On the other hand. the Central Daily News was more defensive and reactive.
Many of the reporting trends, as also shown in Figure 1, corresponded with each other by a similar increase or decrease of frequency
in reporting on integration-related issues. The most significant increase was during October 1981, the highest peak in the trends of the
two newspapers. During this month, the People's Daily often reported
on the PRC's nine-point peace proposal and the Central Daily News
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immediately reported a rejection. As a result, Figure 1 shows corresponding increases and decreases in reporting frequencies by the two
newspapers on this issue.
Figure 2 illustrates that the Central Daily News showed more dramatic increases and decreases in reporting frequency in most of the
thematic categories. This is particularly true on thematic categories,
# 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side," with a
frequency total of 3,244; # 10 "Regression and Defectors," with
2,545; #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration With The ROC," with 1,989;
# 12 "Commentary Unfavorable on The Other side," with 1,958; #21
"Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side," with 1,790;
#22 "Promote A Warmer Relationship with the United States," with
1,795; #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side,"
with 1,546; #7 "Chinese," with 1,519; and #6 "One China," with
1,386.
Among these categories, # 10 "Regressions and Defectors,"
shown in Figures 2 and 3, had a more dramatic increase in reporting
frequency in the Central Daily News than the other categories.
When PRC air force pilot Sun Tienchin defected to the ROC
through South Korea in August 1983, the greatest increase in reporting frequency in the trend of Figure 3 occurred. The second greatest
increase came during October 1982, when a flux of invited overseas
Chinese visited Taiwan. These dramatic increases indicate that the
Central Daily News intended to use these events as publicity to promote a favorable image toward the ROC, and to promote an unfavorable image toward the PRC.
Thematic category # 10 appeared in both newspapers as an obvious propaganda and consensus strategy against the other side.
"Regressions" were the visits made by overseas Chinese or Chinese from the other side; such visits are encouraged by both Chinese
governments.
The well-known overseas Chinese who have visited both the PRC
and the ROC include two Nobel-prize-winning scientists Cheng-tao Li
and Samuel Chao-chung Ting, Columbia University professors Chienhsiung Wu and Chia-liu Yuan, the first Chinese American astronaut
Taylor Kan-chun Wang, architect I.M. Pei, pianist Fu Cong, violinist
Chao-len Lin, computer enterprising billionaire An Wang, Olympic
ice-skating medal winner Tiffany Ting-ting Chen, writer Rao-si Chen,
politician Anna Chennault, and political science professors James
Chien Hsiung and Parris Hsu-chen Chang. Most were received personally by leaders of both sides; their visits highly publicized by the
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China they were visiting, but they were seldom mentioned in the newspaper of the other side.
Shanghai-born and Taipei-raised astronaut Taylor Kan-chun
Wang presented a PRC flag to PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang in Peking
on July 7, 1985. Four weeks later, on August 5, Wang presented an
ROC flag to ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua in Taipei. Wang claimed that
each of the flags had accompanied him on his space trip in May 1985
aboard the space shuttle Challenger: the ROC flag was taken up without the consent of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration. 1
The defectors most played up by the People's Daily were ROC air
force pilots Ta-wei Li and Chi-cheng Huang, ROC political theorist Bi
Ma, ROC television variety show producer Ah-yuan Huang, and ROC
singer Te-chien Hou. Those most played up by the Central Daily
News were PRC air force pilots Sun Tienchin, Wu Ruoken, Wang
Hsuanchen and Fan Yuanyen, PRC civilian aircraft hijacker Cho
Changjen and his five colleagues, and PRC cellist Li Tienhui.
The Central Daily News took advantage of the propaganda opportunity of the former PRC tennis player Hu Na's visit to Taiwan in
June 1985. Hu defected to the United States in 1982, causing a temporary rift in PRC-U.S. relations. The 19-year-old female tennis star had
won many international tennis tournaments for the PRC and her action therefore greatly embarrassed the PRC, causing it temporarily to
cancel cultural exchange programs with the United States. The PRC
made numerous acrimonious statements, and even a personal attack
on President Reagan after the United States refused to send Hu Na
back to the PRC. Hu was granted political asylum in 1983. 2
More obvious differences in reporting frequency by the two newspapers can be seen in Figures 4-17, which graph frequencies of the 14
thematic categories of political, military, societal and economic reports and commentaries about the other side.
Both newspapers show a much higher frequency of unfavorable
reports and commentaries than favorable or neutral ones. As shown
in Figures 6, 9, 12, 15 and 17, the Central Daily News had a considerably higher frequency of unfavorable reports about the PRC than the
People's Daily had about the ROC. Both newspapers had a very low
frequency on favorable and neutral reports and commentaries.
I. People's Daily, July 10, 1985, and Central Daily News, August 6, 1985.
2. James A.R. Nafziger, "The Cultural Dimension: Cultural Relations Between
American and Chinese on Either Side of the Taiwan Strait," in Frederick Tse-shyang Chen,
ed., China Policy and National Security (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational, 1984), pp. 120121.

70

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

The trends revealed in Figures 4-17 indicate that the two newspapers and parties have a great problem in building mutual understanding, which integration theory regards as essential for achieving
integration.
The trends of reporting frequency in the thematic categories of
Factors I-V, other than those categories of reporting about the other
side, are shown in Figures 18-39.
1.

Reporting Trends for Factor I: Nationalism Consensus

Among the trends of Factor I (Figures 18-28), thematic category

# 39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC" (Figure 23) shows a

trend of dramatic increases and decreases in reporting by the Central
Daily News. This suggests that the Central Daily News or the Nationalist Party felt a constant military threat from the PRC to forcefully
integrate the ROC.
For thematic category #6 "The Traditional Political Philosophy
of 'One China' " (Figure 20) there have generally been corresponding
increases and decreases in frequency between the two newspapers;
however, the Central Daily News shows a higher amount of reporting
frequencies, suggesting that both newspapers or parties have respected
the traditional political philosophy of "one China." The highest peak
in reporting frequencies on this theme came during October 1981, after the PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal was initiated on September
30, 1981.
There are also peaks during the same month for related categories: #45 "The PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the
Two Parties" (Figure 18), #41 "The PRC's 1981 Nine-Point Peace
Proposal" (Figure 19), and #42 "The PRC's Three-Link, Four-Exchange Peace Proposal" (Figure 21). These peaks suggest that the
"PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal" has been a very important issue.
The reporting trends of thematic category # 5 "The Hsin-hai
Revolution in 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party"
(Figure 22) show high peaks for the Central Daily News during its
regular memorial months of October (the Nationalist Revolution occurred in October 1911). The People's Daily shows a sudden peak in
October 1981. Reports at this time focused on the "PRC's Nine-Point
Peace Proposal."
A similar situation occurs for thematic category #4 "Sun Yatsen as the Revolutionary Leader, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's
Widow" (Figure 20). Here, the Central Daily News shows regular
higher peaks of reporting frequencies on Sun's birthday, Sun's death,
and revolution-success day. The People's Daily shows a sudden peak
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in June 1981 after the death of Soong Ching Ling on May 29, 1981.
At this time, the People's Daily called on the Nationalist Party to join
in peace talks and to work for peaceful integration inspired by a common loyalty to Sun Yat-sen. This difference suggests that the Central
Daily News regularly reported on this event every October, while the
People's Daily used this theme for the more specific purpose of peace
talks.
For thematic category #43 "The PRC's Peace-Talk Proposal to
the ROC" (Figure 25), the highest peak for the People's Daily came
during January 1979, shortly after the PRC established diplomatic relations with the United States, subsequently calling on the ROC to
join in peace talks. This suggests that the PRC quickly took the opportunity to offer peace talks to the diplomatically isolated ROC. The
peak decreased after the ROC rejected the PRC's offer in the same
month.
In the trends of thematic categories #9 "The Separated Relatives" (Figure 24) and #8 "The Separation of People from Native
Towns" (Figure 27), the People's Daily shows the higher peaks in reporting frequency; the Central Daily shows a very flat trend-line.
These trends suggest that the PRC has used more sentimental appeals
than the ROC toward the integration issue.
The trends of thematic category #40 "ROC's Proposal to Integrate Under the Three Principles of the People" (Figure 28) also revealed a significant difference between the two newspapers. The
Central Daily News shows an increase in reporting frequency in January 1981; the People's Daily shows a nearly flat trend-line at the zero
frequency level. The People's Daily did not mention this theme.
2.

Reporting Trends for Factor 11· Mutual Understanding

For Factor II, Figures 4, 10, 11, 13 and 16 were analyzed previously; they show the trends in reports and commentaries on the other
side.
In thematic category #28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technology" (Figure 29), the People's Daily shows a higher and more irregular trend than the Central Daily News. This suggests that the PRC
wished to acquire more American transfer of scientific technology
from the United States after the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two countries in January 1979. The Central Daily News
shows a noticeable increase in this category in January 1984. The two
trends suggest that the PRC and the ROC agree that the transfer of
American technology is essential.
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3.

Reporting Trends for Factor III: Economic Function

The trends of thematic category # 36 "The PRC's Hong Kong
Integrative Model" (Figure 31) show peaks in September 1982, when
the PRC started negotiations with Britain to return the sovereignty of
Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997. Both newspapers show the highest
peak of reporting frequency in September 1984 when the PRC and
Britain signed an agreement regarding Hong Kong. The People's Daily
reported the event with a tone of celebration. The Central Daily News
reported it with a condemning attitude.
In thematic category # 34 "The PRC's One Nation, Two Systems
Integrative Model" (Figure 30) there are dramatic peaks in September
and October of 1984. This suggests that this model did not become a
subject of serious debate between the PRC and the ROC until then.
The trends for thematic category #51 "PRC's Special Economic
Zones" (Figure 32) show that the People's Daily started to report
about this theme in May 1981; it began to emphasize it more in November and December of 1984. The Central Daily News started reporting on this theme at about the same time; it increased its reporting
frequencies in 1982 and 1983 with an unfavorable tone.
4. . Reporting Trends for Factor IV: U.S.-China Policy
There are both dramatic increases and dramatic decreases in the
reporting frequencies of the thematic categories of Factor IV. This is
shown in the trends of thematic categories # 22 "Promoting a
Warmer Relationship with the United States" (Figure 33), #23 "Calling on the United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the
Other Side" (Figure 34), #24 "The PRC's Diplomatic Relationship
with the United States" (Figure 35), #29 "Emphasis on PRC's or
ROC's Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States and the
World" (Figure 36), and # 1 "One Greater China Territory" (Figure
37).
The figures show peaks of reporting frequencies during the periods of new establishment of PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations in January
1979 and President Reagan's visit to the PRC in April 1984. These
trends indicate that both newspapers and both parties tried to influence U.S. China policy by arguing that Taiwan is a part of China.
The Central Daily News hit peaks of reporting frequencies on
these themes more often than the People's Daily, suggesting that the
Central Daily News expressed a stronger concern than the People's
Daily over U.S.-China policy.
For thematic category #35 (Figure 35), both newspapers show a
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high peak in December 1978 when PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations
were announced on December 15, 1978. The frequencies suddenly
drop in the months following January 1979. The figure then shows a
moderately flat line for both newspapers. These trends suggest the acceptance of the new diplomatic reality by both the PRC and the ROC.
For thematic category #29 (Figure 36), both newspapers show
mild increases and decreases of reporting frequencies. This suggests
that both newspapers have regularly emphasized their country's strategic importance to the United States.

5.

Reporting Trends for Factor V.· U.S. Protecting-Taiwan
Policy

For Factor V, thematic categories #26 "U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan" (Figure 38) and #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act" (Figure 39)
show peaks in reporting frequency for both newspapers in June 1981
and August 1982, when the PRC started to put pressure on the United
States to abolish Taiwan Relations Act and to stop arms sales to Taiwan. On August 17, 1982, the PRC announced the signing of a joint
communique with the United States, which agreed to reduce arms
sales to Taiwan.
The Central Daily News shows higher peaks on these two events
in these months than the People's Daily. This suggests that the ROC
cares more about the U.S. policy of protecting Taiwan with its arms
sales and the Taiwan Relations Act than does the PRC; it also reflects
that Taiwan's security and peaceful or forceful integration with the
mainland are influenced by and dependent on the U.S. protecting-Taiwan policy.
Directional Analysis
1. Directional Analysis in Reporting About the Other Side
To obtain a complete overview of the direction of each newspaper
as it reports about the other side, the following 14 thematic categories
were grouped together for the T -test:
# 13 "Favorable Political Report About the Other Side."
# 14 "Neutral Political Report About the Other Side."
# 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side."
# 16 "Favorable Military Report About the Other Side."
# 17 "Neutral Military Report About the Other Side."
# 18 "Unfavorable Military Report About the Other Side."
# 19 "Favorable Societal Report About the Other Side."
#20 "Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side."
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#21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side."
#50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side."
#53 "Favorable Economic Report About the Other Side."
#54 "Neutral Economic Report About the Other Side."
# 11 "Commentary Favorable to the Other Side."
# 12 "Commentary Unfavorable to the Other Side."
The percentages of the total reporting frequencies in this group
should be previewed for an overall picture to analyze the T -test results. The three directions are favorable, neutral and unfavorable.
Since commentary usually is not neutral, and no thematic category is designed for neutral commentary to the other side, the breakdown did not include thematic categories # 11 and # 12.
Table 8 shows that during six and a half years, or 78 months, the
two newspapers together had a frequency of 9,093 in reporting about
the other side. The People's Daily had a frequency of 1,485, or 16.33
percent, and the Central Daily News, 7,608, or 83.66 percent.
TABLE 8
PERCENTAGES OF REPORTING FREQUENCIES
IN DIRECTIONAL CATEGORIES
Favorable
Neutral
Unfavorable
Total
M
P
M
S
E
s E P M S E
PD
32 2 191 107
53
4 139
18 291
13 384 251
214
939
Subtotal
1485
332
16.33%
2.35%
10.33%
3.65%
CDN 124 53
14 22 331 102
14
13 3244 355 1790 1546
460
213
6935
7608
Subtotal
76.27% 83.665%
5.06%
2.34%
674
9093
7874
545
PD&
Total
86.59%
CDN
5.99%
7.41%
100%
*PD: the People's Daily; CND: the Central Daily.
P: Political Report About The Other Side, Themes # 13, 14 and 15.
M: Military Report About The Other Side, Themes # 16, 17 and 18.
S: Societal Report About The Other Side, Themes #19, 20 and 21.
E: Economic Report About The Other Side, Themes #53, 54 and 50.
p

The Central Daily News showed four times more reporting frequencies than the People's Daily in reporting about the other side.
This suggests that the Central Daily News considered it more important to inform its readers about the other side for the sake of China's
national integration. It can be interpreted that the Central Daily News
felt more threatened about the other side's ideas on integration and
therefore was more defensive.
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Table 8 also shows that the two newspapers had a total reporting
frequency of 7,874, or 80.59 percent, for unfavorable reports about the
other side; 674, or 7.41 percent, for neutral reports; and 545, or 5.99
percent, for favorable reports.
Individually, the People's Daily had a reporting frequency of 939,
or 10.33 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 214, or
2.35 percent, for neutral reports; and 332, or 3.65 percent, for
favorable reports.
The Central Daily News showed a frequency of 6,935, or 76.27
percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 460, or 5.06 percent for neutral reports and 213, or 2.34 percent, for favorable reports.
Both newspapers showed a higher frequency of unfavorable than
of neutral or favorable reports about the other side. The Central Daily
News showed 14 times more unfavorable than neutral reporting frequencies and 31 times more unfavorable than favorable reporting frequencies about the other side. The People's Daily showed three times
more unfavorable than neutral reporting frequencies and two times
more unfavorable than favorable reporting frequencies about the other
side. The Central Daily News showed almost seven times more unfavorable reporting frequencies about the other side. This breakdown
suggests that objective reporting, fair and balanced objectivity about
the other side, was not to be found in either newspaper.
Table 9 shows a breakdown of reporting frequencies about the
other side in political, military, societal and economic categories. The
two newspapers together showed a frequency of 4,075, or 44.81 percent, in political reporting about the other side; 2,532, or 27.85 percent, in societal reporting; 1,957, or 21.52 percent, in economic
reporting; and 529, or 5.82 percent, in military reporting.
Individually, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 714, or
7.85 percent in societal reporting; 371, or 4.14 percent, in political reporting; 376, or 4.14 percent, in economic reporting; and 19, or 0.2
percent, in military reporting.
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TABLE 9
PERCENTAGES OF REPORTING FREQUENCIES
IN DIRECfiONAL CATEGORIES
Military

Political
PO

CON

PO&
CON

Societal

F

N

u

F

N

u

F

N

32

53

291

2

4

13

191

139

Subtotal

376
4.14%

124 331

3244

19
0.2%
53

102

355

Economic

u

N

u

384

107

18

251

714
7.85%
14

14

Total

F

1790

376
4.14%
22

13

1485
16.33%

1546

3699
40.68%

510
5.6%

1818
19.99%

1581
17.39%

7608
83.66%

Total 4075
44.81%

529
5.82%

2532
27.85%

1957
21.52%

9093
100%

*PO: the People's Daily; CON: the Central Daily News.
F: Favorable Report About The Other Side, Themes # 13, 16, 19 and 53.
N: Neutral Report About The Other Side, Themes #14, 17, 20 and 54.
U: Unfavorable Report About The Other Side, Themes #15, 18, 21 and 50.

The Central Daily News showed a frequency of 3,699, or 40.68
percent, in political reporting; 1,818, or 19.99 percent, in societal reporting; 1,581, or 17.39 percent, in economic reporting; and 510, or
5.6 percent, in military reporting. These figures indicate that the People's Daily paid more attention to the ROC's societal affairs than to
political, economic or military affairs. The Central Daily News paid
more attention to the PRC's political affairs than to societal, economic
or military affairs.
Both newspapers showed very high frequencies or percentages of
unfavorable reports about the other side in all four thematic categories. In economic reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of
251 out of 376, or 66.76 percent, for unfavorable reports about the
other side; the Central Daily News, 1,546 out of 1,581, or 97.78 percent. In political reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of
291 out of 376, or 77.39 percent, for unfavorable reports about the
other side; the Central Daily News, 3,244 out of 3,699, or 87.7 percent.
In societal reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 384 out
of 714, or 53.78 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side.
The Central Daily News, 1,790 out of 1,818, or 98.45 percent. In military reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 13 out of 19,
or 68.42 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; the Central Daily News, 355 out of 510, or 69.6 percent.
The small frequencies or percentages in military reporting about
the other side could either show that neither side has really felt much
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of a military threat from the other side, or else neither side intentionally wants its readers to know about or to fear a military threat.
The results 3 of the T-test show the People's Daily and the Central
Daily News were significantly different in political, military, societal
and economic reporting about the other side, regardless of whether the
reports were favorable, neutral or unfavorable. Neutral economic reports were the only exception. Both newspapers show small and similar frequencies of neutral economic reports about the other side. The
People's Daily showed a frequency of 18, and the Central Daily News,
13. The results of the T-test demonstrate neutral economic reports
were not significantly different between the two newspapers, nor were
they significant when compared with the other thematic categories of
reporting the other side. This suggests that neither newspaper reported about the other side's economic situation neutrally enough.
The sharpest difference between the two newspapers occurred in
thematic categories # 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the
Other Side", #21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other
Side", #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side."
For # 15 "Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side,"
the People's Daily shows a frequency of 291, the Central Daily News,
3,244.

For #21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side, the
People's Daily shows a frequency of 384, the Central Daily News,
1,790.
For #50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side,"
the People's Daily shows a frequency of 251, the Central Daily News,
1,546.
These findings suggest that the readers of the Central Daily News
have received more unfavorable reports and therefore have likely developed an unfavorable image about the PRC's political, societal and
economic situation.
Unfavorable economic and societal reporting in the Central Daily
News mostly compared the living standard in the PRC with the higher
living standard in the ROC. No attention was given to the contrasting
sizes in population or land of the two countries. The content probably
has persuaded the readers of the Central Daily News since they do
enjoy a higher living standard. It has likely driven readers away from
any interest in integrating with the PRC, most of the reporting being
in a cynical, unsympathetic tone.
The sharp differences between these three thematic categories,
3. Detailed results of the T-Test are omitted in this edition; available upon request.
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and the significant difference between the two newspapers in most of
their reporting about the other side, strengthens the argument of Hypothesis III. This also shows that the corresponding "Mutual Understanding" factor (Factor II) is an important but weak factor in China's
national integration; both newspapers have reported about the other
side without trying to achieve any mutual understanding, required by
integration theory as a basis for integration.
The results of the T-test show a significant difference between the
two newspapers in thematic categories # 11 "Commentary Favorable
on the Other Side" and# 12 "Commentary Unfavorable on the Other
Side." The People's Daily offered more commentary favorable to the
other side; the Central Daily News shows an eight times greater frequency of commentary unfavorable to the other side than the People's
Daily, suggesting a hard-line editorial policy by the Central Daily
News, a policy unfavorable to the PRC on the China national integration issue. The People's Daily used a reconciliatory approach with
more commentary favorable to the ROC, causing the Central Daily
News to call this approach a "trick with smiles" and a "sugar-coated
poison."
This finding further suggests that there is a large gap between the
two newspapers or parties in building mutual trust and understanding
for integration.
Results of the T-Test on Five Factors
The results of the T-test on the 22 thematic categories, other than
those reports about the other side, show that the two newspapers used
significantly different approaches of reporting in 15 thematic
categories.
The results reveal that the two newspapers only agreed on the
aim of "nationalism consensus." They disagreed on any particular integrative methods or models, on "mutual understanding," on "economic function," on "U.S.-China Policy," and on "U.S. Protecting
Taiwan Policy."
The sharpest differences are seen in thematic categories # 39
"PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act," #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," #22 "Promoting a Warmer
Relationship with the United States," #23 "Calling On the United
States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other Side," and
#6 "One China."
In #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," the People's
Daily shows a frequency of 38, the Central Daily News, 1,989. It could
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be interpreted that the Central Daily News felt threatened that the
PRC might use forceful means to achieve integration.
In #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act," the People's Daily shows a
frequency of 50, the Central Daily News, 410. This difference suggests
that the ROC felt a great need for the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act to
protect it from forced integration.
In #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," the People's Daily shows a frequency
of 94, the Central Daily News, 815. The Central Daily News showed a
greater play for U.S. attention. The strategy was likely based on the
desire to gain more defensive arms sales from the United States.
In #22 "Promoting a Warmer Relationship with the United
States," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 356, the Central Daily
News, 1,795. This shows that the Central Daily News has been more
concerned about promoting the ROC's unofficial relationship with the
United States than the People's Daily has been in promoting its official
relationship with the United States.
In #23 "Calling on the United States to Maintain a colder Relationship with the Other Side," the People's Daily shows a frequency of
181, the Central Daily News, 716. This suggests that the Central Daily
News has tried harder to persuade the United States to restrain its
relationship with the PRC than the People's Daily has for the U.S.
relationship with the ROC.
Along with #22, these two categories show that the Central
Daily News expressed more of a need for U.S. interests in China's national integration than did the People's Daily.
In #6 "One China," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 560,
the Central Daily News, 1,386. The Central Daily News shows almost
three times the frequency as the People's Daily. This could be interpreted to mean that the Central Daily News felt "one China" integration was more important than the People's Daily did. It also could be
said that by maintaining a "one China" policy, the ROC has the advantage of decreasing, or at least not increasing, any immediate threat
by the PRC to integrate by forceful means. This is probably true because there is a consensus on the "one China" policy.
The PRC seems to be willing to tolerate the status quo of Taiwan
until integration is completed if the ROC maintains a "one China"
policy and maintains a common intention to unify with the mainland.
A "one China" policy helps the ROC to maintain the legitimacy of its
central government; the ROC maintains that it will eventually return
to the mainland and is only temporarily in Taiwan.
For thematic categories # 5, 4, 40, 43, 36, 28, 29, 1 and 24, the

80

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Central Daily News also shows significantly higher totals of reporting
frequency than the People's Daily.
In # 5 "The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 Led by Sun Yat-Sen
and his Nationalist Party," the People's Daily shows a frequency of
201, the Central Daily News, 798. The high frequency for the Central
Daily News is a result of its tradition of reporting on the revolution as
an annual memorial event. The People's Daily began reporting more
about the revolution in 1981, using reporting as part of its peace
overture.
In #4 "Sun Yat-Sen as the Revolutionary Leader who Overthrew the Manchu Empire, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's Widow and
the PRC's Honorary President," the People's Daily shows a frequency
of 440, the Central Daily News, 707. The People's Daily has used this
theme of Sun and his widow as part of its attempt to appeal to the
ROC to join in peace talks. The Central Daily News has had more
regular reports on Sun's birthday and Sun's death, and has mentioned
Sun in most reports concerning governmental speeches or
announcements.
In #40 "ROC's Proposal to Integrate Under the Three Principles of the People," the People's Daily shows a frequency of two, the
Central Daily News, 124. This suggests that the People's Daily has
tried to ignore this proposal from the ROC, while the Central Daily
News has promoted it.
In #43 "The PRC's Peace-Talk Proposal to the ROC," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 163, the Central Daily News, 453.
This reveals the ROC's continuous resistance of the PRC's proposals
for peace talks.
In #36 "The PRC's Hong Kong Model to Integrate the ROC,"
the People's Daily shows a frequency of 183, the Central Daily News,
436. This reveals that the Central Daily News has used almost twice
the frequency as the People's Daily in discussing and rejecting the
PRC's Hong Kong Model to integrate the ROC.
In thematic categories #28, 29, 1 and 24, the Central Daily News
reveals a strong need by the ROC for U.S. support to fight against
pressures and threats from the PRC. The need for U.S. support was
especially crucial after official ties were cut between the ROC and the
United States.
In #28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 46, the Central Daily News, 223.
In #29 "Emphasis of its Strategic Importance to Asia, the
United States and the World," the People's Daily shows a frequency of
72, the Central Daily News, 149.
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In # 1 "One Greater China Territory," the People's Daily shows a
frequency of 323, the Central Daily News, 442.
In #24 "The PRC's Diplomatic Relationship with the United
States," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 167, the Central Daily
News, 327.
On the other hand, in thematic categories #45, 41, 42, 9, 8 and
51, the People's Daily shows significantly higher totals of reporting frequency than the Central Daily News.
All six of these categories were related to the PRC's peace proposals and strategies to integrate the ROC under its rule; these strategies were rejected by the Central Daily News.
In #45 "The PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the
Two Parties," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 175, the Central
Daily News, 69.
In #41 "The PRC's 1981 Nine-Point Peace Proposal," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 118, the Central Daily News, 90.
In #42 "The PRC's 1979 Three-Link and Four-Exchange Peace
Proposal," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 183, the Central
Daily News, 88.
In #9 "The Separation of Relatives Divided by the Taiwan
States," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 180, the Central Daily
News, 14.
In #8 "The Separation of People from their Native Towns," the
People's Daily shows a frequency of 106, the Central Daily News, 49.
In #9 and #8, the data reveal that the People's Daily wanted
these sentimental appeals transmitted or relayed to the people on Taiwan even though they usually do not have access to the newspaper.
The Central Daily News reported on these two categories for sentimental appeal; they presented them as an expression by the people from
the mainland residing in Taiwan, not necessarily for the purpose of
transmitting them to the PRC.
In #51 "The PRC's Special Economic Zones," the People's Daily
shows a frequency of 51, the Central Daily News, 39. The two newspapers have a very close total reporting frequency but with an opposite
attitude in this category. The People's Daily tried to promote its new
special economic zones with eventual economic function of integration
with the ROC in mind; however, the Central Daily News rejected this
idea firmly.
In #34 "The PRC's One Nation and Two Systems Model," the
two newspapers show the same total reporting frequency of 75 but
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with completely opposite opinions on the theme. The People's Daily
promoted it, the Central Daily News rejected it.
All of the PRC's integrative methods or models promoted by the
People's Daily were rejected by the Central Daily News; both sides,
however, did agree on the policy of "One-China Nationalism." The
above results of the T -test on the 22 thematic categories show that the
two newspapers did have sharp differences in reporting on integrative
methods and models.
Descriptions of Five Factors
The descriptions of the five factors and their 28 thematic categories focused on the major issues of consensus or disagreement that the
two newspapers or parties have argued. The major issues of consensus
and disagreement are pinpointed in an analysis of the initial announcements, historical events, and fundamental ideologies that the two
newspapers or parties have used in their propaganda struggle on
China's national integration. This approach avoids tedious, details
and confusing items by presenting every article of reporting frequency.
This approach should give a full comprehension of the overall issue of
China's national integration as the two newspapers reported on it during the December 1978 to May 1985 time period.
1.

Factor 1· Nationalism Consensus

Factor I with 11 thematic categories manifests the properties of
the dimension of nationalism consensus as postulated in Hypothesis
II. All 11 thematic categories have a common appeal: nationalism.
Both newspapers used the appeal of nationalism in their bid for
China's national integration, each side offered its integrative method
or model and rejected any integrative method or model offered by the
other side on the basis of nationalism.
In Factor I, the most dramatic evidence of using nationalism-consensus appeal were reports in the two newspapers on the open letters
and announcements made by the leaders of the PRC and the ROC
addressed directly to the people and the leaders of the other side. For
example, in the People's Daily on December 18, 1978, peace talks were
first proposed by PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, two days after the PRC
and the United States announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The PRC, trying to express its peaceful intentions, announced
that it would immediately stop bombardments of the ROC-controlled
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.
On page one of the People's Daily on January 1, 1979, a report
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announced a message to compatriots in Taiwan calling for reunification. The "PRC's Three-Link, Four-Exchange Peace Proposal" was
first mentioned in this message. The "three links"-postal, transportation services and trade-and "four exchanges"-relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups and sports representativeswere considered by the PRC as the first step toward peace talks with
the ROC. The message's nationalism appeal was clear:
We place our hope on the 17 million people in Taiwan, including the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities
have always firmly stood for one China and opposed an independent Taiwan. We take the same stand and it is the basis for our cooperation. Our position has always been that
all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility of reunifying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make
valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland. . . The reunification of the motherland is the sacred
mission history has handed to our generation. . . Let us join
hands and work together for this glorious goal!
The People's Daily on January 6, 1979, first called on "Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo" to join in peace talks for reunification. The People's
Daily on February 4, 1979, published a full page of color pictures of
Taiwan's scenery. It was the only color page in the People's Daily
during the survey period of six and a half years.
The People's Daily on May 31, 1981, reported another of the
PRC's sentimental appeals to the ROC's leaders. It invited the relatives of Soong Ching Ling to join in her funeral in Peking. Soong, who
died on May 29, 1981, was Sun Yat-sen's widow, the sister-in-law of
Chiang Kai-shek, the aunt of Chiang Ching-kuo, and the honorary
president of the PRC. The invitation included reimbursement expenses and free landing from ROC airlines. The People's Daily on
June 4, 1981, also reported Deng Xiaoping's appeal at Soong's memorial services for peace talks with the ROC. The Central Daily News,
however, ignored both appeals, offering little coverage of Soong's
death.
On page one of the People's Daily on October 1, 1981, a report
announced the "PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal." Ye Jiangying,
chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, also expressed an appeal to nationalism in this proposal:
We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play
to their patriotism and work energetically for the early reali-
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zation of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of
it.
The Central Daily News on October 7, 1981, reported a response
by ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo to the PRC's Nine-Point Peace
Proposal, also with a sentimental appeal to the people on the
mainland:
The Chinese Communists have never ceased to manufacture
their rumors of peace talks, but we never paid any attention.
At one time they clamored for "washing Taiwan in blood."
Then they shifted to the call for "return and identification."
Now they shout their demands for talks on a "reciprocal"
basis and joint "leadership." Tomorrow they will coin another slogan and try to effect another deception.
In solemnly expressing this view, I want to tell our compatriots on the Chinese Mainland that we are resolved toremove the yoke that the Communists have imposed upon
them ... We must tell our mainland compatriots of our confidence and determination to deliver them and assure them
that we shall never talk with the Communists they hate so
deeply.
The People's Daily on October 10, 1981, reported that Hu
Yaobang, secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, had
made an extremely sentimental appeal to ROC President Chiang
Ching-kuo in his speech at the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Hsin-hai
Revolution:
Does Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo not love his natal land? Doesn't
he want to have Mr. Chiang Kai-shek's remains moved back
and buried in the cemetery of the Chiang family in Fenghua?
In my capacity as a leading member of the Communist
Party, I today invite Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo, Mr. Shieh
Tung-ming, Mr. Sun Yun-suan, Mr. Tsiang Yien-si, Mr.
Kao Kuei-yuan, Mr. Chiang Wei-kuo and Mr. Lin Yangkang, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Yen Chia-kan,
Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Ho Ying-chin, Mr. Chen Li-fu, Mr.
Huang Chieh, Mr. Chang Hsueh-liang and others, and personages in all walks of life in Taiwan to visit the mainland
and their natal places. It would be good if they wanted to
talk with us, but they are also welcome if they do not want to
talk with us for the time being. What have Mr. Chiang
Ching-kuo and the others and the compatriots in all walks of
life in Taiwan to lose if they do this? Foreign aid is impor-
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tant, but what is most important, most reliable and most
powerful is the great patriotic unity of one billion people of
our own country.
The great cause of reunifying the motherland peacefully
and making the Chinese nation prosperous and strong depends on no more than taking the decision or a turning of
the hand. Let us consider Dr. Sun Yat-sen's teaching,
"agreeing with the trend of world affairs and serving the urgent needs of the community," join hands and work together
to create a new glorious page in the history of the Chinese
nation!
The Central Daily News never mentioned Hu's appeal; the PRC,
however, did not give up easily on this personal sentimental appeal to
Chiang. On page one of the People's Daily on July 25, 1982, Liao
Chengzhi, the PRC official in charge of Taiwan relations, issued an
open and warm letter to his former friend and schoolmate, ROC President Chiang, offering to come to Taiwan to initiate "peace talks." In
the letter, he also made an appeal to nationalism:
Dear Brother Ching-kuo:
... From our childhood friendship to our chats in the
Soviet capital, everything in the past is still alive in my memory. But it's unfortunate that we haven't heard from each
other for so many years. Recently I was told that you are
somewhat indisposed and this has caused me much concern.
Men in their seventies are often afflicted with illness. I sincerely hope that you will take good care of yourself.
Over the past three years, our party has repeatedly proposed talks with your party to bury the hatchet and work
jointly to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. But you have time and again announced that there
should be "no contact, no talks and no compromise," which
I think is inadvisable.
. . .Since you are presiding over the administration of
Taiwan, you have unshirkable responsibility for the realization of a third cooperation. It would be easier to talk the
matter over when leaders on both sides used to be schoolmates and close friends who know one another well. I find it
really hard to subscribe to those views which describe cooperation as surrender, humiliating, suffering losses or being
duped. . .Such talks as reunifying China under the Three

86

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

Principles of the People are regarded by all sensible people as
unrealistic, deceptive and self-deceiving.
People of our generation know the true meaning of the
Three Principles of the People quite well and there is no need
to argue about it. Neither is there any need to dwell on such
assertions as Taiwan's economic prosperity, democracy and
easy livelihood, the truth of which the venerable gentlemen
in Taiwan know clearly. For the sake of your party, I would
think that if you take up the historical responsibility and resolutely take part in peace talks to accomplish national
reunification. . .
I recently read one of your writings in which you expressed "fervent hopes that my father's soul would be able to
return to the homeland and be reunited with the forefathers." I was overwhelmed with emotion when I read this.
The remains of your father are still placed temporarily at
Cihu. After reunification, they should be moved back and
buried in the native soil-in Fenghua, Najing or Lushan-in
fulfillment of your filial wishes. You recently said, "Filial
devotion should be expanded into national devotion, which
means love of the nation and dedication to the country."
This is an excellent statement. Why don't you apply it to the
great cause of national reunification? As far as the country
and the nation are concerned, this would be an answer of the
two generations of the Chiangs to history and as far as you
yourself are concerned, this would be an expression of both
loyalty and filial piety. Otherwise how could you account
for yourself after your passing away? It is hoped that you
would think more about it.
Dear brother! Your life has been marked by frustrations, which should not be attributed to fate ... I hope you,
my brother, would be good at making the choice... What are
you waiting for, staying away from home?
The longing for old friends grows with age. If it is convenient to you, I would pack and set out for a visit to Taibei
to seek enlightenment from our elders. For all the disasters
the brotherhood has remained; a smile at meeting, and enmity is banished. When I look towards the distant southern
sky, my heart is already there. No word is enough to express
what I wish to say. Hope you will take care of yourself. I
am waiting impatiently for a reply.
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Please convey my regards to your mother as well as to
Fangliang, Weikuo and the children.
The Central Daily News did not report about or respond to Liao's
appeal until three weeks later. It released an open letter by Soong
Mei-ling in New York on August 17, 1982. Soong, widow of Chiang
Kai-shek and younger sister of Soong Ching Ling, responded on behalf of Chiang Ching-kuo with a negative reply to Liao's peace-talks
proposal. The People's Daily was not discouraged by the ROC's refusal for peace talks; it has kept reporting these nostalgic messages of
reunification appeal from relatives and old friends of the Chiang
family.
The People's Daily on June 5, 1983, reported another personal
appeal to the ROC people by PRC leader Deng Yingchao. Deng,
widow of PRC Premier Chou En-lai, said, "Peaceful reunification of
our motherland is a common desire of the people of all nationalities of
China and a glorious task history has placed on our generation."
Deng also called on the people of Taiwan to display patriotism for
reunification. The Central Daily News did not report about Deng's
appeal.
When the People's Daily reported another of Deng's appeals on
January 17, 1984, the Central Daily News on February 17, 1984 responded with a public letter from Soong Mei-ling in New York. At
the Sun Yat-sen Research Association and Nationalist meeting, Deng
called for cooperation between the two parties for peace talks and
reunification. Soong rejected Deng's appeal with a personal touch:
. . .I had on several occasions met with you in Chungking
during the war of resistance against Japan, inquiring of your
views on the war and on the prospects of our national future.
We were impressed with your objectivity and your understanding of the multitudinous problems facing our country ... Since then, I have often wondered why you should be
obsessed by Marxism authored by an anti-God German Jew,
who was and continued to be scorned by the God-fearing
Jewish people?
Were you a member of the Nationalist Party, I would
have addressed you as comrade; were you a member of society at large, I would address you as Mrs. Chou or Miss Teng.
All these forms amongst you the practice is to call everyone
by one's name-surname and all. Being reared in the Chinese tradition, however, it is my wont to greet everyone
courteously. I hope you would understand whereof I speak.
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Now that you have passed the proverbial hoary three
score and ten, it behooves you to be beyond fear of displeasing your confreres. Should you be speaking from your heart,
persuade those who have been led astray to follow truly the
examples of Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People, which
you exhorted in your own speech at the recent commemorative meeting. Should you and others work for the reunification of China, then the mainlanders, like the compatriots in
Taiwan, will enjoy freedom, peace, prosperity, happiness and
an upward mobility to a bright future.
Other sentimental and nationalism-oriented reports in the People's Daily and the Central Daily News were written in a literary style.
These come under the themes "Homesick" and "Relatives"; some
were even in the form of poetry. They presumably could have little
effect since the targeted readers have little chance to read the newspaper of the opposite side.
As for the peace talks for a third cooperation, both newspapers
reported that both parties had already had two bitter experiences of
cooperation-from 1922 to 1927, and from 1938 to 1948. Both newspapers and parties have maintained their own interpretations of the
two earlier brief periods of cooperation. The respective interpretations
of those periods have shaped each party's perception of the other, and
of the best means for reunifying China.
The Central Daily News asserted that within these two periods of
interaction are the chief reasons for the Communist Party's victory
over the Chinese mainland in 1949.
The incidents were significant during these two periods: One was
the admission of Communist members into the Nationalist Party in
1924 by Sun Yat-sen to gain assistance from the Soviet Union to overthrow the Chinese feudal warlords. Right up to his death in 1925, Sun
believed cooperation between the two parties was necessary. Chiang
Kai-shek, on the other hand, hardly showed Sun's tolerance. He denounced the Communists in April 1927 and terminated the first cooperation in the same year. The second incident was the creation of the
second cooperation in 1936 after Chiang was kidnapped in Xian by his
own generals because he agreed to join forces with the Communists to
fight Japan. 4
With then unpleasant experiences of cooperation made more unpleasant by fundamental political and philosophical disagreements, the
Communist Party and the Nationalist Party have a deep historical leg4. Downen, op. cit., p. 16-19.
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acy of mistrust; this mistrust provides a weak basis for a third cooperation between the two parties. 5
In Factor I, the thematic category of "The PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC" was also based on "nationalism consensus."
The PRC has expressed that the use of force to integrate Taiwan is a
patriotic and nationalistic action, and has never ruled out the possibility of integrating Taiwan by force. The People's Daily on January 12,
1984, reported that PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang said during his visit to
the United States that the PRC "cannot promise any foreign country
to use only peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue" and "China will
never guarantee not to use force to unify China." The People's Daily
on October 11, 1984, reported that PRC leader Deng Xiaoping told a
Japanese delegation that the PRC made no promise to Americans that
it would never use non-peaceful action against Taiwan. Deng told
U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on September 28, 1983,
that while the PRC may not have power enough to occupy Taiwan by
force, it has strength enough to blockade the Taiwan Strait.
On October 23, 1984, Deng told former Japanese Prime Minister
Zenko Suzuki that the PRC "will never accept the United States' demand to promise unifying with Taiwan by peaceful means only."
Deng reaffirmed: "About peaceful unification with Taiwan, we will
have patience. We will never give up the use of non-peaceful means."
So Factor I of "Nationalism Consensus" shows consensus on
"one China" with nationalism appeals to Sun Yat-sen and his Hsin-hai
Revolution, to separated relatives on both sides, and to hometowns
separated by the integration issue. Factor I also shows some integrative methods and models that the two sides do not express consensus
on.
2.

Factor IL· Mutual Understanding

Factor II indicates that Hypothesis III was fairly accepted with
thematic categories #28 "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," #53 "Favorable Economic Report About the Other Side," #20
"Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side," # 11 "Commentary
Favorable to the Other Side," # 13 "Favorable Political Report About
the Other Side," and # 19 "Favorable Societal Report About the
Other Side."
Reports on these thematic categories reflect that the two newspapers used their pages significantly in reporting and commenting about
the other side for the last six and a half years. This reporting became a
5. Ibid., p. 23.
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factor in China's national integration as Hypothesis III predicted, as a
factor of "mutual understanding." Most of these reports in the two
newspapers were in the form of special columns about the other side.
The People's Daily, from January 1979, reported about the ROC an
average of once a week in a special one-third page section called "Taiwan Today." The Central Daily News had a special weekly column on
the PRC named "See Through the Mainland." The column occupied
one-third of a page. The Central Daily News presented this column
from issue #304 on December 6, 1978, to issue #636 on May 28,
1985, the last day of this survey.
The People's Daily used a more sentimental appeal, but filled with
substantial unfavorable reports about the ROC. The Central Daily
News generally used a more critical tone, and unfavorable content in
reporting on the PRC.
The People's Daily printed a full page of color· photographs of
Taiwan scenery on February 4, 1979. The Central Daily News never
printed any scenes of the PRC in color. Both newspapers seldom
printed photographs of the people of the other side except for defectors. Neither newspapers ever printed photographs of the leaders of
the other side, with one exception: the Central Daily News printed
photographs of "The Gang of Four" during their trial in December
1980.
The thematic category of "Commentary Favorable to the Other
Side" was found mostly in the People's Daily in sentimental appeals of
mainland scenery or hometowns of the people on Taiwan.
The thematic categories of "Favorable Political and Societal Reports About the Other Side" were also usually carried in the "Taiwan
Today" column in the People's Daily. The Central Daily News printed
very few favorable political or societal reports about the PRC. For
example, the People's Daily on June 18, 1980, reported that a Taiwan
television station broadcast for the first time in Taiwan a documentary
that won popular ratings. The documentary showed landscape scenes
of the mainland. The People's Daily on February 20, 1984, reported
that ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan announced the relaxation of interactions between Taiwan and the mainland. The People's Daily on March
13 and 19, 1984, reported that Taiwan had elected Chiang Ching-kuo
as president and Li Deng-hui as vice president. It was the first time
that the People's Daily reported them as "president" and "vice president" even though it used quotation marks around the words. The
People's Daily on May 23, 1985 reported that "Taiwan Vice President"
Li said, "Taiwan is a part of the mainland." Though the People's Daily
has gradually reported more favorable and neutral stories about the
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ROC, the Central Daily News has not changed significantly from its
unfavorable reports about the PRC.
As the trends and directional analyses on this factor indicate, the
mutual understanding with favorable reports and commentaries has
been factored as an important but weak factor in China's national integration. The higher percentages and frequencies of unfavorable reports and commentaries about the other side compared with the low
percentages of neutral and favorable reports and commentaries about
the other side by both newspapers show the factor of mutual understanding to be weak; it must be improved if both sides want
integration.
Thematic category #28, "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," could be interpreted as a sample of mutual understanding
since both the PRC and the ROC want the United States to transfer as
much scientific technology as possible to them, and not to transfer it to
the other Chinese side. Each side understood the other on this.
The United States has understood both the PRC's and the ROC's
wishes and has taken steps toward enhancing the PRC and the ROC
simultaneously through technological and security cooperation. 6 The
United States is interested in preserving its influence in these operations, in stabilizing the internal modernization process, and in
strengthening the defensive capability of both Chinas7 ; however, in attempting to standardize its dual-assistance stabilizing approach,
Washington has not yet established a workable balance that would
guarantee Taiwan's security while stimulating progress in the PRC
and strengthening diplomatic relations with it. 8
The Carter administration first authorized the transfer of "dualpurpose" technology and military support equipment to the PRC.
The Reagan administration further liberalized export licensing regulations for high technology and proposed the sale of defensive weapons
to Peking; nevertheless, policy reconsiderations and bureaucratic reviews of export controls have made implementation slow and uncer6. James C. Hsiung, "China, Part II: The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Policy," in James C. Hsiung and Winberg Chai, eds., Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York:
Praeger, 1981), p. 128, and Robert L. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension: The Shifting
Foundation," in Chen, ed., op. cit., p. 69.
7. Christopher Phillips, "Economic and Political Developments in China," in the
Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation, ed., A Heritage Roundtable: U.S. -China
Challenge to American Po/icymakers (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1984), p.
30; and Downen, op. cit.
8. Robert G. Sutter, "Taiwan: The Emerging Relationship," in U. Alexis Johnson,
George R. Packard, and Alfred D. Wilhelm, eds., China Policy for the Next Decade (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1984), pp. 318-323, and Downen, op. cit.
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tain. Authorization of U.S. nuclear technology transfers were deferred
due to concern about Peking's refusal to agree to non-proliferation
accords. 9

3.

Factor III· Economic Function

Factor III loading with thematic categories # 34 "The PRC's
One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model," #36 "The PRC's
Hong Kong Integrative Model," #54 "Neutral Economic Report
About the Other Side," and #51 "The PRC's Special Economic
Zones" has strong economic elements that might have an economic
function as Hypothesis V predicted.
When the PRC started negotiations with Britain on Hong Kong
in 1983, it had not yet come out with the "Hong Kong Integrative
Model" or the "One Nation, Two systems Integrative Model" for the
ROC. But, as negotiations developed, the PRC began to promote
these models. It has included the "Hong Kong Model" as an example
of the "One Nation, Two Systems Model." Both models are political
proposals with a strong economic appeal. The potential economic
function, in fact, is aimed at non-political integration.
The People's Daily on May 16, 1984, reported on the "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" for the first time. The paper
gave a detailed coverage of this model, which was announced by PRC
Premier Zhao Ziyang at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress. "In view of historical experience and the present state
of affairs in Taiwan, we have advanced the idea of 'One Nation, Two
Systems' to be put into practice after reunification," Zhao announced.
The People's Daily on July 24, October 4 and 6, November 17 and
December 19, 1984, reported that Deng Xiaoping confirmed the application of the new model by announcing, "Should the system of 'One
Nation, Two Systems' be successfully carried out in Hong Kong, it
may provide a solution to similar problems in the international arena
and Taiwan." In other words, Deng implied that this model may become a new formula for solving the reunification problems of other
divided countries such as Germany and Korea.
Chien Chunjui, an advisor to the PRC's Academy of Social Sciences, described the concept of the "One Nation, Two Systems
Model" as a new socialist formula:
The principle of the Communist Party Central Committee is
9. James C. Hsiung, "The Reagan Administration and U.S. Policy Toward the PRC
and Taiwan," in Hung-mao Tien, ed., Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Rain, 1983), p. 25.
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to maintain socialism on the mainland, but capitalism in
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, over a long period after the
reunification of the country so that the two systems will coexist and enhance each other through peaceful competition.
The practical way for achieving this is: We should first establish special economic zones, then open 14 coastal cities to
foreign investment so as to absorb and employ the good
points of capitalism to reform socialism and improve the socialist material civilization on the mainland on a large scale.
At the same time, we must continue to promote spiritual civilization on the mainland. In this manner, there will surely
be no need to worry about China's economy after 60 or 70
years. 10
Chien's description disclosed the "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" to be an advanced application of the "Hong Kong
Integrative Model," aimed at integrating not only Hong Kong but also
the ROC and Macao under PRC rule. Moreover, concrete steps have
already been taken toward establishing "special economic zones" and
opening 14 coastal cities.
This disclosure further confirms Factor III and Hypothesis V's
correspondence values: the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model," the "PRC's Hong Kong Integrative Model," and
the "Special Economic Zones" are grouped in the same factor of economic function.
Chien also revealed that the PRC is planning to absorb and employ the capitalism system in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao to reform the socialist system on the mainland. An economic
interdependence among these four areas can be anticipated if the PRC
is seriously promoting the new "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative
Model."
The People's Daily expressed the PRC's seriousness on September
27, 1984, after the PRC and Britain signed a joint declaration on Hong
Kong the previous day. The paper reported that after the transfer of
Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997, the former British colony would be
allowed to retain its previous capitalist economic system for 50 years
in order to maintain peace and prosperity in the region. This was the
first official announcement the People's Daily reported on the "One
Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model." The same day, the Central
Daily News reported the ROC's rejection and its worries over the
10. Kuo-chiang Hsing, "One Nation, Two Systems," in Issues & Studies (September
1984), Vol. XX, No. 9, p. 6.
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"PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" for Hong Kong
and the ROC on Taiwan.
The paper reported that ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua reacted, first,
accusing the British government of "pushing 5.5 million people under
communist totalitarian enslavement, creating disgrace in human history"; it then condemned the PRC for creating an illusion:
To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hong Kong, the Chinese Communists-fearful of resistance from the Chinese in
Hong Kong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and democracy-went out of their way to embellish an illusion of
"one country, two systems." They promised that the present
Hong Kong system would remain unchanged for 50 years, in
order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hong
Kong and Kowloon.
The Central Daily News on October 10, 1984, reported another
ROC rejection of the Hong Kong solution for reunification. The paper reported a remark by ROC President Chiang: "They have used
nationalism and patriotism as a curtain over deception and blackmail
in reaching a so-called 'accord' with Great Britain; and they have
taken further advantage of this opportunity to pull hair over the eyes
of the world via an all out propaganda campaign on the question of
the reunification of China."
Regardless of these rejections of the "PRC's One Nation, Two
Systems Integration Model," the People's Daily reported on June 2,
1984, that the PRC was sincere in its offers by referring to the PRC's
constitution. The paper reported that Hong Kong would become a
special administrative region and be subject to a different system from
that on the mainland, according to Article 31 of the constitution. In
addition to winning the confidence of the people of Hong Kong and
Taiwan, the People's Daily emphasized the PRC-Britain Accord,
which was signed in September 1984, saying that the PRC would
carry out its "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model." They
would allow Hong Kong and Taiwan to maintain their capitalism system for 50 years after the PRC gained sovereignty of both islands. As
political appeals, these attempts have not yet worked. Once the growing trade and the economic functions among the three areas become
interdependent, the "PRC's One Nation, Two systems Integrative
Model" might have a better chance of succeeding if trade continues to
grow between the PRC and the ROC through Hong Kong.
The survey discovered that the two newspapers did not report
objectively on the growing trade and economic interdependent reality.

CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE

95

An analysis of the reality from sources other than the reports of the
two newspapers could help give an understanding of its potentiality.
First, an economic interdependence between the PRC and Hong
Kong has existed for the past 35 years in various degrees; it has increased since the PRC-Britain Accord was signed. Hong Kong is
needed economically by both the PRC and Britain. If economic selfinterest were the only consideration, Britain and the PRC could probably carry out their agreement to leave Hong Kong as it is as a new
symbol of the PRC's sovereignty. Then, the "PRC's One Nation, Two
Systems Integrative Model" could be executed. The benefits to
London of preserving the status quo in what has become the world's
third largest financial center are obvious: Hong Kong is London's direct connection with the most dynamic region in the world economy.
The PRC also has a great deal to gain from allowing Hong
Kong's vitality to survive after the formal transfer of sovereignty.
First, since Hong Kong in a microcosm reflects the legal, commercial
and monetary problems posed by PRC's own opening to the West, the
steps taken in Hong Kong to settle these matters and to preserve investor confidence could demonstrate the priority that the PRC attaches to its modernization. 11 Second, the PRC's trade surplus with
Hong Kong has grown from $1.741 billion in 1977 to $4.4 billion in
1983; nearly 40 percent of the PRC's hard currency income is derived
from Hong Kong. 12
Third, since 1970, Hong Kong has moved from twentieth to first
position in PRC's re-export trade. Trade in goods imported for transhipment to PRC has grown considerably. In 1979, Hong Kong's reexports to the PRC increased 514.5 percent from 1970. They fell to
73.3 percent after the PRC's economic retrenchment in 1981. They
are expected to grow even more in the next few decades. 13
Fourth, Hong Kong will continue to play a vital role in the
PRC's modernization well into the next century. The PRC's own
transport facilities-road, rail, and port-are likely to remain inadequate, despite the heavy emphasis placed on infrastructure in the Five
Year Plan (1981-1986) adopted by the National Party Congress in November 1982. 14 Fifth, Hong Kong plays an irreplaceable role as a
"political filter" for trade with Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, Israel
11. Richard Nations, "Hong Kong," in Johnson, Packard, and Wilhelm, eds., op. cit.,
pp. 371-372.
12. Ibid., p. 372.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
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and South Africa. 15 To understand further about the potential interdependent trade and economic function between the PRC and the
ROC, the existing indirect trade between them through third countries
or areas via Hong Kong must be analyzed.
Thematic category #48 "Indirect Trade Between the Two Sides
Through Hong Kong" did not have enough loading points to be included in this factor. The indirect trade between the two sides
through Hong Kong is a possible basis for the "spill-over" function as
Hypothesis V predicted that economic function may have an effect on
eventual political integration. Trade between the PRC and the ROC
through Hong Kong grew from $70 million in 1979, to $460 million in
1981, to $550 million in 1984, to $500 million in the first six months of
1985. It is expected to reach $1.5 billion by the end of 1985. 16
The Central Daily News on April 14, 1985, reported that the
ROC government prohibits the people of Taiwan from trading directly
with the PRC. Two days later, the paper reported the ROC government would regard any trade with the people of the mainland by the
people of Taiwan as illegal smuggling. Nevertheless, on April 28 the
paper reported that the ROC government would not intervene in indirect trade between the mainland and Taiwan through Hong Kong at
present because it is estimated to be only one percent of the ROC's
total foreign trade. The People's Daily, on the other hand, has not
reported any prohibition on trading with Taiwan, directly or
indirectly.
Without any direct intervention by either government, trade between the two economies via Hong Kong has been brisk in the past
five years. There are several things that have contributed to this trade.
First the PRC maintains a duty-free policy for Taiwan goods, established in 1981, regarding them as domestic goods. The policy was
designed to draw a favorable image of the PRC for the people of Taiwan. The policy was cancelled in 1982 when the PRC saw that some
Hong Kong businessmen took advantage of the policy by importing
Korean goods with faked Taiwan labels. Some ROC citizens have
feared that an unrestrained expansion of exports to the PRC through
Hong Kong may eventually lead to over-dependence on that market,
and to non-voluntarily "spill-over" integration with the PRC. 17 Some
think that the trade is too risky because the PRC is too volatile under
the Communist system. Any unfavorable change could plunge ROC
15. Ibid.
16. Economic News (Taipei), April 22-28, 1985, No. 3230, p. 16.
17. Ibid.
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exporters into serious setbacks; furthermore, should the ROC one day
really become dependent on the PRC market, the PRC might use it as
a weapon against the ROC. Some believe that the PRC's rapidly rising demand for ROC products is part of a political picture aimed at
reunification under the present communist system. But the ROC government says shipments made by Taiwan manufacturers to meet orders from intermediaries in Hong Kong are in accord with ROC
government regulations and the ROC government cannot do anything
about them. 18
The ROC Institute for Economic Research has said that the
PRC's increasing purchases of ROC products simply reflect a rise in
its overall imports of foreign goods made possible by the PRC's economic reforms since 1979. An indication of this is that the PRC's
imports from other areas, especially Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong
and Singapore, all showed increases in 1984. Judging by this fact, the
institute said that the PRC has not intentionally increased its
purchases from the ROC for political purposes. The institute concluded that the ROC need not worry so much about indirect exports
to the PRC; because indirect exports are part of free trade, the ROC
government cannot and should not interfere with them. Indirect trade
through Hong Kong, therefore, will likely continue to be a booming
business. It can be considered a potential alternative function of
"spill-over" for China's national integration. 19
As for thematic category #54, "Neutral Economic Report About
the Other Side," the People's Daily reported on economic issues about
the other side with a fairly objective attitude. Both sides watch the
other side's economic activities more closely than before. Economic
activities have become regarded as a healthy source of competition between them.
Thematic category #51, "PRC's Special Economic Zones," Factor V, have been reported by the People's Daily and the Central Daily
News with a close amount of frequency. Both newspapers paid attention to this theme for different reasons. The People's Daily sought to
promote the success of the zones in order to use the model for the rest
of the mainland. It also considered the zones important in later absorbing Taiwan, since Taiwan has used similar zones for 25 years.
The Central Daily News has mainly reported on its concern over
the PRC's political aims of absorbing Taiwan and competing with Taiwan's foreign-trade-oriented economy.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
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On December 25, 1981, the People's Daily reported about the
Shenzhen special economic zone in Guangdong province with four
pictures. These four zones were officially approved by the PRC government on August 26, 1980. The current active zones are Shenzhen,
Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong province, and Xiamen of Fujian
province. 20 As the four zones are located near Taiwan, the ROC has
felt threatened both economically and politically. The Xiamen zone is
only a mile from the ROC-held island of Quemoy. This has worried
the ROC the worst. 21 The four special economic zones, however, have
been no direct threat to the integration of Taiwan economically.
Along with the growing indirect trade between the PRC and the ROC
through Hong Kong, and the common attention paid to the economic
development of the other side by the two newspapers, and to the economic reforms in the PRC, these new economic trends have strengthened the potential for success of the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems
Integrative Model" for economic integration, if not immediate political integration.
4.

Factor IV: U.S.-China Policy

Factor IV with loadings of thematic categories' #22 "Promoting
a Warmer Relationship with the United States," #23 "Calling on the
United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other side,"
#24 "The Diplomatic Relationship with the United States," #29
"Emphasis of its Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States or
the World," and # 1 "One Greater China Territory," made Hypothesis IV valid in predicting the factor as a "U.S.-China Policy" factor.
Thematic categories #22 and #23 have almost the same loadings in Factor IV: .793 and .791, respectively. These two themes
often appeared side by side in the same article or on the same page.
The Central Daily News, however, showed a four-times higher frequency than the People's Daily for #22, and a seven-times greater frequency than the People's Daily for #23. This suggests that the Central
Daily News has shown more concerned than the People's Daily with
the U.S. role in relations between the two Chinas.
The five thematic categories loaded in Factor IV reveal that both
the PRC and the ROC intended to influence the United States in
China's national integration. In particular, the PRC tried to ask the
United States to press the ROC to join in peace talks. The ROC, how20. Jung-feng Chang, "A Study of Special Economic Zones," in Economic Papers (September 1983), No. 40, p. 8.
21. Ibid., p. 13.
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ever, has kept resisting any possibilities of peace talks from the United
States. On the other hand, Factor IV showed that the United States
respects the consensus on the territorial claim of the PRC and the
ROC that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States, however,
insists that China's national integration should be achieved by peaceful
means.
The significance of the five thematic categories in Factor IV is
particularly evident in several reports in both newspapers.
The People's Daily on April 26, 1984, commented on President
Reagan's Trip to the PRC:
It cannot be denied that the current development of SinoAmerican relations is very far from what it ought to be. Relations between the countries have suffered certain interference from time to time. In particular, the Taiwan issue
remains a major obstacle between China and the United
States. The only principles for solving this problem are those
guiding Sino-American relations as affirmed in the series of
PRC-U.S. joint communiques. We believe that as long as
the two sides earnestly abide by the three communiques, respect each other's sovereignty and territory integrity, andrefrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, the
relations between the two countries will be freed from turbulence and instability and will grow steadily and continually.
It is clear that the PRC hoped the United States would give up its
relations with the ROC in accordance with the PRC's interpretation
of the "three communiques." Therefore, an analysis of the "three
communiques" would be a better way to describe Factor IV of "U.S.China Policy."
(1) The Shanghai Joint Communique
The Shanghai Joint Communique of February 28, 1972, signed by
President Nixon and PRC Premier Chou, established a starting point
from which future contacts could develop. It made clear that a cooperative relationship could occur despite disagreement on ideological,
regional and global issues between Washington and Peking. 22 Most
significantly, the Shanghai Communique stated the U.S. intention to
gradually withdraw all U.S. military forces form Taiwan, thereby allowing cooperation with the PRC. 23 The communique affirmed the
22. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension," op. cit., 64.
23. Ibid.
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U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese without outside interference. It also acknowledged the existence of "one China" with Taiwan as a subordinate part. 24 This aspect
of U.S. policy, as documented with the Shanghai Communique, has
been reiterated frequently:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the
Chinese themselves. 25
The PRC text in Chinese uses the term "ren-shi" for acknowledge. This term conveys the same meaning of recognition but not necessarily agreement. 26
(2) The Normalization Joint Communique
The Normalization Joint Communique of December 15, 1978,
signed by President Carter and PRC Premier Hua Quofeng, says the
United States "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one
China and Taiwan is a part of China, ... [and] recognizes the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this
context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.'m
However, there is a serious linguistic discrepancy in the English and
Chinese texts of the communique concerning to the two parties' positions on the status of Taiwan. 28
The term "acknowledges" was not accidently chosen in the English version. Following the Shanghai Communique, the term indicated recognition of, but not necessarily agreement with, the PRC's
position29 ; however, the PRC used the word "acknowledges" as
"cheng-ren" in the Chinese version of the communique. This translates more literally as "recognizes," a term carrying a clear connotation of acceptance or agreement. 30 When one reads the Chinese texts
of the two communiques together, it appears that the United States
24. Ibid.
25. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., p. 52.
26. Victor Hao Li, "The 'Taiwan Question' in U.S.-China Relations," in Tien, ed., op.
cit., p. 198.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
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has increased the degree of its acceptance of the Chinese position from
"ren-shi" to "cheng-ren." 31 In interpreting this phrase, U.S. officials
have said that the United States will adhere only to the English version; the PRC only to the Chinese version. 32
The 1978 Normalization Joint Communique reaffirmed all of the
political goals set forth by the 1972 Shanghai Communique, also it
added references to continuing "cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." For the most part it was a
formal reiteration of the same objectives sought by a different presidential administration, establishing official political ties between the
PRC and the United States. 33
(3) The Joint Communique of August 17, 1982
In the Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, often called the
"Shanghai Communique II," the United States affirmed:
It has no intention of. . .interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one
Taiwan.' The United States government understands and
appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question ... The new situation which has
emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides
favorable conditions for the settlement of United StatesChina differences over the question of United States arms
sales to Taiwan. 34
The most significant provision of the communique was a U.S.
commitment to limit arms sales to the ROC. The United States
agreed not to "carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan,"
not to "exceed... the level of those supplied in recent years"; and to
"reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan ... " 35
In an interview with the U.S. media afterward, President Reagan
explained, "In that communique, the People's Republic has agreed
that they are going to try and peacefully resolve the Taiwanese issue.
We, in tum, linked our statement about weaponry to that .. .If the day
ever comes that those two [the PRC and ROC] find that they can get
together and become one China, in a peaceful manner, then there
wouldn't be any need for arms sales to Taiwan. And that's all that
31. Ibid., p. 30.
32. Ibid.
33. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension," op. cit., p. 46.
34. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., p. 52.
35. Ibid., p. 53.
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was meant in the communique." 36
The Central Daily News on December 17, 1982, expressed the
ROC's disapproval of the communique but accepted it as long as the
United States still supplied it with defensive weapons. The paper reported its view on the communique and Taiwan's strategic importance
in an article restating President Chiang's reply to an interview by the
Far Eastern Economic Review:
The rupture of diplomatic ties between the Republic of
China and the United States and the "August 17 Communique" issued jointly by the United States and the Chinese
Communist regime have inflicted tremendous damage on the
Republic of China; they have also done much to undermine
the international reputation of the United States.
The damage of the Republic of China directly affects
the stability and prosperity of the entire Asian-Pacific region.
The countries in this region do not like this state of affairs,
an unfavorable factor for the United States as a member of
the Asian-Pacific community.
This indicates that the United States and the Republic
of China have common interests. Therefore, we always believe that the strengthening of relations between the United
States and the Republic of China is in the best interests of
both nations and, the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. We
also believe that the United States, as the leader of the free
world, will not and should not yield to the Chinese Communists' unwarranted blackmail. We are confident that the
U.S. government will strengthen its adherence to the Taiwan
Relations Act.
We are also pleased to see that President Reagan is an
American statesman of vision, principle and courage. Judging from his thorough understanding of international Communism and his clear vision in world affairs, we have all the
reasons to be optimistic over the future of U.S.-ROC
relations.
The reason to accept the communique was that the ROC received
private assurances that the United States would "not play any mediation role between Peking and Taipei" and would "not exert pressure
on the ROC to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Communists.'m The ROC made public these U.S. assurances on August 17,
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
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1982, at the same time the ROC announced the communique. These
assurances were reiterated to Taipei at the time of President Reagan's
visit to the PRC in April 1984. 38 It was also during that visit that
Reagan rejected a request by Deng Xiaoping to pressure Taipei to
come to the bargaining table. 39 The New York Times disclosed on the
day President Reagan arrived in Peking that the United States had
provided the ROC a six-point guarantee:
(a) the U.S. government would not set a deadline for the
complete cessation of arms sales to Taiwan;
(b) the U.S. government would not negotiate with Peking in
advance on questions concerning arms sales to Taiwan;
(c) the U.S. government would not act as intermediary between Peking and Taipei;
(d) the U.S. government would not agree to any proposal to
change the Taiwan Relations Act;
(e) the U.S. government would not change its position on
the question concerning Taiwan's sovereignty;
(f) the U.S. government would not put pressure on Taiwan
to draw it to the negotiation table. 40
Obviously, the United States and the PRC interpreted the three
communiques differently. The PRC emphasized them as a framework
for a PRC-U.S. relationship. The PRC also interpreted each to say
that Taiwan was a part of the PRC and that the PRC could integrate
Taiwan whenever the United States would reduce its arms sales to
Taiwan. 41 The United States interpreted the communiques as a reaffirmation of its position for a peaceful settlement without U.S. mediation, but not necessarily a recommendation for peace talks. The
United States did, however, subsequently begin a reduction in arms
sales to Taiwan.
The different interpretations of the communiques explain why the
PRC and the ROC have argued about these issues. They also reveal
why the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have shown high
frequencies in reporting on the five themes on Factor IV.
Thematic category #24 "The Diplomatic Relationship with the
United States," reflected the beginning of the breakthrough in U.S.
38. The Washington Post, May 1, 1984.
39. The Washington Post. April 29, 1984.
40. United Daily News (Taipei), April 27, 1984, and Po-tang Yeh, "An Analysis of
Reagan's Visit to Mainland China," in Issues & Studies (July 1984), Vol. XX, No.7, p. 75.
41. Ibid.
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China policy and a PRC peace proposal for integration to the ROC.
This theme deserves a detailed description.
A breakthrough was found possible with the willingness of the
PRC and the United States to make concessions on issues that had
been disputed by the two sides for 30 years. Each side claimed that
the other had made the greater sacrifice. 42 For its part, the United
States agreed to three conditions that the PRC had long insisted on:
(a) ending recognition of the ROC on Taiwan; (b) terminating the
U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty; (c) withdrawing the remaining U.S.
troops on Taiwan. 43
The PRC also agreed to three conditions: (a) not to oppose continued American arms sales to the ROC, (b) to agree that the United
States could terminate its defense treaty with the ROC with one year's
notice, rather than immediately, and (c) not to object to an American
declaration of continued interest in the future of Taiwan. 44
American conservative critics have argued that the United States
essentially gave in to Peking's demands. The PRC's concessions, they
said, were merely rhetorical. But high-level officials of the Carter administration concluded that the United States had won essential points
that would ensure Taiwan's independence from the PRC in the foreseeable future. 45 Both newspapers contributed a significant amount of
reporting on establishment of relations between the PRC and the
United States in December 1978. The People's Daily showed 43 frequencies in that month, the Central Daily News, 112.
Although eventual normalization of relations between Washington and Peking had been taken for granted since President Nixon's
trip to the PRC in February 1972, the sudden announcement caught
most of the world, particularly the ROC, by surprise. 46 Among those
most surprised were some conservative members of Congress. Many
of them had thought Carter had promised to consult with them before
changing the status of the Taiwan treaty. 47 Many liberals, however,
were enthusiastic about Carter's announcement; however, members of
Congress of all political persuasions were upset because Carter had
acted so secretly, with little advance warning, with no congressional
42. "The Reopening of China," in China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1980), p. 12.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid., p. 13.
47. Ibid.
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consultation. 48 Even the harshest critics, however, did concede that
Carter had the legal authority to switch diplomatic recognition from
the ROC to the PRC. 49
The People's Daily and the Central Daily News reported considerably about the anger on Capitol Hill. The People's Daily, of course,
condemned it, the Central Daily News welcomed it. The Central Daily
News used a tremendous amount of space and frequency in reporting a
suit filed by a group of congressmen led by Sen. Barry Goldwater, RAriz., to have the abolition of the Taiwan defense treaty declared illegal because Carter had not consulted Congress. The courts upheld the
president's action.
After Carter's announcement, the Central Daily News focused
most of its attention on whether the ROC had obtained assurances
from the United States for the future security of Taiwan. The paper
charged that Carter's action left the ROC vulnerable to an invasion
from the PRC and to forceful integration, or to a boycott or blockade,
at least. Many supporters of normalization in Congress also said they
were concerned about the future safety of Taiwan. 5° Carter administration officials did not alleviate fears for Taiwan's security. They
flatly that denied they had ever attempted to pressure the PRC into
making a commitment on Taiwan's future. 5 1 In a statement accompanying the communique, however, Carter did say: "[The United States]
will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." 52 Referring to that phrase, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
said: "We have expressed very clearly our deep concern that the welfare of the people of Taiwan be protected, and that the transition be a
peaceful transition, that the Taiwan solution be a peaceful solution.
This has not been contradicted by the People's Republic of China." 53
On the one hand, the United States is still at loggerheads with the
PRC on the issue of China's national integration. On the other hand,
peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue has been its consistent
policy. 54
The United States has shown a reduced interest in the strategic
importance of Taiwan and demonstrated an increased interest in that
of the PRC. The Central Daily News has continued to emphasize its
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
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country's strategic role while the People's Daily has promoted the
change in U. S. attitude. Still, the United States has not changed its
policy regarding a peaceful settlement of the integration issue.
5.

Factor V: U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy

Factor V with loadings of thematic categories #26 "U.S. arms
Sales" and #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act" also supported Hypothesis IV in its prediction of Factor V as a "U.S.-China Policy" factor.
It did, however, emphasize a particular aspect of U.S. policy on Taiwan, making it appropriate to name Factor V, "U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy" factor. This emphasis shows an acceptance by the PRC
in allowing continued American arms sales to Taiwan. Even during
the Carter administration, Secretary of State Vance and other officials
repeatedly said the strongest assurance for the safety of Taiwan was
the "reality" of the military situation in east Asia. "It simply does not
make sense," Vance said, "for the People's Republic of China to do
anything other than proceed in a peaceful fashion." 55
President Carter said that the PRC "did not have the capability"
of launching a successful invasion of Taiwan, 100 miles off the mainland and "heavily fortified and heavily armed." One official said the
PRC would have to commit almost its entire armed forces to such an
invasion, and that would mean withdrawing troops from the Russian
front, which was the PRC's greatest security concern. 56
Officials said, however, that a PRC naval blockade of Taiwan
might be successful. Taiwan did not have an adequate capability to
ward off the large mainland Chinese submarine fleet. Because Taiwan
depends on imports for most of its food, oil and raw materials, a prolonged blockade could seriously damage its economy. The main concern, however, for the United States to continue arms sales to the
ROC was to protect it from the PRC's efforts to force negotiations or
integration. 57
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, loaded in Factor V, now governs U.S. unofficial relations with the ROC. It protects the island
from the PRC's military threats to integrate it by force.
The House and Senate agreed that "the United States' decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means," and
that the United States would consider "any effort to determine the
55. "The Reopening of China," op. cit., p. 13.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
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future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts
or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and of grave concern to the United States." 58
The most distinguishing policies of the Taiwan Relations Act
were the preservation of Taiwan's ability peacefully to determine its
own future and the assurance of its social, political, and economic systems through continued U.S. unofficial interaction. 59
This policy statement by the U.S. Congress pledged the continuation of U.S. defensive weapons sales and defensive services to the ROC
along with continued commercial exchanges; it offered other means of
cooperation for the indefinite future, and also added a new dimension:
a commitment in support of "the preservation and enhancement of the
human rights of all the people of Taiwan" as "objectives of the United
States." No formal U.S. commitment of equal visibility and force has
yet been made with respect to human rights in the PRC. 60
According to the People's Daily, the continuing sale of U.S. defense weapons to the ROC and the Taiwan Relations Act, which authorized those sales, are the major barriers to China's national
integration. Both the act itself and the arms sales are interpreted by
the paper as blatant U.S. "intervention in China's internal affairs,"
which impede both China's national integration and future progress in
U.S.-PRC relations. By "intervening" in this fashion, the People's
Daily maintains, the United States violates the 1978 Normalization
Joint Communique. 61
The most fundamental issue that remains unresolved in view of
the People's Daily is the authority of the Taiwan Relations Act. Continuing to argue that the act is illegitimate, the paper writes: "The
'Taiwan Relations Act' seriously contravenes the principles embodied
in the [1978] joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic
relations between [Washington and Peking]." 62 The People's Daily on
July 4, 1981, attacked the Taiwan Relations Act because it "obstructed" Taiwan's unification with the mainland; "as a result, China
may be forced to resort to non-peaceful methods to settle the Taiwan
problem." The United States, however, has reiterated that the act is
"the law of the land" and has stipulated that in case of any conflict
between the act and the joint communique, the law "clearly will take
preference."
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8). enacted April 10, 1979.
Ibid.
Ibid.
People's Daily, May 4, 1983.
Ibid., January 12, 1984.
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Peking and Washington were negotiating the establishment of
diplomatic relations in 1978. The U.S. government asked the PRC to
use peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue. The PRC promised it
would. On a visit to Washington on January 29, 1979, PRC Vice Premier Deng said that his country would not use arms against Taiwan in
the next five years. In his talks with Reagan in Peking in April 1984,
Deng said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait "could gradually increase their contacts and achieve peaceful reunification through
negotiations."
Interviewed by newsmen after his talks with Deng, Reagan said
the Taiwan issue should be settled by people on both sides of the strait
and that the United States should not serve as an intermediary. President Reagan had also expressed his attitude in an interview with PRC
reporters at the White House before his visit to Peking. On April 18,
1984, the People's Daily reported it:
I realize that there is a difference there and it has been discussed. On a recent visit [by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang]
here, this was one of the subjects of discussion. I think our
position is pretty well-known to the leaders of the People's
Republic of China, that we have a long and historic friendship with the Chinese people on Taiwan; we are not going to
tum our back on old friends in order to strengthen or make
new friends.
A firm and consistent U.S. policy on Taiwan has made the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales to Taiwan effective. Factor V of
"U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy" has been one of the important issues
on which the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have not
agreed in their reporting.

CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the beginning it was postulated that the concept of China's
national integration reported by the two Chinese party newspapers is a
multidimensional phenomenon. Through factor analysis, five factors
were established; each accounted for most of the variation in China's
national integration; each represented an important element in the
views that the two newspapers express on China's national integration;
each showed similarities and differences in the view of the two newspapers or parties; and each could be used as a basis in evaluating the
implications of the research. Below, eight conclusions or assessments
are drawn, and two overall conclusions from this study on China's
national integration.
1.

The Problem of China's national integration has been and
will remain a multidimensional phenomenon for a

considerable time before it can be solved.
Both newspaper or parties have recognized China's national integration as a multidimensional phenomenon; no single factor or a single
leader can achieve integration. The study reveals how complex the
process of integration is. Notwithstanding the media's tendency to
oversimplify, the political unification of the mainland and Taiwan remains elusive and unresolved, within the foreseeable future. Realistically, it almost certainly will not occur until a major transformation
occurs in the mutual understanding between the two sides, and the
understanding of the political leadership or elites of one or both sides.
The inherent complexity of integration also affects the timing and
strategies of both PRC and ROC reunification plans. The two have
followed different timetables; how long the integration process should
take is not the same for both Chinas. In the late 1970s, PRC vice premier Deng Xiaoping was reported to have said that the PRC could
wait five or one hundred years for integration to be completed; however, by 1980, he listed integration as one of the three major national
objectives of the next decade. 1
In contrast, the ROC's position has been unchanging in its essence, "Reunification but not now." It is doubtful that the ROC lead1. Hsi-sheng Chi, "An Agenda for China: Through the Year 2,000," paper presented
at the Association of Asian Studies Convention, San Francisco, California, March 25-27,
1983, p. 1.
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ership has ever set a timetable for itself, being inclined to look at
reunification as a distant objective. In the summer of 1982, ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan said that his government hoped the obstacles to
reunification would be reduced with the passage of time to allow the
political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the two sides to
narrow gradually. 2
The reasons for these sharply different timetables are not difficult
to understand. For the PRC, the separate existence of the ROC on
Taiwan has served as a constant reminder of its unfinished revolution.
The surviving members of the first generation of the communist
revolution know that time is running out for them. They strongly desire to see the revolution completed before dying. Adding to this sense
of urgency is a belief that the current ROC government under President Chiang Ching-kuo represents the last tenuous emotional link between the two peoples. Those who were born after 1950 will likely feel
much less attachment to the mainland. PRC leaders are concerned
that it will become more difficult to appeal on a patriotic or sentimental level to future leaders. 3 In contrast, the ROC believes it can put off
the issue of reunification. The ROC can still maintain a large military
for its own defense, will sustaining a high rate of economic growth. 4
Unless the ROC leadership is confronted with some extraordinary crisis or is offered extremely attractive benefits, reunification will be given
a low priority, perhaps left off the political agenda for many years to
come. The present state of multidimensional factors in China's national integration and their state in the coexistence between the PRC
and the ROC may continue for a long time even if not entirely
satisfactory.
2.

As long as a consensus on one-China nationalism as the
basis for future integration exists between the PRC
and the ROC, there is a possibility of
eventual integration.

Both newspapers have used nationalism as the common ground
for their stands on integration since 1945; nevertheless, world history
has demonstrated that nationalism by itself has seldom been sufficient
enough to reintegrate divided nations. One-China nationalism could
be reinforced if the two parties realized that China's national integration is a multidimensional phenomenon.
2. Ibid., p. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
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As revealed in the People's Daily and the Central Daily News, the
PRC has promoted consensus on one-China nationalism more than
the ROC. One-China nationalism has been advocated by the PRC
largely in the form of peace proposals.
The PRC has relied heavily on exploiting interpersonal relationships between prominent figures on both sides, hoping to elicit a more
favorable emotional response to the call for peaceful integration. A
small group of people on the mainland, mostly ROC military and civilian defectors, relatives of ROC government officials in Taiwan, or
leaders or pre-1949 democratic parties, has been used to make recurrent public appeals to ROC leaders to return to the motherland.
Other peace proposals by the PRC have relied heavily on the oneChina nationalism factor. The most-used peace proposal was the ninepoint proposal. These proposals have been pursued with great tenacity. The PRC leaders must be genuinely convinced of their effectiveness. Indeed, they have occasionally expressed puzzlement and
indignation at the ROC government's continual rejection of what they
consider generous offers. These strategies, however, have been seriously out of touch with current realities. If the Nationalists think they
have learned any lesson from history, it is never to be trapped a third
time. Had the PRC recognized this attitude of the Nationalists, its
leaders might not have been surprised by the scorn and contempt that
with which the ROC has opposed its peace proposals. Though PRC
peace proposals based on one-China nationalism have been fully rejected by the ROC, both sides have maintained and have used a oneChina nationalism consensus for eventual integration. As long as this
consensus exists, so does hope for integration.
3.

Due to fundamental ideological differences, there is no
consensus on any integrative method or model
between the two newspapers or parties,
making the realization of integration
indefinite.

Study results suggest that the PRC and the ROC have not agreed
on any integrative method or model because of fundamental ideological differences. Because of these differences, no schedule can be determined for China's national integration. At least two reservations can
be raised about the feasibility of the integrative methods or models
that have been proposed by either side. The first reservation equalizes
those methods or models to a renunciation of war by the PRC. Since
the 1950s, the PRC has rejected similar demands brought up by the
U.S. government. Taiwan is China's internal problem, and the PRC
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would neither allow foreign interference nor give up the possible use of
force in response to a foreign demand. The PRC regards China's national integration as an entirely different matter, however, in the form
of an internally initiated mutual relaxation of relations with the ROC. 5
A second reservation, the process of peaceful integration, could occur
only if military pressure is removed. The ROC has lived under the
shadow of a PRC attack for 35 years, preventing it from softening its
attitude toward the PRC. If military pressure from the PRC were
stepped up, and if the ROC were to become even more isolated internationally, ROC leaders might view independence as a lesser evil than
total surrender to the PRC. 6 From the PRC's point of view, independence would be worse than the current situation. It might leave the
PRC feeling it had no alternative but to resort to war.
By and large, these two reservations would be far outweighed by
the positive gains that the two parties could realize from peaceful
reunification. Only by removing the threat of war could there exist an
atmosphere favorable to conducting serious discussions on eventual integration. Each side might also become more receptive to internal demands for political reform if there were no fear that such reforms
would be exploited by the other side to destabilize its government. 7
The PRC's peace negotiations cannot be conducted in a spirit of
good will if one side still expressly reserves the right to use force
against the other. The ROC's suspicion that the PRC merely uses
these proposals as an attempt to wear down its vigilance is understandable. Would the PRC proposals be better received if they presented an
intention to implement the least threatening measures first? The PRC
has argued that once the "One Nation, Two Systems," "Nine-Point,"
and "Three-Link, Four-Exchange" peace proposals are accepted, the
details can be worked out later. From the ROC's view, expressed in
the Central Daily News, it is most dangerous to accept the proposals
without the power to control the course of subsequent developments;
however, the PRC is certain to continue to press to accelerate its publicity campaign of direct negotiations with leaders of the ROC.
The ROC is likely to continue to reject talks and proposals made
solely on the PRC's terms. Virtually every PRC overture has involved
a fundamental concession of principle on the ROC's part. The most
dramatic gestures, involving retention of economic, social, and military privileges for the island, assume the ROC's submission to the
5. Ibid., p. 12.
6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p. 13.
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PRC's authority and control. The lesser offers, suggesting immediate
trade, mail, and tourist contacts, have been closely tied to the initiation of talks. In both cases, the basic precondition has been acceptance of the mainland's political dominance; therefore, the reaction of
the ROC in the Central Daily News remained disinterest. The Central
Daily News appears to be in no hurry for the ROC to enter the PRC's
political embrace for vague assurances of continuity of conditions the
ROC already enjoys. The paper sees the ROC as being placed in a
subordinate position from the outset, as being a local province accepting the motherland's offer to sit down to talks on repatriation.
With these attitudes, the PRC and the ROC will likely retain separate
identities and make no progress toward integration.
4.

The common rejection of the disintegrative model of the
"Taiwan Independence Movement" has been a unique
consensus between the two newspapers or parties.

This model of thematic category #46 did not have any loadings
to become one of the factors because of its uniqueness in being rejected
by both sides.
Though unable to agree on any particular integrative method or
model, the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have both stuck
to one-China nationalism and rejected the disintegrative model of the
"Taiwan Independence Movement" (TIM), the People's Daily showing
11 reporting frequencies in rejecting the model of an independent Taiwan, the Central Daily News, 371. This suggests that the Central
Daily News felt more directly threatened by the TIM than the People's
Daily.
The TIM constitutes another sort of opposition to the ROC government besides the PRC. It has not been very active in Taiwan since
the United States recognized the PRC in January 1979 and acknowledged that Taiwan was a part of China. 8
The TIM was organized in Japan in 1947, with main centers of
activity in the United States and Japan, where there are sizeable numbers of Taiwanese-Chinese with foreign citizenship. The organization
has been active in both countries for some time; it advocates a Taiwan
ruled by Taiwanese-Chinese and the overthrow of the ROC government by force, if necessary. Some would also expel mainlander-Chinese from the island. During the 1960s, the movement received
8. John F. Copper, "Political Development in Taiwan," in Chiu, ed., China and the
Taiwan Issue, op. cit., p. 64, and John F. Copper, "The Taiwan Independence Movement
Factor," in Chen, ed., China Policy and National Security, op. cit., pp. 81-90.

114

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

considerable publicity when the United States and Japan seemed to be
moving toward a two-China policy. At this time, it also allegedly received support from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and
the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. The TIM, however, declined in importance in the 1970s. The movement suffered a
major setback when President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique in 1972, which said that there was only one China. It had been
assumed that the United States was moving toward a two-China policy, one China and one Taiwan. Soon after this, Japan recognized the
PRC and severed official relations with the ROC. Members of the
ruling party in Japan as well as businessmen became cautious about
their support of the TIM. 9 The TIM is still active in the United States,
though without any public support from the U.S. government or from
the majority of the people in Taiwan. 10
Six incidents in the last 17 years have given the movement
notoriety:
(1) In 1968, Professor Ming-min Peng, a TIM member, secretly
fled from Taiwan to the United States through Sweden after he had
been released from prison in the ROC and was under surveillance. 11
(2) On April 24, 1970, two TIM members attempted to assassinate then ROC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in New York. The
assassins were Taiwan-born graduates of National Chengchi University in Taipei. The university was a former cadres-training school for
the Nationalist Party. 12
(3) On October 10, 1976, a TIM member attempted to assassinate the governor of Taiwan, Hsieh Tung-ming, in Taipei. Hsieh lost
his left arm to a letter bomb. 13
(4) TIM members were responsible for a series of bombings of
ROC offices and airline counters in Washington, D.C., New York and
Los Angeles in August and December 1979, and January, April and
September 1980. The bombings led to the California announcement in
1981 that TIM members were international terrorists. 14
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., and Ming-min Peng, "President Reagan and Taiwan," in Tien, ed., Mainland
Taiwan, and U.S. Policy, op. cit., pp. 233-237.
12. Copper, "Political Development in Taiwan," op. cit., p. 64, and Copper, "The Taiwan Independence Movement Factor," op. cit., p. 84.
13. "Announcement of Taiwan Headquarters, World United Formosans for Independence," Tai-tu Journal, No. 57, November 28, 1976.
14. Heng-shi Ho, "An Analysis of the Taiwan Independence Movement," in United
Monthly, No. 21, April, 1983, pp. 51-52.

9.
10.
11.
China,
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(5) On December 10, 1979, TIM members and sympathizers
were involved in a violent riot in the industrial city of Kaohsiung in
southern Taiwan. The clash between rioters and authorities caused
183 military and civilian policemen to be injured. More than 30 rioters and the staff of the Formosa Magazine, which organized the riot,
were jailed. Later, some of the rioters and some of the initiators of the
1977 ballot dispute riot in Chungli, a small town in northern Taiwan,
joined the movement in the United States. 15
(6) On July 3, 1981, a Taiwan-born Chinese-American professor,
Wen-cheng Chen, died in Taipei after being questioned at ROC military security headquarters for activities sympathetic to the TIM in the
United States. The headquarters announced that Chen's fall from a
university-campus building was a suicide. This caused an uproar and a
U.S. congressional threat to cut off arms sales to the ROC. 16
The Central Daily News has consistently reported on the movement in condemnation. The People's Daily has also reported unfavorably on TIM, except in the cases of the Kaohsiung riot and Cheng's
death. The paper labeled the rioters as patriotic democrats fighting
against the ROC, and fighting for reunification with the PRC. 17 The
paper also charged the ROC with political murder in Chen's death. 18
In general, the two newspapers or parties have commonly rejected the TIM for its perception of opposition to "One Unified China
with the Mainland and Taiwan" and its disintegrative model of "a new
and independent Taiwan." 19
5.

The PRC integrative model of "National Regional
Autonomy, Tibet" has been a uniquely disputed
model between the two newspapers or parties.

This model of thematic category # 35 did not meet any loadings
to become one of the factors. This is due to its uniqueness as a model
of "national regional autonomy," a model that the PRC offered and
the ROC rejected. The People's Daily showed 38 reporting frequencies
on this theme, the Central Daily News, 200. The model was first of15. A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "The Political Culture of the Republic of
China," in The Republic of China and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public
Policy Center, 1983), pp. 72-73, and Dan C. Sanford, The Future Association of Taiwan
with the People's Republic of China (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1981),
p. 62.
16. The Washington Post, January 24, 1985.
17. People's Daily, January 28, 1980.
18. Ibid., August 1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 11 and 13, 1981.
19. People's Daily, April 9, 1984, and Central Daily News, December 13, 1983.
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fered to the ROC by the PRC in the 1981 nine-point peace proposal,
without mentioning the name of Tibet. Point #3 said, "After the
country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a
special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The
Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan." 20
It was the same offer that the PRC had given to Tibet in an agreement
on May 23, 1951. Article # 3 of that agreement said, "The Tibetan
people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under
the unified leadership of the Central People's government." 21
The day after the PRC's nine-point proposal was issued on September 30, 1981, and reported in the People's Daily, a three-member
delegation of Tibetan exiles in India sent by the Dalai Lama requested
that the PRC accord Tibet the same treatment as the proposal offered
to the ROC. The request was rejected by the PRC: "Tibet has been
liberated for more than three decades. . .the nine-point principle,
therefore, is not applicable." The experiences of the Tibetan people
have affected the ROC's attitudes toward the PRC's "Tibet Model."
In 1953, the PRC said in an agreement with Tibet that it would not
alter "the existing political system in Tibet," or "the established status,
functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama." The agreement also said,
"Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual." 22 In 1959, the
PRC took Tibet by force, killing thousands and driving large numbers
of refugees into India, dissolving the Tibetan government under the
Dalai Lama. 23
The Central Daily News on December 14, 1982, responded to the
PRC's "Tibet Model" with an article entitled "Trilogy of the Fall of
Tibet by a Taiwan author, Peng-hsiao Huang." The article said:
As soon as Peking completed its military occupation of Tibet, it forgot completely the promises it had made to the
Tibetans and started tightening its iron-fisted rule.
Finally in 1954, the Chinese Communist authorities disbanded the Tibetan armed forces and appointed puppets to
high positions while the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama
were in Peking attending the First National People's
Congress.
20. People's Daily, October 1, 1981.
21. The Agreement of the Central's People's Government and the Local Government
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, signed in Peking, May 23, 1951.
22. Ibid.
23. Chiu, "Prospects for the Unification of China," op. cit., p. 1084; The Question of
Tibet and the Rule of Law (Geneva, 1959), and Tibet and the Chinese People's Republic
(Geneva, 1960), the International Commission of Jurists.
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By the time the Tibetan leaders returned to their homeland they had become virtual prisoners in their own fief.
On December 17, 1982, the Central Daily News reported a speech
made by ROC President Chiang. Chiang used Peng's article to call on
the people of Taiwan to regard events in Tibet as a lesson for the ROC.
Responding to the ROC's concern, the PRC published three long articles explaining the situation in Tibet. The conclusion of the second
article said:
Following more than 30 years of liberation, Xizang (Tibet)
has accomplished its democratic and socialist reforms and
abolished the serf system. Under the direct leadership of the
central people's government, Xizang practices national autonomy, the people will never allow the wheels of history to
be turned back. That is why earlier this year, when the Dalai
Lama said the Xizang autonomous region must also be allowed to enjoy autonomous right like those of Taiwan, which
will become a special administrative region after its return to
the motherland, the Chinese Communist Party flatly refused.
This is understandable and it meets with the people's
approval. 24
Provisions for the PRC's "special administrative region" model
are outlined in Article 31 of the PRC Constitution, adopted on December 1982. It provides: "The state may establish a special administrative region when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special
administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions." 25
PRC leaders made it clear that this article was enacted for the
purpose of unifying Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.
The ROC rejected the proposal to establish Taiwan as a "special
administrative region" in January 1983:
Article 31 of Communist China's Constitution is the base
melody in the Communists' orchestration to solve the "Taiwan problem," i.e., destroy the ROC and establish Communist China's "sovereignty" over Taiwan. What deserves
special notice is this: the "special administrative regions" are
to be established "when necessary" and when the necessity is
24. "Commentary by Chen Guoshao: 'The Trilogy that Fishes in Muddied Waters,'"
Beijing Zhongguo Cinwen She (Beijing China News Agency) (in Chinese), January 7, 1983,
in FB/S, China, January 21, 1983, p. U4.
25. Chiu, "Prospects for the Unification of China," op. cit., p. 1086.
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no longer operative, they may be abolished. The entire system to be practiced there will be "stipulated by law" by the
Chinese Communists. In due course it may be revised or
eliminated "by law." The strategy employed here is one of
absolutely gradual, step-by-step encroachment. The ambition and the cunning that lie behind it need no comment. 26
The PRC's Tibet model or its advanced model of a "Special Administrative Region" model for Taiwan did not receive any favorable
responses from the ROC.
6.

The People's Daily has been more initiating, more on the
offensive, more flexible and more dramatic in offering
integrative methods and models. The Central Daily News
has been more responsive, more defensive, more consistent,
more determined and more resistant with regard to such
methods and models. This is a sign that the two newspapers
lack mutual understanding in reporting about the other side.

In this study, the Central Daily News showed three times more
frequencies than the People's Daily in reporting on China's national
integration. The Central Daily News tried to inform its domestic readers of the party's line on the issue of integration, tried to persuade
them to support it. The People's Daily tried to transmit party
messages on integration via overseas and foreign media, aiming at
overseas Chinese, foreign readers, governments, and the people and
the ROC government on Taiwan.
The People's Daily has offered more integrative methods or models than the Central Daily News. It has more often been the one to
initiate any methods or models, and has done so by using a dramatic
approach. By being the initiator, it has also been able to assume an
apparently more flexible attitude.
In comparison, the Central Daily News is defensive. It has assumed the role of responding to the PRC's initiations of integrative
methods or models, while its responses have been consistently resistant
and determined.
The newspapers have shown a lack of mutual trust and understanding in reporting about the other side. Both newspapers have reported much more unfavorably than neutrally or favorably. At this
time, formal agreements or contacts between the two sides should
probably be avoided because the trust and mutual understanding nee26. ICM Staff Writer, "Some Key Points in the New Constitution," Inside China
Mainland (Taipei: Institute of Current China Studies, January 1983), Supplement, p. 2.
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essary to sustain them are still absent. The two newspapers must build
mutual trust and understanding and must report on the other side
more objectively if integration is indeed their common goal.
National integration will likely be a gradual process involving the
reduction of mutual animosity and an accompanying increase in
confidence.
A number of tension-reducing attempts or an increase in neutral
reports about the other side in the two newspapers could be seen as an
attempt to reduce tensions. It is important to maintain the momentum of these changes in reporting and to continue to expand neutral
and objective reporting about the other side in all areas. This method
of reducing tensions and building mutual understanding could have a
strong appeal to the readers and to the people of both sides. As mutual trust, understanding and confidence are restored, attention can be
directed more rationally to exploring integrative methods and models,
which could also help to end the no-war, no-peace standoff between
the two sides.
7.

The economic factor could be a function of "spill-over" into
political integration. Indirect trade between the two sides
through Hong Kong continues to grow and could develop
into an interdependence between them. The recent reforms
of the PRC's economic system, which is moving closer,
though very slowly, to the ROC's economic system, however,
provides an even greater possibility offuture economic
interdependence.

A transformation of the PRC-ROC relationship is not only subject to the attitudes and intentions of both parties, but also to conditions beyond the control of either. 27 This study suggests that
economic interdependence between the PRC and the ROC is growing
and might be developing into political integration. The magnitude of
the ROC's international economic involvement and the PRC's
planned interdependence with key trading partners of the ROC could
prove instrumental in building mutual understanding; however, economic interdependence could also lead to greater misunderstanding
and conflict. Economic interdependence can create a monster--economic boycott.
One PRC option in the event it fails in its reunification campaign
might be to seek the collapse of the ROC's economy by pressuring
foreign businessmen to withdraw support from the ROC. Threats
27. Sanford, op. cit., p. 79.
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themselves might create enough insecurity to frighten investors away.
The PRC could also dump goods on the world market, similar or identical to those produced in Taiwan, but cheaper. This would reduce the
ROC's export revenues. 28 No such threat on the part of the PRC has
been reported nor does the PRC shows any intention now of using
such a tool to achieve its national goal of integration; furthermore, and
more importantly, it probably does not have the capability, either now
or in the near future. The PRC's recently scaled-down economic goals
and revised purchase plans make it a less significant consumer of foreign products than was originally expected. The PRC's leverage on
Western businessmen would be minimal, particularly as a hostile act
toward the ROC. 29
At this point, it appears that the PRC needs foreign companies
more than foreigners need PRC business. The PRC has shown amazing support of the ROC's economic arrangements. It has not discouraged the dual operations of its trading partners. 30 The PRC, however,
does not need trade links with the ROC equal to those it has with
Hong Kong. The ROC does not represent a crucial window for PRC
products to move West nor is it a source from which the PRC is likely
to build important currency reserves. 31
Indirect trade or economic interdependence between the PRC
and the ROC has not yet reached the "spill-over" level. Attentive to
its growth and development, the current trends in trade have apparently created a new PRC aspect for the ROC. It has also led to a
hesitant interest in the ROC for separating economics from politics in
foreign policy toward Communist areas. The continuation of this
trend could lead to future peaceful associations with the PRC. 32
Thirty-five years ago, two radically different economic philosophies
were inherited by people of the same ethnic group. Since then, two
very different economic situations have developed.
In 1952, on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan in the PRC and
the First Four-Year Plan in the ROC, the per capita incomes in the
two countries were quite close--$46 in the PRC, and $50 in the
ROC. 33 By 1984, the PRC's per capita income had reached $295,
28. Ibid., p. 81.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 82.
33. Yuan-li Wu, "The Taiwan Experience in Economic Development," in James C.
Hsiung, ed., The Taiwan Experience (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 119; and Chu-yuan
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while the ROC's had soared to $2,500. 34
The widening gap between the two economies and their different
economic systems has begun to attract worldwide attention, especially
regarding a future economic interdependence. These economic differences were reflected in the reports of the two newspapers in thematic
category #49 "Advocacy of its Own Economic System." The People's Daily showed 63 reporting frequencies on this theme, the Central
Daily News, 386. The Central Daily News showed a frequency five
times higher than the People's Daily in advocating its own economic
system.
In light of this attention and the important role that economic
realities might play in China's national integration, it is relevant to this
study to provide a brief discussion of the different economic strategies
that the two Chinese governments have pursued.
(1) The PRC's Economic System
The PRC followed the Marxian-Leninist doctrine of nationalizing
land and all means of production, the entire economy being guided by
a national plan. 35 Planning authority is concentrated at the top. All
input and output targets for individual enterprises are decided by central planners and are passed down through various levels of administration. 36 In commerce, the government trading agencies purchase
and distribute key commodities, including all capital goods and all necessities. The government monopolizes foreign trade, setting all important prices. Workers are hired by state labor bureaus and assigned to
factories and firms where they are paid wages set by the government. 37
Many of Mao's economic policies, such as the Great Leap Forward, the People's Commune, "Agriculture learning from Tachai,"
etc. were against traditionally accepted economic laws. 38 Many see
them as causing great losses to the national economy. Unbalanced development strategy hampered the growth of agriculture and restricted
the consumer goods industries. The expansion of the steel and defense
industries has drained investment and materials from other basic industries-notably electricity, coal and transportation. 39
Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China: A Comparison of Strategies and Performance," in Asian Affairs (Spring 1983), p. 60.
34. Ibid.
35. Cheng, ibid., p. 76.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 77.
39. Ibid., p. 78.
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A high rate of capital formation resulted in only a moderate rate
of economic growth and an extremely low level of per capita GNP. In
1983, per capita GNP in the PRC was $250, about one-eleventh that
of the ROC. 40 It is against this background that large-scale reform
programs have been undertaken in the past five years. One major reform has granted greater decision-making power to local governments
and individual enterprises; another promoted management efficiency
by introducing a new system to 100 industrial and transportation enterprises in Sichuan before being extended to 6,600 major enterprises
throughout the country. These enterprises account for 60 percent of
all production and 70 percent of all profits in the industrial sector.
Under the new system, the enterprises have the right to design their
own production plans and to retain up to 5 percent of planned profits
and 20 percent of extra profits after state quotas are fulfilled. The enterprises are also allowed to control their own profits and their foreign
exchange earnings. The right to retain profits is considered the heart
of the reforms because it acts as material incentive to the enterprise
manager to increase productivity.41
In the rural areas, the most significant reform was to establish a
system of contracting production with individual households. While
the land is still collectively owned, plots of land are now contracted to
individual farm households for cultivation. The households are obligated to produce a certain amount which goes to the production team
to be sold to the state. After fulfilling the contracted amount, the
households may keep the rest of their production, for their own consumption or for their trade at a market. With the introduction of the
new system, rural free markets have expanded and private plots cut or
banned during the Cultural Revolution have expanded. In some areas,
private plots have increased from 6 percent to 15 percent of total cultivated land. Apparently, the new PRC leadership now assumes that
the key to agricultural development is the promotion of material
incentives. 42
The strategy of economic development has also been drastically
revised. First, there was a change in investment priorities. The share
of capital investment for agriculture was raised from 10.7 percent in
1978 to 18 percent in 1980. The shares of investment for textile, electronics and light industries rose from 10.1 percent in 1978 to 17.9 in
1982. The advantage annual growth rate for light industries since 1978
40. Ibid., and People's Daily, April 30, 1983.
41. Cheng, op. cit., p. 79.
42. Ibid., pp. 79-80.

CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE

123

is 11.8 percent, for heavy industry it dropped to 3.4 percent. The ratio
between light industries and heavy industries changed from 42.7 percent and 57.3 percent in 1978, to 50.2 percent and 49.8 percent in
1982, to 49.5 percent and 50.5 percent in 1984. This policy is apparently a move toward more balanced growth. 43
With leadership favoring a more open and liberal attitude toward
foreign investment, the self-reliance principle has been abandoned.
Direct foreign loans and joint ventures have been solicited. Thousands
of PRC students have been sent to attend Western academic institutions. Four "Special Economic Zones" have been set up in
Quangdong and Fujian provinces. Fourteen coastal cities are open for
foreign investment. The PRC is willing to revise the old Stalin-Marxian economic doctrine to a new doctrine-the "Chinese Socialist
System. " 44
The PRC is moving closer, though very slowly, to the economic
system of the ROC. For five years, the leadership of the PRC has been
searching for a new developmental model. In the 1977-1978 period,
the PRC leaders considered the Yugoslavia model an attractive alternative. But after three years of intensive study, they realized that Yugoslavia was plagued with numerous problems. 45 After the
Yugoslavian model proved inadequate, the impressive achievements of
the ROC began to catch the attention of PRC leaders. Since then, the
PRC has adopted many strategies employed by the ROC. For example, they have opened the door for foreign consumer goods industries
and begun promoting foreign trade. 46
To energize the PRC economy, more fundamental changes in the
economic system must be carried out. As former President Richard
M. Nixon observed, "The key to China's future economic success lies
in its becoming less Communist and more Chinese. Its failures during
the third of a century since Mao Tse-tung took power have been a
direct result of Communist dogma generally and Maoist dogma particularly."47 At the heart of the present economic expansion in the PRC
is the introduction of economic reforms, which liberalize the rules for
private enterprise. Small scale private activities are now permitted in
industry, services and agriculture, however, the PRC is still very much
43. Ibid., and China Times (Taipei), May 24, 1985.
44. Cheng, op. cit., p. 80.
45. Chu-yuan Cheng, "Leadership Changes and Economic Policies in China," Journal
of International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1978), pp. 255-273.
46. Ibid.
47. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., p. 84.
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a socialist country and is likely to remain so. 48
Ma Hong, the president of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences
and advisor to the Planning Commission, has written, "In our current
efforts to reform the economic management system, we should have a
correct understanding of the nature of our socialist economy. Socialist
construction in an economically underdeveloped country such as ours
requires that commodities and money be fully utilized. In other
words, our socialist economy is a planned one which should actively
develop commodity production and exchange. " 49
(2) The ROC's Economic System
The ROC on Taiwan has followed a mixed economic system.
While the ROC government owns some of the island's major basic
industries such as steel, ship building, defense, railroads, public utilities, electric power and petrochemicals, almost all the light industries
and virtually all the services and trading firms are privately owned. 50
The government sets goals for the economy by designing long-term
developmental plans. At every phase in Taiwan's development, the
government has exercised direct control or indirect influence to guide
economic activities. 51
Important regulations used by the government include foreign exchange, import controls, bank credit allocations, interest rate policies,
investment licensing, and tax rebates. These controls provide incentive or disincentive by fostering a growth which conforms to the plans
of the government agencies. 52 Despite these interventions, government policies improve the investment climate rather than limit private
activities. The mixed economic system allows the government to influence the direction of economic activities while preserving private enterprise and individual initiative. 53
Realizing that agriculture is an important base for an industrialized nation, the ROC has paid great attention to promoting agricultural productivity. One of its major measures was a land-reform
48. L. R. Klein, "Taiwan-China: Mainland-China, Some Economic Impressions,"
World Journal (New York), November 18, 1984.
49. New Strategy for China's Economy (Beijing: New Word Press, 1983), p. 95.
50. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., p. 71.
51. Ibid.
52. Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," in Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and
Structural Change in Taiwan, pp. 259-262.
53. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., pp. 71-

72.
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program between 1949 and 1953. 54 Prior to land reform, land ownership in Taiwan, as in many less-developed countries, was unequal.
With a large tenant population, the competition for land was fierce,
and rent often consumed as 50 percent of the expected harvest. 55 The
land redistribution program enabled 48 percent of Taiwan's farm families to purchase land. The annual growth rate for total farm yield averaged 5.2 percent for the period 1953 through 1968. 56
Aware of its limited domestic market, the ROC promoted export
expansion to ensure economic growth. As early as the 1950s, many
export programs were started. One of the most important measures, a
tax rebate on exportable industrial products, reduced the cost of exports and increased their competitiveness in the international
market. 5 7
Between 1952 and 1962, total trade volume went up 80 percent,
with an average annual growth rate of 6.1 percent. Between 1962 and
1974, trace increased 22 times, with an annual growth rate of 29.4
percent. The highest growth rate was achieved in the 1970 to 1974
period, 41.5 percent, passing even Japan's postwar record. In recent
years, the ROC foreign trade has exceeded its gross national product
to become the island's most significant sector. 58 From the early 1950s,
the ROC government has systematically sought foreign investment
and expertise; these have created a favorable investment climate for
the development program of the island. The annual flow of foreign
capital has risen sharply from a few million U.S. dollars a year in the
1950s to a high of almost a quarter of a billion dollars in the 1970s. 59
During the past 35 years, the economic system and development
strategies adopted by the ROC government have transformed Taiwan
from a relatively poor, underdeveloped, agrarian economy to a modem industrial economy, ranking third among Asian countries in per
capita income. The ROC's real GNP has increased sevenfold in 35
years, averaging an annual groWth of 9 percent, which is among the
highest in the world. In foreign trade, the ROC now ranks as the
seventh largest trading partner of the United States and is among the
20 largest trading nations in the world. 60
54. Ibid., p. 72.
55. Erik Thorbecke, "Agricultural Development," in Galenson, ed., op. cit., p. 153.
56. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," op. cit., p. 73.
57. Ibid., p. 74.

58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo, Growth with Equity, The Taiwan
Case (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 41; and China Times, op. cit.
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With a much richer natural resources base, if the PRC were to
more fully adopt the ROC's economic system, its GNP could conceivably rise rapidly, reducing the economic gap between the two countries. The possibility of future economic interdependence through
direct or indirect trade would be greater. Eventually the economic
function of "spill-over" could lead to the realization of political
integration.
8.

Both the PRC and the ROC have attempted to influence the
United States to support their respective policies on China's
national integration. The United States, however, has
continued to support a peaceful integration by the PRC and
the ROC themselves. To maintain this policy, the United
States maintains unofficial but substantial relations with the
ROC

The People's Daily and the Central Daily News have revealed their
intentions of involving the United States in their differing integration
goals. The United States has been consistent in its established policy
of supporting a peaceful settlement of the reunification issue without
outside interference. To protect the ROC from forceful integration,
the United States has provided continuous arms sales and has maintained unofficial relations through the Taiwan Relations Act; however,
this policy has upset the PRC, which regards it as an obstacle to integration. The ROC is well aware of its relatively small position in
American strategic plans, especially when compared with the strategic
importance of the PRC; therefore, it has tried to highlight its economic importance to the United States and to strengthen the longstanding U.S. ideological and sentimental ties with the island. 61
The United States will likely seek a balance in its China policy,
maintaining close unofficial ties with the ROC and maintaining cordial
official relations with the PRC. Such balance is not necessarily easy to
achieve. Positive developments could include a reduction in PRC
pressure over continued U.S. relations with the ROC. The PRC may
come to believe that integration is unlikely without the support of the
United States. A continued hard line on U.S.-Taiwan relations could
alienate American opinion from the PRC and jeopardize chances for
integration with Taiwan. The PRC domestic political situation could
stabilize and its leaders could reach a compromise with the United
States over the ROC without repercussions inside the PRC.
Future trends also could work against U.S. interests. The PRC
61. Sutter, op. cit., p. 321.
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might remain uncompromising on U.S.-Taiwan relations; might even
increase pressure on the United States to cut off U.S. arms shipments
to the ROC; might demand that the United States explicitly recognize
PRC sovereignty over Taiwan; could demand that the United States
actively support PRC proposals for integration, could require that the
United States apply pressure on the ROC to come to terms with the
PRC. If the United States refused, the PRC could respond by downgrading diplomatic relations; could shift PRC policy away from the
United States and confront American interests more directly in sensitive areas, notably Taiwan62 ; or could establish better relations with
the Soviet Union. Any of these trends, combined with a harder PRC
line on the ROC, could make it more difficult for U.S. leaders to justify compromise over Taiwan.
U.S.-Taiwan relations could also again become a major partisan
issue in U.S. politics. For this reason, the Reagan administration
might try to accommodate PRC demands by cutting back on military
and other ties with the ROC, and by playing down past American
commitments made in the Taiwan Relations Act. Conservatives would
have a tough time accusing Ronald Reagan of being "soft" on Taiwan,
but they might be able to attack his aides who have been prominently
involved in PRC relations. Meanwhile, if the Reagan administration
fails to accommodate the PRC and relations are downgraded, Democratic leaders could exploit the administration's "mismanagement" of
U.S. China policy. 63 China's national integration presents difficulties
for U.S. China policy. Legally, the Taiwan Relations Act deliberately
provides a deterrent level of support. The United States provides arms
under the Taiwan Relations Act as interpreted by the U.S.-PRC understanding of August 1982. The island also remains a major U.S.
trading and investment partner. These factors indicate that the United
States would respond to an attack on the island; nevertheless, those
same factors strain the U.S.-PRC relationship, a matter of far greater
importance to U.S. interests.
Apart from U.S.-PRC-Taiwan considerations, longer-term American foreign policy could be influenced heavily by shifts in Soviet policy. As the United States or the PRC cooperate with each other
against suspected Soviet expansionism, the United States might accommodate PRC interests in Taiwan. If Soviet power were seen by
the United States, growing and strategic concerns might push the
62. Ibid., p. 323.
63. Ibid., p. 324.
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United States into favoring the PRC over the ROC. 64
Under these circumstances, the United States would presumably
be more willing to cut off military supplies to the island, to recognize
PRC sovereignty over Taiwan, and to pressure the ROC to join in
peace talks with the PRC. Arguments against such action would continue to focus on the moral commitment to the ROC and on U.S.
economic interests on the island. The relative importance of these factors would fade in comparison with broader U.S. strategic interests
which would depend on how threatened the United States felt in the
face of Soviet expansion and how useful the PRC appeared to be as a
partner against the Soviet Union. 65
One general trend has stood out in U.S. policy in the past decade,
a policy to move in the direction of meeting PRC demands and conditions and gradually cut back contacts with the ROC for the sake of
better relations with the PRC. 66 Unforeseen future developments
could change its course, but these policies are likely to continue in
U.S.-China policy for some time to come. Ultimately, U.S.-China policy is likely to be more to the PRC's advantage than to the ROC's.
Two overall conclusions are derived from the findings of this
study:
1.

The theory of integration has been applied and found to be
valid by the study's communication approach to the media
of integrative entities. The study•s hypotheses based on the
theory of integration have been supported: the two Chinese
party newspapers have used their reporting media for the
purpose of advocating their respective integrative ideologies,
methods and models. The factor analysis of the survey
found five factors in China•s national integration: (1) oneChina nationalism consensus, (2) mutual understanding
about the other side, (3) economic function, (4) U.S.-China
policy, and (5) U.S. protecting-Taiwan policy.

The study concludes that the two Chinese party newspapers have
focused on one-China nationalism, but without providing common
agreeable methods for a future integrative model; have increased their
neutral understanding about each other, but still retained a significant
amount of unfavorable reports about the other side; have developed an
awareness of the possible economic function of indirect trade through
64. Ibid., p. 325.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 326.
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Hong Kong and of the narrowing economic gap through PRC's recent
economic reforms, but without realizing serious discussions or planning for a healthy development of "spill-over" integration; have tried
hard to influence the United States to support their respective advantages over the other side on the integration issue, but without much
success of changing established U.S. China policy; have disputed continued U.S. protection of the ROC with the Taiwan Relations Act and
arms sales, but without direct contacts or consultations between them.
Both sides claim integration is an internal problem.
Sentimental appeals to one-China nationalism fill in the two
newspapers. A fair and objective reporting policy about the other side
seems unlikely to be accepted by the two newspapers in the near future. Mutual understanding and confidence building seem to be beyond the consideration of the two newspapers' editorial policies.
As discussed in conclusion #7, indirect trade through Hong
Kong will probably continue to grow. The recent reforms of the
PRC's economic system have a fairly good chance of succeeding and
of slowly increasing the PRC's economic power. Though it may be a
long time before reforms affect the rest of the mainland's economy,
there is hope of reducing the economic gap between the PRC and the
ROC. There is hope of achieving economic interdependence and eventual economic integration.
As discussed in conclusion # 8, the two newspapers or parties
will probably try to use their media influence to persuade the United
States on integration. The United States is maintaining its established
policy for a peaceful settlement unless other factors, such as policies of
the Soviet Union, intrude. Nevertheless, the PRC has more to gain
than the ROC concerning the concessions that the United States
might have made on integration. There is an external element in
China's national integration issue as the theory of integration
indicates.
2.

This study, through research on the media of the two parties
on the integration issue, has provided a scientific
source for practical political reference in
dealing with China's national
integration.

The media of the two parties are useful sources; however, access
to both domestic editions in the United States was hard to obtain.
This study provides a more accessible source for researching the fundamental policies and strategies of the two parties on particular political issues such as China's national integration.

130

CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

The two newspapers usually carry the full text of announcements
or speeches made by their leaders that other Chinese newspapers do
not report. The hidden messages between the lines must be found in
reference books or other media since the two newspapers are very
political and usually allow no second opinions on sensitive issues such
as China's national integration.
The two newspapers provide important messages and trends on
the issue of integration, even though they are not necessarily popular
newspapers as far as the reader's general interests are concerned. In
other words, they are more informative on party-line messages, but
less educational, less informative and less entertaining by ordinary
Western newspaper standards.
For this study on China's national integration, the two Chinese
party newspapers certainly served the purpose of the research by providing a way to find relevant materials to either confirm or reject the
reporting of the two newspapers on the integration issue.
Recommendation
The results of this study indicate that the PRC and the ROC have
not built up a solid mutual understanding of each other. It is worth
emphasizing again that such understanding is necessary if they are sincere in pursuing national integration. Both sides could increase their
neutral and objective reporting about the other side and decrease unfavorable reporting for their integration-concerned readers.
Both sides probably will maintain their one-China nationalism
consensus. If their common goal is an integrated China, they might
consider providing solid and workable integrative methods, models for
serious academic and political discussion in their newspapers for the
benefit of their millions of readers. The present one-way traffic which
denounces the other side's proposals and models undermines the development of any workable integrative method or model that could be
accepted by both sides. Any foreign effort, particularly by the United
States, to coerce or mediate a final solution would be ineffective and
possibly counterproductive. The U.S. role can be limited to making as
sure as possible that any solution, any process, will be achieved without coercion or force of any kind.
This study also recommends that the United States not stand in
the way of all possible contacts and interaction between the PRC and
the ROC, nor try to play a direct role in promoting any particular
solution.
Assuming that the PRC sticks to peaceful methods, the United
States is recommended to adhere to its established position on continu-
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ous arms sales to the ROC, and to execute the Taiwan Relations Act
so that the ROC not be forcefully integrated by the PRC. The United
States might avoid promoting or coercing either party to adopt any
particular solution, insisting only that the use of force be avoided. The
United States can influence but "should" not control the future of
China's national integration. The gradual evolution of PRC and ROC
relations neither requires more benefits from excessive attention nor
needs suspicions or false claims of urgency. Precipitous actions by
either side would fail and be unnecessary and counterproductive.
All five factors in this study could be watched closely by further
academic research that monitors their development and change.
The growing indirect trade between the two Chinese countries
through Hong Kong, and the recent reforms of the PRC's economic
system, are potential economic factors of the "spill-over" function relevant to the study of integration theory. Observation and analysis are
recommended. Neither the PRC nor the ROC has shown a genuine
interest in stopping the indirect trade between them. Both sides have
benefited in the past, and will benefit in the future. Both sides have
watched the development of the PRC's economic reforms.
The study also found that integration is not only an internal affair, as the PRC, the ROC and the United States maintain. Each side
has tried to involve the United States in its favor. It is this study's
recommendation that the ultimate solution to the problem of China's
national integration should be a Chinese solution, arrived at by the
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Ideally, a peaceful solution will respect the willingness and opinions of one billion Chinese on
the mainland and the 18 million Chinese on Taiwan.
Further research on media other than these two party newspapers
or comparing other media to these two newspapers on the issue of
China's national integration is recommended. Other media may have
different perspectives that are worthy of research. Radio propaganda
of both the PRC and the ROC is also an important media although
difficult and complicated to survey.
Because this study is limited to the overall factors of China's national integration found in the media survey, further research could
concentrate on particular factors or on particular periods of time.
Each factor involves many complex issues, events, theories and practices that are beyond the limitations of this study. Certainly, an advanced study could provide more concrete results or suggestions on
workable and acceptable integrative methods or models for the people
and the leaders of both sides to consider.
Any study on the integration issue would be extremely valuable
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and is encouraged. The interests of one billion Chinese are at stake.
Thirty-five years of disintegration between the mainland and Taiwan is
not a long time compared to other periods of disintegration in Chinese
history. The Chinese on both sides could be open-minded, patient and
enthusiastic in evaluating a workable and peaceful integrative method
or model.
The final, idealistic recommendation for future research is to conduct an opinion survey the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait. Is national integration is felt necessary? Or desirable? Why,
when and how could national integration be achieved? Answers to
these questions would offer a solid reference to the issues of China's
national integration.
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Frequency: 0-667
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 7,570 reporting frequencies
The Central Daily News, 28,135.
The two newspapers, a total of 35,708.

FIGURE 1
TREND OF TOTAL REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
A TIME SERIES, DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-3,244
Thematic Categories: #1-54
-----: The People's Daily, 7,570 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 28,138.
The two newspapers, a total of 35,708.

FIGURE 2
TREND OF TOTAL REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THE THEMATIC CATEGORIES #1-54
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Frequency: 0-238
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 474 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 2,545.
The two newspapers, a total of 3,019.

FIGURE 3
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #10 "REGRESSIONS AND DEFECTORS," DECEMBER
1978-MAY 1985
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FIGURES 4
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
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-----: The People's Daily, 53 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 331.
The two newspapers, a total of 384.

FIGURE 5
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #14 "NEUTRAL POLITICAL REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-122
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 291 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 3,244.
The two newspapers, a total of 3,535.

FIGURE 6
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY US "UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL REPORT ABOUT
THE OTHER SIDE," -DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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The two newspapers, a total of 55.

FIGURE 7
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEt-TSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #16 "FAVORABLE MILITARY REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEHBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-23
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 4 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 102.
The two newspapers, a total of 106.

FIGURE 8
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #17 "NEUTRAL MILITARY REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-19
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 13 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 355.
The two newspapers, a total of 368.

FIGURE 9
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEZ.IATIC CATEGORY US "UNFAVORABLE MILITARY REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-9
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----· The People's Daily, 191 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 14.
The two newspapers, 205.

FIGURE 10
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #19 "FAVORABLE SOCIETAL REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
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Frequency: 0-13
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 139 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 14.
The two newspapers, a total of 153.

FIGURE 11
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #20 "NEUTRAL SOCIETAL REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
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Frequency: 0-48
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 384 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 1,790.
The two newspapers, a total of 2,174.

FIGURE 12
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #21 "UNFAVORABLE SOCIETAL REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-9
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 107 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 22.
The two newspapers, a total of 129.

FIGURE 13
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #53 "FAVORABLE ECONOMIC REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
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Frequency: 0-8
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 18 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 13.
The two newspapers, a total of 31.

FIGURE 14
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #54 "NEUTRAL ECONOMIC REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER

SIDE,~
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Frequency: 0-55
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 251 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 1,546.
The two newspapers, a total of 1,797.

FIGURE 15
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #50 "UNFAVORABLE ECONOMIC REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-l-iAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-13
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 250 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, SO.
The two newspapers, a total of 300.

FIGURE 16
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #11 "COMMENTARY FAVORABLE TO THE OTHER
SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
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Frequency: 0-63
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----· The People's Daily, 206 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 1,958.
The two newspapers, a total of 2,164.

FIGURE 17
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO

NE~vSPAPERS

IN

THEMATIC CATEGORY #12 "COMMENTARY UNFAVORABLE TO THE OTHER
SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
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Frequency: 0-70
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 175 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 69.
The two newspapers, a total of 244.

FIGURE 18
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #45 "THE PRC'S PEACE PROPOSAL FOR
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
(FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-89
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 118 reporting frequencies.
The Central Dailv News, 90.
The two newspapers, a total of 208.

FIGURE 19
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE T\'70 NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #41, "THE PRC'S 1981 NINE-POINT PEACE
PROPOSAL TO INTEGRATE THE ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
(FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-82
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 560 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 1,386.
The two newspapers, a total of 1,946.

FIGURE 20
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #6 "THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF ONE CHINA," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM
CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-39
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 183 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 88.
The two newspapers, a total of 271.

FIGURE 21
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY i42 "THE PRC'S THREE-LINK, FOUREXCHANGE PEACE PROPOSAL TO BEGIN TO INTEGRATE THE ROC,"
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISH CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-99
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 201 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 798.
The two newspapers, a total of 999.

FIGURE 22
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #5 "THE HSIN-HAI REVOLUTION IN 1911 LED BY
SUN YAT-SEN AND HIS NATIONALIST PARTY," DECEMBER 1978-MAY
1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
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E'requency: 0-83
rime Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 38 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 1,989.
The two newspapers, a total of 2,027.

FIGURE 23
rREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
rHEMATIC CATEGORY #39 "PRC'S FORCEFUL INTEGRATION WITH THE
ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM
:ONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-21
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 180 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 14.
The two newspapers, a. total of 194.

FIGURE 24
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #9 "THE SEPARATED RELATIVES DIVIDED BY THE
TAIWAN STRAIT," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I:
NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-45
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 163 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 453.
The two newspapers, a total of 616.

FIGURE 25
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #43 "THE PRC'S PEACE-TALK PROPOSAL TO THE
ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM
CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-122
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 440 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 698.
The two newspapers, a total of 1,138.

FIGURE 26
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #4 "SUN YAT-SEN AS THE REVOLUTIONARY
LEADER, AND SOONG CHING LING, SUN'S WIDOW," DECEMBER
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-14
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 106 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 49.
The two newspapers, a total of 155.

FIGURE 27
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC
CATEGORY #8 "THE SEPARATION OF PEOPLE FROM NATIVE TOWNS
RESULTING FROM POLITICAL SEPARATION BETWEEN THE MAINLAND AND
TAit'IAN," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM
CONSENSUS)
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Frequency: 0-9
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 2 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 124.
The two newspapers, a total of 126.
:"\

FIGURE 28
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
TH~~TIC

CATEGORY #40 "ROC'S PROPOSAL TO INTEGRATE UNDER ITS

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE,"
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)

161

CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE

240

......__

7R 79

-

-.

80

81

~

A -.
82

/~. ~"" .A
8J

84

85

Frequency: 0-17
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 46 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 223.
The two newspapers, a total of 269.

FIGURE 29
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #28 "TRANSFER OF AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC
TECHNOLOGY," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
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Frequency: 0-32
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 75 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 75.
The two newspapers, a total of 150.

FIGURE 30
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #34 "THE PRC'S ONE NATION, TWO SYSTEMS
INTEGRATIVE MODEL," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR III:
ECONOMIC FUNCTION)
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Frequency: 0-56
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 183 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 436.
The two newspapers, a total of 619.

FIGURE 31
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #36 "THE PRC'S HONG KONG INTEGRATIVE
MODEL," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR III: ECONOMIC
FUNCTION)
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Frequency: 0-8
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 51 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 39.
The two newspapers, a total of 90.

FIGURE 32
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #51 "PRC'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN
GUANGDONG AND FUJIAN PROVINCES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
(FACTOR III: ECONOMIC FUNCTION)
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Frequency: 0-86
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 356 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 1,795.
The two newspapers, a total of 2,151.

FIGURE 33
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #22 "PROMOTING A WARMER RELATIONSHIP WITH
THE UNITED STATES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S.
CHINA POLICY)
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Frequency: 0-88
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 181 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 716.
The two newspapers, a total of 897.

FIGURE 34
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #23 "CALLING ON THE UNITED STATES TO
MAINTAIN A COLDER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER SIDE,"
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY)
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Frequency: 0-112
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 167 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 327.
The two newspapers, a total of 494.

FIGURE 35
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY 124 "THE PRC'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE UNITED STATES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV:
U.S. CHINA POLICY)
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Frequency: 0-10
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 72 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 149.
The two newspapers, a total of 221.

FIGURE 36
TREND OF REPORTING .FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS !N
THEMATIC CATEGORY #29 "EMPHASIS ON PRC'S OR ROC'S STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE TO ASIA, THE UNITED STATES OR THE WORLD,"
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY)
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Frequency: 0-41
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 323 reporting frequencies.
The Centr~l Daily News, 442.
The two newspapers, a total of 765.

FIGURE 37
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #1 "ONE GREATER CHINA TERRITORY," DECEMBER
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY)
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Frequency: 0-51
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
-----: The People's Daily, 94 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 81.
The two newspapers, a total of 909.

FIGURE 38
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY # 2 6 "U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAil'lAN, " DECEMBER
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR V: U.S. PROTECTING-TAIWAN POLICY)
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Frequency: 0-29
Time Series: December 1978-May 1985
The People's Daily, 50 reporting frequencies.
The Central Daily News, 410.
The two newspapers, a total of 460.

FIGURE 39
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THE~~TIC

CATEGORY #25 "U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT," DECEMBER

1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR V: U.S. PROTECTING-TAIWAN POLICY)
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APPENDIX
COMMUNIQUE

1: FEBRUARY 28, 1972. THE U.S.-PRC SHANGHAI

The Shanghai Communique, February 28, 1972
President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's
Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the
President was Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to
the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.
President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist
Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations and world affairs.
During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China,
as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of
State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same
spirit.
President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial
and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.
The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of
America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues.
They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great
upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.
The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts
both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict.
The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills
the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because
it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside
pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce
tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to Jessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual
respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be
prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. Tite United
States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine
their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has
been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic
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of Vietnam and the United States on Jaunary 27, 1972 represents a basis for the
attainment of that objective; in the absence .of a negotiated settlement the
United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of aU U.S. forces from the
region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain· its close ties with and support for the
Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication
in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly
relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21,
1971, the United States favors the continuation of the cease fire between India
and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the
United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own
future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the
subject of great power rivalry.
Tite Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance.
Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution-this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small,
should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should
not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony
and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports
the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation
and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems
according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign
aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be
withdrawn to their own countries.
The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm
support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this
year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration ·of
the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eightpoint program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the
stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of
Japanese militarism and finnly supports tlte Japanese people's desire to build an
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independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that
India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on
the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their re·
spective territories and to their own sides of the ceascfire line in Jammu and
Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their strug·
glc to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and
Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.
There are essential differences between China and the United States in
their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that
countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on
the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states,
JHm-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of
other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. lnterna·
tional disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or
threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are pre·
pared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.
With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides
stated that:
-progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the
United States is in the interests of all countries;
-both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
-neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is op·
posed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such
hegemony; and
-neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter
into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the
peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other
countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.
TI1e two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China
and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan
question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations be·
tween China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic
of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China
which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is
China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and
all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. TI1c
Olinesc Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of
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. 1: FEBRUARY 28, 1972. THE U.S.-PRC SHANGHAI
APPENDIX
COMMUNIQUE (Continued)

"one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and
"independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be
determined."
The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese
on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Tai·
wan is a part of China. Tite United States Government does not challenge tluot
position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question
by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate
objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Tai·
wan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installa·
lions on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.
The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding he·
tween the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as
science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people
contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to
facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit
can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual
benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to
facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.
The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various chan·
nels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to
time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations be·
tween the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common
interest.
The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit
would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. Titcy
believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only
in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the
relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.
President NiXon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their
appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and
people of the People's Republic of China.

Dtf'{lrtmcnt of Stalt Bulletin 66, no. 1708 (March 20, 1972): 435-38.
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2 : DECEMBER l 7, 1978. REPORT ON THE
APPENDIX
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PRC AND
THE u • s • (The People' s naily)
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3: DECEMBER 17, 1978. ROC'S PROTEST ON THE
ANNOUNCEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE PRC AND THE U.S • (The central Daily Ne\oJS)
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APPENDIX
4: JANUARY 1, 1979. JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.AND
THE PRC1 DECEMBER 15, 1978, U.S. AND PRC STATEMENTS
I.CCOMPANYING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the United States of America and the People's Republic
of China, January 1, 1979
(The communique was released on December 15, 1978, in Washington and
Peking)
llte United States of America and the People's Republic of China have
agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1,1979.
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's
Republic of China as ttie sole legal Government of China. Within this context,
the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm
the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again that:
•Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
•Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other
region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or
group of countries to establish such hegemony.
•Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter
into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
•The Government of the United States of America acknowledges• the
Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
•Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only
in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the
cause of peace in Asia and the world.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March I, 1979.

•The Chinese text uanslated the word ..acknowledges"~ into Cheng-jrn. which, if
retranslated into English, would mean ..recognize."
Dcptirtment of Stau Bull.,in 79, no. 2022 (January 1979): 25.
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APPENDIX
4: JANUARY 1, 1979. JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.AND
THE PRC; DECEMBER 15, 1978, U.S. AND PRC STATEMENTS
ACCOMPANYING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Continued)

United States Statement Accompanying the Joint Communique on
the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China, December IS, 1978
As of January I, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People 's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date,
the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States
of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China.
On that same date, January I, 1979, the United States of America will
notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being
terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The United States
also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.
In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.
The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to
permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other nongovernmental
relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.
TI1e United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful
and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the
peaceful resolu lion of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will
be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interest, and to the peace of the entire world.

Deportment of State Bulletin 19, no. 2022 (lanuary 1979): 26.
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APPENDIX
4: JANUJL~Y 1, 1979. JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.AND
THE PRC; DECEMBER'15, 1978, U.S. AND PRC STATEMENTS
ACCOMPANYING THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE (Continued)

People's Republic of China Statement Accompanying the Joint
Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
the United States and the PRC, December I 5, 1978
As of January I, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United
States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. 1l1is is a historic
event in Sino-U.S. relations.
As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is
the sole legal Government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. TI1e question
of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two
countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint
efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the
people of the two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the em·
brace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.
At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Tcng llsiao-ping, Vice-Premier
of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit
to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the
friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.

Peki11g Review 21, no. 51 (December 22,1978): 8-9.
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APPENDIX
5: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF
HALT!NG ITS BOMBINGS ON OUEMOY AND MATSU ISLANDS, AND PRC'S
"A MESSAGE TO COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN" (The People's Daily)
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6: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S "A MESSAGE TO
COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN"

TEXT OF NPC STANDING COMMITTEE MESSAGE
TO TAIWAN COMPATRIOTS
Beijing,january I, 1979
(cmpha.sis added)
Tu.t of the New Ycar"s Day message of the Standina; Committee of
lhc National People's Congress to compatriots in Taiwan, which wu
rndoncd after discussion at the committee's fifth plenary session on

December 26:

Dear compatriots in Taiwan:
Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cor·
dial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all
nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.
As an old saying goes, "a special festival calls up affectionate
remembrances of our beloved ones." On this happy occasion as
we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts tum all the more to
our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in
Taiwan. We know you·have the motherland and your kinsfolk
on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of many
years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when
Taiwan was regrettably separated from the motherland in 1949,
we have not been able to communicate with or visit each
other, our motherland has remained disunited, relatives have
been unable to have a reunion, and our nation, country and
people have suffered great losses as a result. All Chinese com·
patriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world,
without exception, look forward to an early termination of
this sad situation.
Our Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a
quarter of the world's population and has a long history and
excellent culture, and its outstanding contributions to world
civilization and human progress are universally recognized.
Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient
times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesiveness.
All through past history, foreign invasions and internal strife
have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation
from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and
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APPENDIX
6: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S •A MESSAGE TO
COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN" (Continued)

against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of
affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in
Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for
the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The
important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges
the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an
issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set
about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at
an early date, what can we say to our ancestors or to our
descendants? This sentiment is shared by all; and who among
the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to be branded a
traitor of all ages?
Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the
world over the past 30 years. Our country's international
prestige keeps rising and its international role becomes ever
more important. The people and governments of almost all
countries now place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle
against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in
Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see
the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we
can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be
no limit to our contributio11s to the future of mankind. Early
reunification of our motherland is not only the common
desire of all the people of China, including all compatriots in
Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and
countries the world over.
Reunification of China now fits in with the direction of
popular feeling and the general trend of development. The
world in general recognizes only one China, with the Govern·
ment of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal govern·
ment. The recent conclusion of the China-] apan treaty of peace
and friendship and the normalization of relations between
China and the United States show still more clearly that no one
can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland,
one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all
nationalities on the mainland are working hard and with one
will for the great goal of the four modernizations. h is our
fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the mother·
land at an early date so that we can work together for the great
cause of national development. Our state leaders hat•e firmly
declared that they will take present realities into account i11
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APPENDIX
6: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S •A MESSAGE TO
COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN" (Continued)

accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and
respect the status qua 011 Taiwan and the opinions of people in
all walks of lrfe there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settli11g the question of reunification so as not to cause
the people of Taiwa11 any losses. On the other hand, people in
all walks in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their
homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to trace their
roots and return," and raised diverse proposals which express
their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the
motherland. With all conditions now favorable for reunification
and everything set, 110 o11e should go against the will of the
nation and counter the trend of history.
We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and
also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always
taken a firm stand of one China and opposed an independent
Taiwan. This is our common stand and the basis for our cooperation. We have always taken the position that all patriots belong
to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland
rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will place
national interests paramount and make valuable contributions
to the reunification of the motherland.
The Chinese Govemment has ordered the People's Liberation
Army to stop the bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as
from today. A state of military confrontation between the two
sides still exists along the Taiwan straits. This can only create
artificial tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure
environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges
in whatever area.
·
The prolonged separation has caused a lack of mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on
Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since many
Overseas Chinese residing in foreign lands far away can return
for visits and tours and reunion with their families, why shouldn't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and Taiwan,
visit each other freely? We believe that there is no reason for
such barriers to continue. We hope both sides will bring about
at an early date the setting up of transportation and postal services to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to contact

185

186

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

APPENDIX
6: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S "A MESSAGE TO
COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWANn (Continued)

each other directly, write to each other, vtstt relatives and
friends, exchange tours and visits and make acadt·mic, ntltural,
sports and technological interchange.
Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the
motherland were originally an entity. Unfortunately, economic
ties have been suspended for many years. Now, construction is
going on vigorously in the motherland and we also wish Taiwan
growing economic prosperity. There is every reaso11 for us to
develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks
and create economic interflow.
This is our mutual need and will benefit both parties without
doing any harm.
Dear compatriots in Taiwan:
The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and
also to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred
mission history has bequeathed to our geueratiou. Times arc
moving along and the situation is developing. The earlier we
fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history of our country, catch up
with advanced powers and work together for this glorious goal!
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APPENDIX
8: SEPTEMBER 30, 1981. YE JIANGYING'S
EXPLANATION ON PRC'S NINE-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL

Beijing, September 30, 1981
(emphasis added)

Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, in an interview with Xinhua today,
elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the
motherland for the realization of China's peaceful reunification.
The full text of his statement follows:
Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of
the People's Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th
anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to ex·
tend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of
all nationalities throughout the country, including the compa·
triots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese nationals
residing in foreign countries.
On New Year's Day 1979, the Standing Committe of the
National People's Congress issued a message to the compatriots
in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to
reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm
support and active response from the people of all nationalities
throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macao, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would take
this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the
return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:
( 1) In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of
the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be
held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China ott a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will
cooperate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of
national reunification. The two sides may first send people to
meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.
(2) It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities of
both sides of the Straits to communicate with each other,
reunite with their relatives, develop trade and increase mutual
understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping
services, and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic,
cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon.
(3) After the country is reumfied, Taiwan ca11 enjoy a /u:~tlt
degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can
retain its armed forces. The central government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
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8: SEPTEMBER 30, 1981. YE JIANGYING'S
EXPLANATION ON PRC'S NINE-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL (Continued)

(4) Taiwan's current sodo-economic system will remain
unchanged, so will its way of ltfe and itJ· economic and cultural
relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment
on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over
pn·vale property, houses, land and enterprises, or on for.-ign
investments.
(5) People in authority and representative personages of
various circles in Taiwan may lake up posts of leadership in
national political bodies and participate in running the state.
(6) When Taiwan's local finance is in difficulty, tht: central
government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.
(7) For people of all nationalities and public figures of
various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the
mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will he
made for them, that there will be no discrimination against
them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.
(8) Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to
invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the
mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guar·
anteed.
(9) The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility
of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities,
public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan
to make proposals and suggestions regardir.g affairs of state
through various channels and in various ways.
Taiwan's return to the embrace of the motherland and the
accomplishme.nt of the great cause of national reunification is a
great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation. China's reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest
of the Chinese people of all nationalities - not only those on
the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the
interest of peace in the Far East and the world.
We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to
their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization
of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We
hope that our compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and Chinese nations residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a
bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the
motherland.
We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their
one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas" and
that they will put national interests above everything else,
forget previous ill-will and join hands with us in accomplishing
the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of
making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our
ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and write a new and
glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation.
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Taiwan Relations Act, 1979
SHORT TITLE

Section I, This Act may be cited as the "Taiwan Relations Act".
SEC. 2. (a) The President having terminated governmental relations be·
tween the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by
the United States as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979, the Con·
gress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary(!) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific;
and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the
continuation of commercial, cultural, a~d other relations between the people of
the United States and the people on Taiwan.
(b) It is the policy of the United States( I) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial,
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the
people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all otl1cr peo·
pies of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare tl1at peace and stability in the area arc in the political, se·
curity, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters ofintcrna·
tiona) concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic
relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the
future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(S) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardi1.e the security, or the social
or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the
United States in human rights especiaUy with respect to the huma·n rights of all
the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and en·
hancement of the human rights of aU the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed
as objectives of the United States.
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY
WITH REGARD TOT AIWAN

SEC. 3. (a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act,
the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such :jUantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability.
(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity
of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the
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needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States mili·
tary authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the
Congress.
(c) TI1c President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any
threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan
and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The
President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional
processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.
APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS

SEC. 4. (a) TI1e absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not
affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan,
and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manncr that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to
January I, 1979.
(b) TI1e application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall
not be limited to, the following:
(I) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include
and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.
(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States
to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similiar entities, the President
or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and
carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions,
and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the
performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial
entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States.
(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect
to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any
way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United
States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.
(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions
in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China
shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in
properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on
or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan.
(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends
upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the
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law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law fut
that purpose.
(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending
diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplo·
matic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack
of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall
be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any
United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding
of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or
to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.
(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be
treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that
Act.
(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United
States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated,
infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of
diplomatic relations or recognition.
(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the
United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.
(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States,
the Congress approve the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United
States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States
as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979, and in force between them
on December 31, 1978, unless and until tenninated in accordance with law.
(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or explusion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international
fmancial institution or any other international organization.
OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

SEC. 5. (a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the S 1,000 per capita income restriction in clause (2) of the
second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or
guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on
Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.

CHINA R.EUNIFICATION ISSUE

APPENDIX
(Continued)

193

9: MARCH 16, 1979. U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

SEC. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with
respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through(!) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President
may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute").
(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to
enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed,
and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by
or through the Institute.
(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the
District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which
the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes
with the perfom1ance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act, such
law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.
SERVICES BY THE INSTITUTE TO UNITED STATES
CITIZENS ON TAIWAN

SEC. 7. (a) The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan( I) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is
required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;
(2) to act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased
United States citizens; and
(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States
for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may
specify.
(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this
section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if
performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States
to perform such acts.
TAX EXEMPT STATUS Of' THE INSTITUTE

SEC. 8 (a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all
taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent
that section II (a) (3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed
under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal
Insurance Contributions Act) or by any State or local taxing authority of the
United States.
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(b) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute
shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(IXA), 179(c),
2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522, and 2522b).
·
fURNISHING PROPERTY AND SERVICES TO AND
OBTAINING SERVICES FROM TilE INSTITUTE

SEC. 9. (a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to
sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform
administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of,
the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reim·
bursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current
applicable appropriation of the agency concerned.
(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire
and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the
President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance
of the purposes of this Act, the procurements of services by such agencies from
the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States
normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.
(c) Any agency of tlte United States Government making funds available
to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the
Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the
books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations
of tlte Institute.
TAIWAN INSTRUMENTALITY

SEC. I 0. (a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States
Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United
States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any per·
formance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action
shall, in the manner and to tlte extent directed by the President, be rendered or
provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Tai·
wan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws
applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on
behalf of Taiwan in accordance with the Act.
(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established
by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were
previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan
recognized as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979.
(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities
with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is
authori1.ed to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate con·
ditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of
their functions.
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SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FOR
EMPLOYMENT WITH THE INSTITUTE

SEC. II. (a) (I) Under such terms and conditions as the President may
direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who
accepts employment with the Institute.
(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (I)
of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon
termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such
agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant
rights, privileges, and benefits which the officer or employee would have had or
acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and
other conditions as the President may prescribe.
(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement
rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed
by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate
in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating
prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for
job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement
under any system established by the Jaws of the United States; except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs
only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, ~s
required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with
the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved
service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be
considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of
any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency
of the United States Government.
(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence
without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this
section for the period of such services.
(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits,
and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement
and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established
by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the
alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the
extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in
payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute,
are currently deposited in the system's fund or depository.

196
APPENDIX
(Continued)

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

9: MARCH 16, 1979. U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT
(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States
and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18,
United States Code.
(dXI) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as
earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be in·
eluded in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that
they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the
Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt
from taxation under section 912 of such Code.
(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (aX3) of this section,
service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purposes of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security
Act.
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

SEC. 12. (a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text
of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement
the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President,
be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so trans·
mitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only
upon due notice from the President.
(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term "agreement" includes( I) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing
authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and
(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the
United States Government.
(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the
Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and ap·
proval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were
malic by or through the agency of the Uniteli States Government on behalf of
which the Institute is acting.
(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act,
the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representa·
lives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, every six months, a
report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States
and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations.
RULES AND REGULATIONS

SEC. 13. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regula·
lions as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of tltis Act. During
the three-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, such rules and
regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Repre·
sentatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action
shall not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by
this Act.
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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

SEC. 14. (a) The Committee on Foreign Mfairs of the House of Repre·
sentatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other ap·
propriate committees of the Congress shall monitor(!) the implementation of the provisions of this Act;
(2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;
(3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between
the United States and Taiwan; and
(4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning
security and cooperation in East Asia.
(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective
Houses on the results of their monitoring.
DEFINITIONS

SEC. 15. For purposes of this Act(1) the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regula·
tion, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any

political subdivision thereof; and
(2) the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of
Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other
entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those
islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States
as the Republic of China prior to January I, 1979, and any successor governing
authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities there·
of).
AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 16. In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the pro·
visions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of
State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out
such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.
SEVERABILITY Ol' PROVISIONS

SEC. 17. If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby.
EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 18. This Act shall be effective as of January I, 1979.

Conguuio1111l Record-House 125, No. 38 (March 16, 1979): H1668-70.
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Otina-US Joint Communique
August 17, 1982

(I) In the Joint Communique on the Es.tablishment of Diplomatic Relations on January ',
1979, issued by the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the
People's Republic of China, the United States of
America recoganized the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the sole legal
Government of China, and it acknowledged the
Chinese position that there is but one China and
Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the
two sides agreed that the people of the United
States would continue to maintain cuitural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the
people of Taiwan. On this basis. relations between
the United States and China were normalized.
(2) Tite question of United S:ates arms sales to
Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotia·
tions between the two countries en establishing
diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing
positions, and the Chinese side staled that it would
raise the iSSJ.!e again following nQrmalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper
the development of United States-China relations,
they have held further discussions on it, during
and since the meetings between President Ronald
Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between
Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and
Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in
October 1981.
(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and
territorial integrity and non-interference in each
other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental
principles guiding United States-China relations.
These principles were confumed in the Shanghai
Communique of February ::!S, 1972 and reaffirm·
ed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment
of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on
January I. 1979. Both sides emphatically state
that the>e principles .:-ontinue to govc:rn all aspects
of their relations.
(4) The Chinese Government reiterates 'that
the question of Taiwan i.s China's internal affair.
The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by
China on January I, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for p~aceful reunificatior,
of the motherland. TI1e Nme-Point Proposal put
forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to
the Taiwan question.
tS) l11e United States Government att3ches
great importan..:e to its relations with China, and

reiterates that it has no intention of inflinging 011
Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, 01
interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursu; 11 ~
a policy of "rwo Chinas" or "one China. 1111 ~
·Taiwan." Tite United States Government und~r
stands and appreciates the Chinese pulky uf
striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiw.;n
question as indicated in China's Mossage t'l (' 0111 •
patriots in Taiwan issued on January I, 1979 and
the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China un
September 30, 1981. The new situation which h.l\
emerged with regard to the Taiwan question ah·•
provides favourable conditions for the settlement
of United States-China differences over Unite.!
States arms sales to Taiwan.
(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of
both sides, the United States qovernment slates
that it does not seek to carry out a long·tcuu
policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sab
to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitath·e ur
in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied
in recent years since the establishment of dipl()o
matic relations between the United States and
China, and Jhat it intends gradually to reduce at~
sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period oi
time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United
States acknowledges. China's consistent positinn
reg~rding the thorough settlement of this issue.
(7) In order to bring about, over a period of
time, a final settlement of the question of Unit.-d
States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an i~sue
rooted in history. the two Goverruneilts will make
every effort to adopt measures and create condr·
lions conducive to the thorough settlement of tlus
issue.
(8) The development of United States.('hinJ
relations is not only in the interests of the t11u
peoples but also conducive to peace and stabihay
in the world.The two sides are determined, on ll>e
principle of equality and mutual benefit, to stren~·
then their ties in the economic, cultural, edU(J·
tiona!, scientific, technologica( and other fieiJ,
and make strong, joint efforts for the continued
development of relations between the Govetn·.
ments and peoples of the United States and Chin•
(9) In order to bring about the he tlthy dcvdupment of United States-China relations. maintJm
world peace and oppose aggression and expan>r••n.
the two Governments reaffirm the prim:ll':~,
a~reed on by the two sides in the Shanghai ('om·
mun!GUe and the Joint Communique on thr
Establisl:ment of Diplomatic Relation>. l1;e t"''
sirle> wili maintain contact and hold appropriate
consultations on bilateral and internationJl i..·u<•
of common interest.
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REMARKS ON HONG KONG ISSUE

From the moment of its founding, the Republic of China
has dedicated itself to abolishing unequal treaties affecting
China, and to establishing a China that is of the people, by the
people, and for the people.
Hongkong and Kowloon are Chinese territory, and the
right of sovereignty over them should naturally be returned
to the Republic of China. But the British government has had
the effrontery to arrange an "agreement" on the so-called
Hongkong problem with the Chinese Communists, that totally ignores the will and wishes of the 5.5 million free residents
of Hongkong and Kowloon, and would force them into a
slave system of Communist totalitarianism. This is not only a
disgraceful episode in human history, but also a grievous offence to all seekers of peace and devotees of democracy in the
world. Therefore, the government and the people of the
Republic of China can not recognize such an "agreement."
To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hongkong, the
Chinese Communists-fearful of resistance from the Chinese
in Hongkong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and democracy-went out of their way to embellish an illusion of
"one country, two systems." They "promised" that the present Hon&kong system would remain unchanged for SO years,
in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hongkong and Kowloon.
It is no secret that throughout the history of the Communists, there has never been any record established of their
good faith nor any "agreement" that was not later trashed.
No matter what the illusion the Chinese Communists attempt
to create today, the basic policy identified in their "four
principles" is in sharp illustration of the fact that Communism's totalitarian nature will never change.
Freedom cannot be faked, nor can it be divided, nor confined in fences. What the whole Chinese people seek is an
eternal, perfected, and fully realized state of well-being nourished on freedom and democracy. We believe that the people
of Hongkong and Kowloon-patrons of peace and ofdemoc-
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racy-will never tolerate the saddle of Communist artifice
and deceit.
Hongkong and Kowloon are, tragically, being ushered
toward an era of darkness. The government and people of the
Republic of China extend their deepest concern to the residents of these Chinese areas ..
On behalf of the government and people of the Republic
of China, with emotions of deep grief, I solemnly declare the
following points of assistance for our beloved compatriots in
Hongkong and Kowloon:
1. We will continue to expose Chinese Communist intrigues directed toward Hongkong and Kowloon and their sly
and execrable intent with regard to the inhabitants of Hongkong and Kowloon. We will make clear for our compatriots in
Hongkong and Kowloon and people round the world that any
pledge made by the Chinese Communists is but a mirage
radiating from consistent practices of trickery and hypocrisy.
2. We will continue to rouse public opinion in the world
to help assure the freedom and prosperity of Hongkong, and
to support our compatriots in fully expressing their aspirations
for freedom and democracy and their rejection of Communist
rule. We will also call upon the nations and peoples of the free
world to take on squarely the issue of the future of Hongkong
and Kowloon, calling on them to uphold international justice
and to render active assistance to the inhabitants of Hongkong
and Kowloon.
3. We urge the Chinese residents of Hongkong and
Kowloon to more vigorously pursue their struggle against
Communism, for freedom. We will assist and support this
struggle using various methods and via different channels.
4. We hope the Chinese residents of Hongkong and
Kowloon will work together in solidarity and extend themselves to participate in as many local "elections" as possible
so that their strength will be burnished to deal with Chinese
Communist ambitions for control, and thereby to help protect
ano secure freedom and democracy.
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5. The ROC Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission has
set up a special office to offer information and assistance to
those Chinese in Hongkong and Kowloon who wish to come
to Taiwan.
6. Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon may
apply via presently established procedures for multiple entry
permits to travel to Taiwan.
7. For the dedicated anti-Communist Chinese residents
of Hongkong and Kowloon, we will make ready arrangements
so they may return here at any time.
8. For patriotic Chinese of Hongkong and Kowloon who
wish to come and settle down here, we will make things as
easy as possible, and we will assist them to obtain loans to
purchase homes.
9. To those Chinese of Hongkong and Kowloon who wish
to come here to arrange to invest and to do business, we will
give prior consideration to their cases and render assistance
and guidance.
IO. If the Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon
wish to deposit their savings in Taiwan, our Offshore Banking
Unit will provide appropriate services so remittances can be
freely made and encounter no restriction.
II. To those Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese who wish to
arrange education for their children in Taiwan, we will give
prior consideration and provide assistance, guidance, and appropriate arrangements for them.
Finally, I would like to say to our compatriots in Hongkong and Kowloon that though night falls, dawn will surely
follow. If you sharpen your awareness to avoid being entrapped by Chinese Communist deceptions, join in solidarity,
and act in consonance with us here in Taiwan, the Hongkong
and Kowloon area will one day definitely be reunited with the
Republic of China.
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1978 AND 1982. PRC CONSTITUTIONS REGARDING

1978 Constitution
Preamble
" ... Taiwan is the sacred territory of China. We must definitely liberate Taiwan and complete the great work of unifying the
fatherland ... "

1982 Constitution
Adopted on December 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People'r Congress
of the People's Republic of China At Its Fifth Session

Preamble
" ...Taiwan is a part of the sacred territory of the People's
Republic of China. The great endeavor of accomplishing unification of the fatherland is the sacred responsibility of the people
of all China, including the compatriots of Taiwan ... "
Chapter One
General Principles
Article Four
" ... Regional autonomy applies in areas where people of
national minorities live in compact communities; autonomous
organs will be established to exercise the rights of autonomy.
National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People's
Republic of China ... "

Article Thirty
"The state may, when necessary, establish special administrative districts. The system practiced in the special administrative districts will be stipulated by law in accordance with the
concrete situation."

(It is interesting to note that the PRC's 1954 and 1975
Constitutions neither mention Taiwan by name nor address the
issue of national reunification. In addition, the question of
the governance of China's "national autonomous regions":
Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Xi:tang (Tihet)
receives a considerable degree of legalistic attention in the 1982
Constitution that is largely absent in the 1954, 1975, and 1978
versions. In addition to reflecting Beijing's increased concern for
legal norms, this section also probably re fleets Beijing's sensi tivity to Taiwan's charges that the PRC's actions in Tihet since
1959 are an "object lesson" in Communist perfidy).
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